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Foreword 
This  study is one  of  a  series of  12  monographs  on  the 
situation in  the  EC  Member  States.  Through  an  analysis  of 
existing  and  historical structures governing  cooperation  and 
coordination between  the  social partners  and  the public 
bodies  responsible  for  vocational  education  and training 
(excluding  general  secondary education  and  university 
education),  it was  intended: 
a)  to carry out  an  in-depth investigation of  the  situation 
commencing  with  the  central regulatory  instruments  and 
decision-making  levels.  These  investigations were  to 
examine  the  situation at regional,  local  and  enterprise 
levels  as  well  as  in industrial sectors  in  EC  Member 
States,  and 
b)  to develop  proposals  for  the  contents  and  objectives of 
an  improved  social  dialogue  at the  various  levels. 
The  reports  comprise  two  sections:  a  general  analysis  and  a 
sectoral analysis. 
Although  the general  analysis was,  as  far  as  possible,  to be 
reinforced by  the  sectoral analysis,  the  two  were  to be 
complementary,  whereas  the conclusions  were  to be  directed 
more  towards  objective  (b). 
The  general  analysis  of  the historical  development,  institu-
tional  involvement  and  problem  areas  was  also to include  a v 
description  of  the  current situation with  regard to  the  links 
!between  the  world  of  work  (employees,  employers,  industrial 
!sectors  and  enterprises)  and  the  world of vocational  training 
:(in-company,  inter company/group  training,  school-based 
1training  - both initial and  continuing  - private,  public  and 
iindependent  vocational  training sponsors). 
f 
Furthermore,  attention was  to  focus  on  the  degree  and  nature 
bf the  involvement  of  the  social partners  in  the  development, 
~mplementation,  administration  and control of  training policy 
~rogrammes,  including  the extent  and nature  of state inter-
~ention within  the  framework  of this  involvement.  The 
~allowing aspects  were  to be  included: 
analysis  of  legal regulations  and collective  framework 
agreements  (education,  labour market  and  social legis-
lation,  nature  and  extent of  the  autonomous  powers  of  the 
social partners  in  the  field of  vocational  training as 
specified in general  collective agreements,  sectoral 
agreements  and  typical enterprise-related agreements), 
and 
+  investigation of the  problems  relating to existing 
cooperative  approaches  to vocational  training,  particu-
larly with  a  view  to the  equal  distribution of training 
provision  amongst  various  target groups  (women,  young 
people,  adults,  early school  leavers,  foreigners,  etc.) 
and  amongst  the various  regions  and  sectors,  and  finally vi 
description of  the  different methods  of  state interven-
tion  aimed at promoting  the  social dialogue  on  the  basi~ 
of selected situations and  regions  or sectors. 
In  order to illustrate and give  a  realistic description of 
the existing situation,  the nature  and extent of cooperation 
amongst  the  social partners  and  government  bodies  were  to be 
analysed  in three  sectors: 
in  a  sector dominated  by  small  and  medium  enterprises or 
craft industries,  e.g.  the construction sector; 
in  a  sector characterized by  modern  industrial technol-
ogy,  e.g~  the metal or electronics industries,  and 
in  a  sector in  which  services  and  the  employment  of 
female  labour  are  predominant,  e.g.  banks  and  insurance 
companies. 
In  these  sectors the  intention was  to analyse  and  compare 
work-place,  employment  and occupational structures 
(hierarchy)  in specific areas  in which  appropriate  data were 
available.  The  aim  was  to identify any  differences  in  the 
social relationships between  employees  and  employers,  and  to 
evaluate  the  involvement  and participation of employees  and 
their organizations  in initial and continuing vocational 
training activities,  including  any  eventual  implications  for 
career  advancement. vii 
The  sectoral analysis  was  intended to illustrate the  more 
general  analyses  and  assessments,  and  to substantiate  and 
supplement  the  findings  with concrete descriptions.  In  this 
1  connection,  the  intention was  not  to carry out  case  studies 
but rather to evaluate existing studies  and collective 
agreements  between  the  social partners  in  respect of initial 
and continuing vocational training. 
The  research work  was  usually  accompanied at national  level 
by  individual  ad  hoc  meetings  between  the  institute(s)  under 
contract and  the  three  Management  Board members  from  the 
respective country,  and at  EC  level  by  regular discussions 
1  organized by  CEDEFOP  and  the  contractual partners  from  other 
Member  States. 
The  investigation covered  a  period of  seven  months.  In  the 
·second half of  1986,  the  studies.were carried out in  Belgium, 
1nenmark,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  France,  Italy,  the 
:Netherlands,  and  the  United Kingdom  and  they were  concluded 
lin  early 1987.  The  studies  in  the other  Member  States were 
,conducted  in the  course of  1987.  A  synthesis report to be 
~repared on  the basis  of  the  twelve  country reports,  will 
~ttempt to collate systematically the  most  important 
ponclusions,  common  trends  and results  in order to promote 
the  dialogue  betw.een  those  concerned both  in  the  Member 
~tates and  at EC  level. 
the  individuals,  independent scientists and  scientific 
~nstitutes under  contract were,  of course,  free  to adapt  the 
.et outline for all twelve  investigations to the prevailing viii 
conditions  and existing institutional  framework  in their 
respective countries. 
On  behalf of  the  authors,  too,  I  should like to extend  my 
sincere  thanks  to the  members  of  the  CEDEFOP  Management  Board 
from  the  respective  Member  States  and to the  numerous  experts 
and  individuals  from  the enterprises,  training and other 
bodies,  and  to employers'  and trade  union organizations  for 
their  ~upport in this work.  We  hope  that this  investigation 
will help to promote better and constructive understanding, 
despite  the  existence of very different interests,  and  thus 
lead to satisfactory solutions to the prevailing problems 
facing  the  development  of initial and continuing vocational 
training.  Thanks  are  also extended to the  team of  authors 
for  the  fruitful  and  successful cooperation  on  what  was 
certainly not  an  easy  subject for  investigation. 
B.  Sellin 
Project Coordinator 1 
1.  Introduction: Industrial  Training at the Intersection of Public  Policy and 
Industrial Relations.  Problems and Method of Investigation 
For firms  competing  in  a  free  labour  market,  an  adequate  supply  of skilled  labor  is  a 
"~llective good":  each  firm  benefits  from  it  regardless  of whether  or  not  is  has  contri-
buted  to  its  production.  As  a  result,  to  the  extent  that  firms  behave  as  rational  actors 
maximizing  their  individual  utility,  they  are  tempted  to  behave  as  "free  riders"  and  take 
advantage  of the  training efforts of their competitors.  Rather than  providing training them-
selves,  rationally acting firms  tend  to prefer attracting skilled labour trained by other firms 
through  higher  wage  offers.  However,  it  is  evident  that  whereas  individually  it  may  be 
rational  not  to  contribute  to  the  provision  of a  needed  collective  good,  from  a  collective 
perspective  the  same  behaviour  is  irrational.  Because  if no  one  contributes,  each  of the 
individual  utility  maximizers  will  suffer  in  the  end  since  the  collective  good  will  not 
: materialize.  Cases  like  this  are  instances  of "market  failure",  and  areas  in  which  markets 
f  are  likely  to  fail  - such  as  training  - tend  to  become  subjects  of public  concern  and 
I public intervention. 
! In  addition  to  public  policy,  training  is  also  closely  connected  to,  and  in  fact  deeply 
1 entangled  with,  the  relationship  between  the  "two  sides  of industry"  - i.e.,  industrial 
. relations  (Sorge  and  Streeck,  forthcoming).  It  is  one  of the  most  glaring  deficits  of tradi-
1 tional  industrial  relations  research  and  theory  that  the  direction  and  character  of  this 
relationship is  still  largely unexplored.  One point which is  known  is  that industrial relations 
, may affect the  amount  of training  that  firms  are  willing  to provide.  For example,  if trade 
i  unions,  like  the  West  German  ones,  are prepared to  accept  apprentices  being paid  signifi-
1 cantly  lower  wages  than  skilled  workers,  the  number of apprentices  is  likely  to be  higher 
I  than  where  the  wage  differential  is  only  small.  The  form  of trade  union  organization  has 
1 also been found  to be  of .importance, with craft unions  in  some countries typically trying to 
i  bring  the  content  and  amount  of training  under  their  control,  as  a  way  of limiting  the 
I 
potential  supply  of skilled  labour.  Less  is  known,  however,  about  the  inverse  effect  of 
,training  on  industrial  relations.  Here,  it has for  example  been  suggested  that  narrow skills 
~and rigid  boundaries  between  occupational  careers  stand  in  the  way  of industrial  unionism 
1and  promote  sectionalism  and  fragmentation  both of trade  unions  and  collective  bargaining 
I(Streeck et al.  1981). 
rrhe relationship between training and industrial  relations has  recently attracted attention  not 
pust  from  social  scientists  but  also  from  practitioners.  In  all  industrialized  countries,  the 
~ew technologies  have  given  rise  to extensive  needs  for  skilling  and  reskilling.  Indications 
pre that such needs are easier to fill  where trade unions do not object to intensified training 
~ut rather  support it.  To the  extent that trade  union  support can  indeed  increase the  likeli-
~ood of training  efforts  being  successful,  union  attitudes  towards  training  may  be  a  key 2 
factor  in  industrial  restructuring  and  an  important  source  of competitive  advantage  and 
disadvantage  among  industrialized  countries  (Streeck  1986).  It is  for  this  reason  that policy 
makers  in  a  number  of countries  are  today  thinking  about  ways  of winning  trade  union 
support for training by coopting unions  into the  management of the  training system. 
This  study is  on the  role  of the  organized  "social  partners"  in the  governance of the  West 
German  industrial  training  system.  That trade  unions  and  employers'  associations  do  have 
such a role in West Germany,  and  quite  a strong one  in  fact,  does  not  imply that the  state 
has  none,  or that  industrial  training  is  not  considered  a  public  responsibility.  States  may 
discharge  their  responsibilities  for  the  production  of collective  goods  in  a variety  of ways 
of which  direct provision  or unilateral  regulation  is just one.  Another  is  the  devolution  of 
public  responsibilities  to  other  agents,  such  as  organized  interest groups,  in the  course  of 
which these  are drawn into the public  sphere and  into a close  cooperative  relationship with 
the  state.  This  mode  of dealing  with  the  endemic  problems  of govemability  that  beset 
modem  democratic  societies  has  attracted  increasing  attention  in  the  1970s  when  it  was 
studied  by  political  scientists  under  the  concept  of  "neo-corporatism"  (Lehmbruch  and 
Schmitter 1982;  Schmitter and  Lehmbruch 1979). 
In the  scientific  literature,  the  concept  of neo-corporatism has  been  used  in  two different 
ways  - which  has contributed to  creating a degree  of confusion.  On  the  one  hand,  as  we 
have  pointed out, neo-corporatism denotes a style of policymaking that  is  characterized by 
delegation  of public  regulatory  authority  to  "quasi -public" private  agencies,  in  particular 
interest  associations.  In  part,  this  is  the  subject  of the  British  literature  on  "quasi -non-
governmental  agencies",  or quangoes,  while  in  the  United  States  the  same  phenomenon  is 
often  treated  under  the  label  of "private  government".  Secondly,  in  the  area  of industrial 
relations,  neo-corporatism  has  come  to  be  identified  with  tripartite  management  of natio-
nal economic policy by  strong,  monopolistic,  centralized organizations of capital  and  labour 
"concerted"  by,  preferabl~, indirect and  "facilitating"  state  intervention~ In the  case  of the 
West German  industrial training  system,  both variants  of the  concept  apply  equally  well  in 
that the  system  combines  involvement of the  social  partners with extensive  recourse  by  the 
state to devolution  of authoritative  decision -making. This  reflects  the  strategic  position  of 
training at the  intersection of industrial  relations anq public policy that  has been  commented 
upon above. 
The West German  state  has by  now  a reasonably  well-established tradition  of "consensus 
politics"  based,  among other things,  on  centrist coalition governments,  a strong role  of the 
Linder  at  the  Federal  level,  and  an  elaborate  body  of constitutional  law  enforced  by  a 
powerful  judiciary  on  the  executive  and  the  legislature.  While  in  part  the  often -observed 
West  German  preference  for  unanimous  decision-making  and  cooptation  of "all  relevant 
social  groups"  reflects  the  experience  of the  divisive  conflicts  that  destroyed  the  Weimar 
Republic,  its  roots  go  much  further  back  in  history.  This  holds  in  particular  for  the  prac-3 
tice  of integrating  special  interests  by  giving  them  an  institutionalized  role  in  policy -
making and thereby putting them to public use.  An important concept in  this respect is  that 
of "soziale  Autonomie"  (social  autonomy)  which  implies  an  obligation  for  the  state  to  let 
social  groups  manage  their  own  affairs  ("Selbstverwaltung"  - self-government)  as  long 
as  they  refrain  from  acting  against  vital  general  interests.  This  tradition  is  particularly 
strong  in  the  field  of industrial  training  where  it  coincides  with  a  phenomenon  which  is 
remarkable  from  a comparative perspective but  often  taken  for  granted  within  the  German 
context:  namely,  that trade  unions  use  their power and  influence  not  to  restrict training  in 
.  order to  keep  up  the  price  of skilled  labour  - but  rather to  press  for  continuous  quanti-
tative  and  qualitative  expansion  of the  training  system.  The  fact  that  West  German  trade 
unions  have  an  institutionalized  role  in  the  management  of industrial  training  is  certainly 
· not  the  only  cause,  and  may  as  well  be  a  consequence,  of their  positive  attitude  towards 
I  training.  Nevertheless,  status  and  attitude  do  interact,  and  by  clarifying  the  role  of trade 
1  unions  in  the  German  industrial  training  system  this  study  may  point  out  some  of the 
I mechanisms  of consensus  building  that  seem  to  have  such  beneficial  effects  on  the  skill 
: level of the country's labour force. 
1 It  has  often  been  observed  that  the  West  German  industrial  training  system  represents  an 
1 attempt to combine private initiative ("market") and public provision ("state").  The result is 
1 the  so-called  "dual  system"  of training  in  vocational  schools  on  the  one  hand  and  at the 
!  workplace  on  the  other.  (A  brief description  of the  "dual  system"  is  given  in  the  Appen-
ldix,  below.)  While  on  the  whole  the  system  is  widely  accepted  in  West  German  society, 
!there  are  nevertheless  pressures  for  change,  and  actually  the  dual  system  has  for  decades 
1 been  undergoing  a  continuous  process  of  gradual  adjustment  to  new  conditions  and 
!requirements.  It  has  also  at  times  been  politically  controversial,  the  main  point  of conten-
jtion  being  precisely  the  proper  place  and  function  of private  intitiative.  While  the  propo-
~ents of the  system  argue that  the  market  remains  the  most efficient  mechanism  of alloca-
~on - both of young  pe~ple to occupational  careers,  and of resources to training activities 
:- its  critics,  among  them  many  trade  unionists,  point  to  examples  of over- or  under-
Faining for  specific  occupations.  Moreover,  while  the  advocates  of the  dual  system  main-
tain  that  training  requires  the  experience  of "real-life" pressures  at  the  workplace,  and 
~t skills  properly  defined  include  "extra -functional"  qualifications  like  discipline  and 
~ligence that  cannot be learned outside  the  work  process  itself,  their opponents  emphasize 
~e danger  of apprentices  being  used  by  firms  as  cheap  labour  rather  than  being  trained. 
they also  point  to  a presumably  growing  need,  due  to  technical  change  and  the  resulting 
'ressures for  increased  flexibility  of human  resources,  for  more  general  training  and  the 
trovision of more  basic  theoretical  knowledge.  This,  it  is  maintained,  can  best  be  offered 
-y schools in  the  public sector. 
ctonflict  and  consensus  are  not  necessarily  contradictions.  In  fact,  a particularly  confusing 
*pect of German  political  culture  to  many  outside  observers  is  the  typical  coincidence  of 
I 
I 4 
heavy  conflictual  rhetoric  on  the  one  hand  and  pragmatic  mutual  accommodation  and 
cooperation  on  the  other.  Such  coincidence  certainly  exists  in  industrial  training,  and 
looking at the ideological principles and programmatic perspectives expressed by each side, 
it  is  hard  to  believe  that  at  the  same  time,  most  participants  are  willing  to  play  their 
assigned  role  inside the  existing  institutions  in  reasonably  good  faith.  In the training  area, 
for  example,  trade  unions  and  employers  are  far  apart  when  it  comes  to  the  question  of 
how training should be financed  and to what extent individual employers providing training 
should  be  subject  to  external  supervision.  This  disagreement  clearly  reflects  on  the  two 
sides'  assessment  of the  performance  of the  dual  system,  with  trade  unions  expressing 
much more criticism than  employers.  But the  public  debate  hides  the  fact  that  neither  side 
doubts  the.  principle  that  each  school  Ieaver  should  have  access  to high  quality  vocational 
training,  and that  training  profiles  should  be  continually  modernized  and  upgraded.  While 
both  sides  fmd  the  existing  system  wanting  in  important  respects,  neither finds  it wanting 
enough to be willing to let it fall  in disuse or decay. 
It is not the objective of our study to go into the details of the dual  system.  The subject of 
our  research  is  not  the  dual  system  as  such  but  its  structure  and  process  of governance. 
This distinction is important. Whereas both the  provision of training and its  management as 
a  public  responsibility  take  place  in  "mixed"  systems,  the  dual  system  of provision  needs 
to  be  kept  apart  from  the  institutions  by  which  it  is  governed.  In fact,  these  institutions 
form  not a  "dual" but essentially a  tripartite system involving the  state,  the employers and 
their associations, and the trade unions  - with  schools as well  as  firms  being regulated by 
decisions  made  by  or negotiated  between  state  agencies  and  the  social  partners.  It  is  this 
mechanism of external governance of industrial training activities by the state and the  social 
partners,  and  the  way  in  which the  latter  work together,  that  will  be  at  the  center of our 
study. 
This study will cover bo~ of the two principal areas of industrial training,  primary ("voca-
tional")  and  further  training.  Whereas  the  former  refers  to  the  initial  training  of school 
leavers,  the  latter  denotes  any  form  of additional  ("adult")  training  building  on  or modi-
fying  an already existing stock of occupational skills and experience.  The term,  "vocational 
training",  comes  closer than  any  other to  the  German  concept  of "Berufsausbildung"  and 
will therefore be used throughout for the primary training of school leavers in  Germany. 
To inventorize the role of employers' associations and trade unions in the governance of the 
West  German  industrial  training  system,  the  study  will  distinguish  four  functions,  or 
functional areas, of governance that will  be dealt with separately in tum: 
regulation:  the determination of the objectives, subjects and standards of training; 
financing:  the mobilization of the financial  resources for training; 
implementation and administration; 5 
supervision  and  control:  the  assessment  whether  objectives  are  achieved  and  standards 
adhered  to;  the  application  of sanctions  where  they  are  not;  and  the  adjustment  of 
objectives,  subjects and standards to changing needs. 
I  Furthermore,  a  distinction  will  be  made  between  four  system  levels  at  which  the  four 
1  governance functions  can be performed: 
the  national  (or  "intersectoral")  level,  with  decisions  extending  to  the  entire  national 
economy; 
the sectoral level,  with decisions  relating exclusively to specific economic sectors; 
the  reg~onal level, with decisions affecting all  firms  in  a given  subnational territory; 
:- the  enterprise  (plant,  workplace,  shop floor)  level,  with  decisions  pertaining exclusively 
to individual economic or production units. 
Crossing the two dimensions yields a "grid" of 16 cells which will  be applied separately to 
!Vocational  training  and  further  training.  For  each  cell,  the  role  of  trade  unions  and 
~mployers'  associations  will  be  briefly  described  in  an  attempt  to  present  a  close  and 
~mparable account  of the  structure  of system  governance.  Following  this,  institutional 
~ctures will  be shown  "in action"  in  three case  studies  on  sectoral training problems and 
~isions involving the  social  partners. 
the empirical  data  on  which  this  report  is  based  were  collected  primarily  from  published 
pd unpublished  Government,  trade  union  and  employers'  association  documents.  In addi-
tion,  a  series  of interviews  was  conducted  with  representatives  of a  number  of organiza-
~ons involved  in  the  governance  of the  training  system,  essentially  to  help  researchers  put 
fte  written  information  into  perspective.  Moreover,  the  existing  literature  on  the  West 
(Jerman training system was  utilized as  much as  possible in  the  short time  available. 6 
2.  The  Organization  and  Representation  of the  Social  Partners  in  West 
German Industrial Relations and Public Policy: An Overview 
West  German  industrial  relations  are  comparatively  centralized  and  well-institutionalized 
in law  and  practice.  Under the  constitution,  collective bargaining is  conceived as  an area of 
"social  autonomy",  with  a  legal  right  for  the  social  partners  to  self-regulation  without 
direct  state  interference.  Collective  agreements  are  negotiated  at  the  level  of industrial 
sectors  between  strong  industrial  unions  and  employers'  associations  on  a  wide  range  of 
subjects,  at either the  regional  or the  national  level.  Inter-sectoral coordination takes place 
inside  the  two  predominant  peak  associations  of labour  and  business,  the  Deutscher  Ge-
werkschaftsbund  (DGB,  German  Trade  Union  Federation)  and  the  Bundesvereinigung 
Deutscher  Arbeitgeberverbande  (BDA,  Federal  Association  of German  Employers  Associ-
ations).  The  organizational  stability  and  the  bargaining power of trade  unions  and  employ-
ers  associations  are  backed  by  an  elaborate  system  of  labour  law  and  legally-based 
co-determination  at  the  workplace  (Mitbestimmung).  Co-determination  also  provides  for 
workplace  institutions  of joint  regulation  which  may  both  supplement  and  preempt  indus-
trial-level  bargaining.  The  organized  social  partners  are  involved  in  a  variety  of pub-
lic  poliy areas one  of which is  vocational training. 
In 1984,  8.95  million  West  German  workers,  or  40  per  cent  of the  national  workforce, 
were members of trade  unions  (Streeck  1985).  About 86 per cent of these were represented 
by  the  17  industrial  unions  that  are  affiliated  to  the  DGB.  These  unions  organize  all 
workers  in  their  respective  industries,  regardless  of occupational  status  and  political  or 
religious  affiliation.  The  remaining  14  per  cent  of union  members  are  organized  in  two 
other,  competing  union  centres,  the  Deutsche  Angestellten-Gewerkschaft  (DAG,  German 
Staff  Union)  and  the  Deutscher  Beamtenbund  (DBB,  German  Association  of  Civil 
Servants).  While  the  former  organizes  white  collar  employees  from  all  industrial  sectors 
including  the  civil  service,  the  latter  represents  only  tenured  civil  servants  (Beamte).  In 
each of these  two  categories  the  DGB -affiliated unions  represent  more  members than  the 
competing trade  union  centre.  Union  membership and  organizational density have  markedly 
increased  since  the  mid-1970s  while  the  relative  numerical  strength  of the  three  centres 
has  remained unchanged. 
On  the  trade  union  side,  collective  bargaining  in  West  Germany  is  dominated,  if not 
monopolized,  by  the  industrial  unions  of the  DGB,  and  in  fact  by  only  a  few  of them. 
Since  tenured  civil  servants  do  not  have  the  right  to  bargain  collectively,  it  is  only  the 
affiliates  of the  DGB  and  the  DAG  that  can  negotiate  formal  industrial  agreements.  (By 
custom  and practice,  pay  and  conditions  of Beamte  follow  the  lead of the  master  agr~ment , 
for  the  civil  service  which  is  negotiated  essentially  by  the  respective  DGB  union,  the 
OTV .)  The  DAG,  however,  is  so  marginal  that  its  bargaining  activities  reduce  for  all 7 
practical purposes to  signing  the  agreements  negotiated  by  the  DGB  industrial  unions.  The 
latter  bargain  either  centrally  or,  where  an  industry  is  as  large  as  metalworking,  at  the 
regional  level.  Decentralized  negotiations,  whether  by  regions  or  for  separate  industrial 
branches,  are closely coordinated and controlled by the national  union executives.  Industrial 
agreements in  West Germany tend  to be detailed  and  specific,  covering a large  number  of 
subjects  - such as  working time,  payment systems,  employment protection,  and the  rights 
of workplace trade unions  - apart from and in  addition to wages. 
Although the  level  of trade  union  membership in West  Germany  is  not  high  by  internatio-
nal  standards,  industrial  agreements  effectively  regulate  wages  and  working  conditions  for 
most or all  workers in the  industries to which they apply.  In  part, this  is  because they may 
be  declared  generally  binding  by  the  Ministry  of Labour  upon  joint  application  of the 
,  respective  trade  unions  and  employers'  associations.  Moreover,  employers'  associations 
~  generally  have  a  much  higher  density  of membership  than  trade  unions,  reaching  70  and 
1  more per cent in  most industries.  Employers associations  are  somewhat more organization-
ally fragmented than  trade unions,  with the  BDA affiliating 47  sectoral peak associations of 
1  employers  (Bunn  1984).  Frequently,  however,  several employers'  associations join together 
: to  negotiate  a  common  agreement  with  one  trade  union.  Moreover,  the  more  important 
! employers'  associations  are  strong enough to make  their  members  comply  with  industry-
· wide  lockouts  in  response  to  selective  strikes.  This,  too,  contributes  to  keeping  sectoral 
; bargaining  units  together  and  to  safeguarding the  role  and  viability  of sectorwide  bargain-
ing. 
While  there  is  no  formal  collective  bargaining at  the  intersectoral  level  in  West Germany, 
, some  degree  of intersectoral  coordination  is  achieved  by  a  variety  of means.  Although  the 
1 DGB  has  no  formal  authority  over  the  collective  bargaining  activities  of  its  affiliates, 
i informal  mechanisms  of wage  leadership,  in  particular  by  the  metalworkers  union  (IGM), 
1 ensure that industrial  agreements do not become too disparate.  In  any  case,  it  is  only eight 
tOr  nine  of the  seventeen  DGB  unions  that  actually  negotiate  industrial  agreements;  the 
'others  are  essentially  "agreement  takers".  In  the  BDA,  an  elaborate  system  of strike  sup-
port funds  makes  it  possible for  the  peak  association to prevent individual  sectors  breaking 
1away  from  intersectoral  policy,  as  laid  down  in  the  so-called  "catalogue  of taboos" 
p:abukatalog) established by  the  BDA.  The  control  exercised by  the  national  peak associa-
~ons over  their  sectoral  affiliates  is  an  important  element  of the  West  German  industrial 
telations  system  in  that  it  prevents  competitive  bargaining  between  sectors.  At  the  same 
fime,  central control, since it is not based on formal  organizational authority, is in  principle 
fragile  and  difficult  to  maintain,  and  its  extent  seems  to  vary  with political  and  economic 
ton  junctures. 
~other critical point in the  system,  in  particular on  the  trade union side,  is  the  connection 
~tween the industrial and the  workplace level of bargaining.  Workplace industrial relations 8 
in  West  Germany  are  conducted  in  the  legal  framework  of co-determination  (Streeck 
1984b).  Workers  are  represented  by  elected  works  councils  with  legal  rights  to  be  con-
sulted  and,  on  a  specified  range  of  subjects,  to  participate  in  managerial  decisions. 
Although  works  councils  are  formally  independent  of trade  unions,  more  than  eighty  per 
cent  of elected  works  councillors  are  members  of DGB-affiliated  unions.  This,  and  the 
legal rights  of works councils to access  and resources, has in  a variety of ways contributed 
to  strengthening  the  position  of trade  unions  at  the  workplace,  especially  in  the  crisis 
periods after 1973. Nevertheless, the relationship between  works councils and trade unions, 
and between workplace co-determination and  sectoral  collective  bargaining,  is  and  always 
was precarious.  Under the  law,  works councils are barred from  negotiating on  subjects that 
are already covered by  industrial  agreements.  While  this  is  intended to  protect the  primacy 
of sectoral  collective  bargaining,  the  law  is  not  always  enforceable,  especially  where  the 
interests  represented  by  works  councils  differ  from  those  represented  by  the  industrial 
union.  On  the  other hand,  the  institutionalization of a workplace tier of joint regulation  has 
injected  an  element  of flexibility  in  an  otherwise  highly  centralized  bargaining  system 
which has  permitted for  a considerable degree of adjustment of general  rules to the  specific 
conditions  of individual  branches,  firms  and  establishments.  In effect,  co-determination 
has  created  a  workplace  system  of industrial  relations  - consisting  of what  amounts  to  a 
post-entry closed shop with  unitary  representation by the  works  council  as  a monopolistic 
bargaining  agent  subject  to  binding  arbitration  and  a  ban  on  strikes  - which  partly 
supplements  the  sectoral  system  and  partly  competes  with  it.  Again,  the  relationship  bet-
ween  the  two  levels  of joint regulation  seems  to  change  with  external  political  and  econo-
mic conditions as  well  as  with firm  size, industrial structure, and the  issues at hand. 
Outside  industrial  relations  proper,  both  trade  unions  and  employers'  associations  have  a 
recognized right,  sometimes formally  established and sometimes not,  to be  heard on  a wide 
range  of public  policy  problems  and  to  participate  in  political  decisions.  This  extends,  for 
example,  to  the  public  broadcasting  system  whose  various  governing  boards  normally 
include  an  employers  and  a  trade  union  representative.  Certainly  more  important  is  the 
presence of trade  unions  and  employers' associations  on  the  governing boards of the  social 
security  system,  the  health  insurance  funds,  and  the  Federal  Labour  Administration  (Bun-
desanstalt  fiir  Arbeit).  While  the  "Konzertierte Aktion"  of the  1960s  and  1970s  has  fallen 
by  the  wayside,  tripartite  consultation  and  policy  making  has  remained  a well-established 
practice in  West Germany. 
A characteristic difference between capital and  labour as  participants in  public policy is that .~ 
whereas labour is always  represented by  the  trade  unions,  capital  acts  through  a variety of 
more specialized organizations  which  are formally  separate.  On  matters that are not  subject 
to collective bargaining and are not regarded as  "social policy",  business is  represented by 
trade  associations  which,  just as  the  employers'  associations,  are  normally  organized  on  a 
sectoral basis.  Although some  sectoral associations act as  trade and  employers'  associations 9 
at the  same time,  the system of trade associations  as  a whole  is  more fragmented than  that 
of employers' associations,  and it is  less comprehensively organized at  the  level  of national 
peak  associations.  The  Bundesverband  der  Deutschen  Industrie  (BDI,  Federal  Association 
of German  Industry)  with  38  affiliates  speaks  for  manufacturing  industry  only.  The  arti-
sanal  sector,  which  comprises  most  of West  Germany's  many  small  and  medium-sized 
firms,  has its  own trade  association,  the  Zentralverband  des  Deutschen  Handwerks  (ZDH, 
Central Association of German Artisans)  - whereas the peak employers' association of the 
artisanal  industries,  the  Bundesvereinigung der Fachverbande des  Handwerks  (BFH,  Fede-
\  raJ  Association  of Artisanal  Associations)  is  affiliated,  with  a  somewhat  special  status,  to 
the  BDA.  Moreover,  the  banking,  insurance,  retail,  wholesale  and  other  industries  -
which  as  ~mployers are  represented  by  the  BDA  - have  their own national  peak  associa-
tions,  and  so  has  the  agricultural  sector.  All  of the  13  national  peak  associations  that 
function  as  trade associations form  the GemeinschaftsausschuB der Deutschen Gewerblichen 
Wirtschaft which is, however, a weak body  of little  consequence. 
The third column of the organization of business interests in  West Germany are the  Cham-
bers  (Groser  et  al.  1986),  in  particular  those  of Commerce  and  Industry  (IHK)  and  of 
Artisans (HWK).  There are 69 of the  former and  42  of the  latter.  Chambers have  compul-
: sory membership, and each firm  has by law to  belong either to  an  IHK or an  HWK  - or, 
. in  exceptional  cases,  to both.  Chambers are territorially-based  organizations that organize 
i 
i  all  firms  in  their  region  regardless  of industrial  sector.  They are  important  bodies  of both 
l,  local interest representation and parastate administration and  have  extensive legal  rights  and 
i obligations,  for  example  with  respect  to  local  zoning  decisions  and  a  number  of licensing 
1 procedures.  Some  of their  most  significant  tasks  relate  to  training,  and  it  is  above  all  in 
1 this  area that they are  legally  obliged to permit trade  unions  and elected workers represen-
\  tatives  to  participate  in  their  internal  decision -making.  Both  Chamber  systems  have 
I  formed  their  own  national  peak  association,  the  Deutscher  Industrie- und  Handelstag 
;  (DIHT,  German Diet of Industry and Commerce) and the  Deutscher Handwerkskammertag 
!(DHKT,  German  Diet of Chambers  of Artisans).  The  latter is  closely  integrated  organiza-
ltionally  and  politically  with  both  the  ZDH and  the  BFH  whereas  the  former  is  careful  to 
~eep its distance especially to the  BDl. 
~ong  the  policy  areas  outside  industrial  relations  proper  in  which  trade  unions  and  the 
~arious associations  of business play a part,  industrial  training is  arguably one  of the  most 
~portant. Since the  labour side  is  represented in  vocational  training by the same organiza-
~ons that  represent  it  in  industrial  relations,  it  is  faced  with  the  same  problems  of inter-
~oral coordination  and  of sectoral  control  over  the  workplace  that  have  been  described 
lvith  respect to collective  bargaining.  On  the  business  side,  there  appears to  be  in  addition 
t
trong  need  for  effective  coordination  between  the  three  columns  of organization  and 
ir different  peak  associations  (Hilbert  et al.  1986).  This  has  led  to  the  creation  in  the 
.  ly  1970s  of a  special  body,  the  Kuratorium der deutschen  Wirtschaft  fiir  Berufsbildung 10 
(KWB,  Joint Committee of German Business for  Vocational  Training),  which  is  formed  by 
the  BOA,  the  BDI,  the  DIHT,  the  DHKT  and  the  three  peak  employers'  associations  of 
agriculture,  the  retail  sector,  and  the  free  professions.  The  Kuratorium  maintains  a  per-
manent  office  in  Bonn  and  coordinates  the  interests  of business  on  training  policy.  Its 
existence  is  an  indication  of the  high  importance  that  is  attached  to  training  by  German 
employers and their associations. 
Trade  unions  and  employers'  associations  have  by  and  large  resisted  the  temptation  to 
confound  industrial  relations  and  vocational  training  issues  and  to  try to  exchange  conces-
sions  in  one  area  for  concessions  in  the  other.  Just  as  the  political  controversy  between 
employers and trade unions in the  1970s on the future  structure of the  training system does 
not  seem  to  have  had  repercussions  on  collective  bargaining,  conflicts  over  wages  and 
conditions have  had no  discemable  impact  on  the  interaction  between  the  social  partners in 
the  governance of the  vocational  training system.  An important example is  the  fact  that the 
metalworkers  union  (IG  Metal!)  and  the  employers'  association  for  the  metalworking 
industry  (Gesamtmetall)  were  able  to  reach  agreement  on  a  fundamental  reform  of the 
industry's  training  scheme  shortly  before  the  strike  of 1984  for  the  35  hours  week  -
which  was  arguably  the  most  crippling  and  bitter  labour  conflict  since  the  war.  Negotia-
tions  on  a new training scheme  had  been  under way  for  more than  a decade,  and  although 
industrial  relations  became  increasingly  strained  during  this  period  - at  least  by  German 
standards  - the  two  sides  skillfully  protected  the  training  reform  project  from  any  nega-
tive  side-effects.  The  main  reason,  we  believe,  why  trade  unions  as  well  as  employers 
took  such  great  care  to  keep  the  two  policy  areas  separate  is  that  both  realise  the  impor-
tance  of training  as  a precondition  of competitive  economic  performance  for  a  high  wage 
economy  exposed  to  the  world  market.  As  training  creates  a  vital  infrastructure  for 
successful  production,  it  appears  in  the  best  interest  of both  capital  and  labour  to  insulate 
its  joint  regulation  against  the  repercussions  of conflicts  over  distribution.  It  seems  that 
comprehensively  organized,  politically  centralized and institutionally well-established trade 
unions  and  employers'  associations  are  well  capable  of pursuing  and  safeguarding  this 
interest. 
Industrial  tratntng  in  West  Germany,  like  all  major  policy  areas  in  modem  soctetles,  is 
organized into and governed by  an  exceedingly complex  institutional  system,  with a myriad 
of different actors  and  subsystems.  Just to give  a descriptive  account of this  system and its 
ramifications  would  require  a  voluminous  book  (Munch  1982).  Moreover,  as  political 
scientists  and  policy  analysts  know  only  too  well,  the  problems  posed  for  descriptive 
analysis  by  excessive  institutional  complexity  are  unlikely  to  be  resolved  by  concentrating 
on  selected  subsystems.  Like  a drop  of water  under  the  microscope,  each  subsystem  of a 
complex institutional  setting is  likely to reveal  as  much  complexity  as  the  macro  system  of 
which it is  a part.  In fact,  the longer one studies even the  smallest and most inconspicuous . 
institutional  structure or process in  a modem society,  the  more  mysteries  and  complexities 
one discovers and the  "larger", as  a consequence, one's object seems to become. 11 
'  One explanation for the  phenomenon  of  excessive  complexity  is  undoubtedly  that 
political-institutional arrangements,  such  as  a national  training  system,  have  grown  incre-
mentally  and  have  so  often  been  modified  that  their  initial,  simpler  structure  has  become 
hidden.  But this  is  not the main cause,  and in  fact  one  could argue that,  for  many reasons, 
the  impact  of incremental  change  explains  less  in  West  Germany  than  in  other  countries 
1  such  as  the  United  Kingdom.  More  important  is  the  fact  that  institutional  complexity 
reflects  the  need  for  public  policy  in  modern  societies  to  respond  more  closely  to  increa-
1  singly  diversified  demands,  interests  and  problems  while,  simultaneously,  taking  into 
l  account  a  rising  number  of sideeffects  and  externalities.  The  growing  sophistication  and 
: specialization  of needs  and  demands,  and  the  accompanying  disappearance  of  standard 
\ problems !Pat  could  be  handled  with  standard solutions,  generates  an  increasing  specializa-
1  tion  and  division  of  labour  inside  political-institutional  systems  and  gives  rise  to  the 
\ growth of more and more separate  bodies  of specialized  "scientific"  knowledge  required to 
: respond  to  diversified  problems  and  external  pressures.  As  a  result,  even  insiders  fmd  it 
:ever more difficult to gain a comprehensive picture of any important policy system. 
Looking  at  a  political-institutional  system  as  a  whole,  as  we  do  in  this  study,  requires 
'1  inevitably  a  degree  of simplification.  We  know  that  this  will  lay  us  open  to  the  criticism 
1  especially  by  participants  in  the  system itself  - that important distinctions,  exceptions  and 
'I new  developments  have  gone  unmentioned.  Fortunately,  our  task  is  not  to  describe  the 
West  German  industrial  training  system  as  a  whole  - which  may  already  have  become 
i  impossible  to  do  in  good  conscience  - but  only  one  aspect  of it:  the  role  of the  social 
~partners in  its  governance.  To do  this,  we  will  operate  on  the  assumption  that  the  main 
!features  of the  system  are  familiar  to  the  reader.  We  are  well  aware  that,  and  we  have 
~ed to  explain  why,  this  is  a  problematic  assumption;  nevertheless,  as  we  have  also 
Ju'gued,  there is no other choice. 12 
3.  The Role of the Social Partners in Vocational Training 
The  vocational  training  system  in  the  Federal  Republic  has  a  long  tradition  which  is 
reflected,  among  other  things,  in  the  high  degree  of continuity  and  complexity  of the 
institutions by which it is governed.  Unlike other countries, vocational training is  treated in 
Germany primarily as  an educational  activity,  with the  boundaries between the  training and 
the employment system being more sharply drawn than  between the training and the  school 
system.  As  a  consequence,  vocational  training  in  the  Federal  Republic  is  comparatively 
unaffected  by the  ups  and downs  of political  or business cycles,  and its  encompassing and 
safely established organizational structure is  in strong contrast to countries whose vocational 
training  system  consists  primarily  of a  set  of individual  programmes  specializing  on  the 
specific, imminent problem of particular sectors or regions. 
On the  other hand at the  same time,  vocational training in the  Federal Republic  is,  in  spite 
of its  institutionalization  as  a  branch  of the  educational  system,  densely  intertwined  with 
industrial  practice.  This  contributes  to both  the  closeness  of training  curricula to practical 
needs,  as  well  as  the  employment  perspects  of apprentices,  whose  transition  from  the 
training  into the employment  system  is  facilitated.  The  connection of vocational  training to 
industrial  practice has become,  under the  concept of the  "dual system", the  trade mark of 
the  German  vocational  training  system. 
1  Organizing  this  connection  across  the  boundary 
between  the  economic  and  the  educational  system,  while  at  the  same  time  preserving  the 
relative  autonomy  ot  training  vis-a-vis  short-term  economic  needs  and  interests, 
requires  stable  and  highly  differentiated  institutions  of regulation,  resource  mobilization, 
implementation  and  control.  Both  state  agencies  and,  as  representatives  of the  practical 
interests  related to training,  the  social  partners  share  in  these  institutions  - which  extend 
across  several  levels  from  the  individual  firm  providing  training,  to  the  region  and  the 
industrial  sector,  up  to  the  level  of the  country  as  a  whole.  In  the  following  we  will 
describe  in  detail  the  rol~ of the  social  partners  in  the  various  areas  and  levels  of gover-
nance of the  "dual system". 
3.1.  Regulation: The Determination of Objectives, Subjects and Standards of Training 
3 .1.1.  At National Level 
The national  level  in the  German system of vocational training  is  primarily  responsible  for 
the  regulation  of vocational  training at the  workplace.  In addition,  it deals with  standardiz-: 
ing the public school  components of vocational training among the eleven Lander, and with 
1)  On the  structure of the  "dual system", see below, Appendix A. 13 
the  coordination of vocational  school  and  workplace training.  Formally, the  Bundesminister 
fiir  Bildung  und  Wissenschaft  (BMBW,  Federal  Minister  of Education  and  Science)  is 
responsible  for  these  activities.  In  practice,  they  are  carried  out  by  the  Bundesinstitut  fiir 
Berufsbildung (BIBB,  Federal  Institute  for  Vocational  Training)  which,  as  a federal  institu-
tion  under  public  law,  is  under  the  authority  of the  BMBW.  The  BIBB  employs  resear-
chers  whose  task  is  to  produce  scientific  knowledge  relevant  to  vocational  training  for  the 
political  decision-making  process.  It  also  involves  the  organized  social  partners  in  a 
variety of ways  within a framework  of established participation procedures. 
The  Federal  Government  makes  the  overwhelming  majority  of decisions  on  vocational 
training  o~ly after  union  and  employers'  representatives  in  the  committees  of the  BIBB 
have  given  their  consent.  Moreover,  it  requires  that  there  be  no  objections  on  the  part of 
the  Lander.  The  participation  of the  social  partners  at  the  federal  level  is  based  on  the 
consensus principle.  This  shapes the  activities of the  Federal  Institute to such  an  extent that 
the  role of the  state  is frequently  reduced to a notary function. 
The  work  in  the  BIBB  is  done  by  a  large  full-time  starr, as  well  as  a large  number of 
1  representatives  from  the  different  groups  involved  in  vocational  training.  The  central 
control  organ  of the  Federal  Institute  is  the  Hauptausschu8  (Central  Board).  It  gives  equal 
representation  to  the  four  main  parties  involved,  i.e.  eleven  representatives  each  for  the 
trade  unions,  the  employers,  and  the  Uinder  as  well  as  five  federal  representatives  (with 
3  eleven votes). 
The  representatives appointed  to  the  Central Board are  nominated  for  the  employers  by  the 
Kuratorium  der  Deutschen  Wirtschaft  fiir  Berufsbildung  (KWB,  Joint  Committee  of Ger-
t  man  Business  for  Vocational  Training)  and  for  employees  by  the  Deutsche  Gewerkschafts-
; bund  (DGB,  German Trade  Union  Federation).  In  the  area of vocational training policy the 
· DGB  assumes  nomination  and  coordination  functions  also  on  behalf  of the  independent 
Deutsche  Angestellten-Gewerkschaft  (DAG,  German  Staff  Union),  even  though  their 
:relations in other areas are occasionally strained. 
\  Three  types  of decisions  at  the  national  level  on  objectives,  subjects  and  standards  of 
\training  can  be  distinguished:  fundamental  issues  of vocational  training  policy  (e.g.  fund-
ling);  standardization  of training  among  different  occupations;  and  preparation  of official 
!training  regulations  and  curricula.  Differences  exist  in  respect  to  the  inclusion  of unions 
land employers' associations in  these three decision-making areas. 
~)  The  BIBB  has  a total  of 380  employees,  160 of which  are  academically  trained.  This  makes  the  BIBB 
~  largest research institute for  vocational training policy  in  the Federal Republic. 
~)  In  addition,  the  meetings  of the  Central  Board  are  attended  by  representatives  of the  Federal  Labor 
~flee and the municipal peak associations as  well  as  liaison officers of the unions and the employers. 14 
Fundamental  issues  and  the  standardization  of training  among  different  occupations  are 
taken  up  by  the  Central  Board  of the  Federal  Institute.  Unanimous  decisions  on  funda-
mental  issues are rare since the  qualitative  and  quantitative training results produced by the 
dual  system in its present state  are  subject to diverging evaluations.  These come to the  fore 
in  the  regular  statements  on  the  Federal  Government's  annual  Vocational  Training  Report 
required from  the Central Board.  In recent years there have  been  repeatedly  majority votes 
carried  by  representatives  of the  Christian-Liberal  government,  the  CDU  /FOP  governed 
Lander,  and  the  employers.  Unions  and  SPD  governed  Lander,  on  the  other  hand,  issued 
minority votes. 
The  decisions  of the  BmB  Central  Board  on  standardization  among  different  occupations 
are  more  relevant  for  the  determination  of objectives,  subjects  and  standards  of training. 
Among  others,  the  Central  Board  passed  a  recommendation  on  subjects  and  duration  of 
vocational  training;  a recommendation  on  the  suitability of training sites;  principles  regard-
ing methods  and  instruments of training supervision and  control;  and  a recommendation on 
the  conduct  of oral  examinations  (DGB  1983).  In these  areas  the  Central  Board  has  a 
consistent record of success in  achieving a consensus among all  participants.  In  the absence 
of unanimous  consent,  there  would  be  a greater danger that  in  the  process  of implementa-
tion, training regulations would be  misinterpreted or even disregarded. 
The  largest federal  task  in  the  determination of objectives,  subjects  and  standards  of voca-
tional  training  is  the  decreeing  of training  regulations.  Responsible  in  each  case  is  the 
Minister  in  charge  of the  respective  economic  sector  which  provides  the  training  for  the 
occupation  in  question.  However,  he  must  also  establish  a  mutual  understanding  with  the 
Federal Minister of Education and  Science.  Training regulations set minimum  standards for 
vocational  training  at  the  workplace.  For this  purpose  they  determine,  for  example,  skills 
and  knowledge  to  be  acquired,  set  guidelines  for  structuring  subjects  and  duration,  and 
sketch  examination  standards.  In  the  Federal  Republic  there  are  a  total  of 420  different 
vocational training regulations. 
The decreeing of training  regulations  by  the  Federal  Government  is  preceded by  a compli-
cated  and  lengthy  process of consultation  among  the  representatives of employers'  associa-
tions,  unions  and the  Lander.  The  BmB presides over this  process and  - if necessary and 
possible  - provides  support  in  the  form  of scientific  expertise.  The  consultation  process 
involving the organized social  partners in the  drafting of training regulations is  significantly 
different from the wort. of the BffiB Central Board. 
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4)  A detailed  description  of the  procedures  for  drafting  training  regulations  and  their  coordination  with 
the curricula of public vocational schools can be  found  in Appendix B. 15 
The  first  point  of difference  consists  in  the  way  employers'  associations  and  trade  unions 
participate  in  the  process.  In  the  Central  Board  unions  and  employers'  associations  are 
primarily  represented  by  their  respective  peak  organizations.  Through  the  Central  Board 
these  have  an  opportunity  at  various  points  in  the  process  to  inspect  the  development  of 
new training regulations.  The actual  work,  however,  is  done  by  experts  from  the  employ-
ers'  organizations  and  trade  unions  of the  sector  in  question.  Formally,  DGB  and  KWB 
have the  right to nominate the  experts.  In practice, however,  they  follow  the  recommenda-
tions  of the  sectoral  organizations.  This  insures  the  mobilization  of practical  expertise. 
Moreover,  it  allows  sectoral  interests  a  greater  degree  of expression  than  in  other  areas 
where  the  social  partners  participate  in  vocational  training.  This  becomes  particularly 
relevant whenever special  sectoral  interests are opposed to the  policies of the  peak  associa-
tions. 
The  second  point  of difference  arises  because  the  Federal  Government  will  decree  new 
training regulations only if all  participants  - i.e. the peak organizations and the  concerned 
sectoral  organizations  of employers  and  employees  as  well  as  the  Lander  - reach  an 
1  agreement  (consensus  principle).  In other  areas  of vocational  training  policy  such  a  pro-
nounced need for  unanimous consent among the social partners does not exist. 
In sum,  the participation of the  organized social partners in  determining objectives,  subjects 
and  standards  of training  is  based  on  the  fact  that  the  Federal  Government  proceeds 
· according to the  consensus principle.  It may not be  applied with the  same consistency in  all 
1  contexts  of vocational  training  policy.  But  whenever  general  rules  or specific  regulations 
~  for individual  vocations  and  for concrete training activities have to be established within the 
i existing  framework  of the  dual  system,  the  consensus  principle  is  used  as  a  mechanism  of 
! forcing all  sides to reach agreement. 
3 .1.2.  At  Sectoral Level 
: Sectoral employers' associations  and trade  unions  play an  important role  in  determining the 
, objectives,  subjects  and  standards  of training.  This  is  primarily a  result  of their  participa-
tion  in  the  drafting  of training  regulations  at  the  national  level  (cf.  3.1.1.).  Due  to  their 
1  strong position,  there  is  a danger  that  individual  sectors  may  become  too  independent.  So 
! far, however, there have generally not been any disparate developments among sectors. 
1 Training  regulations  in  most  cases  have  been  developed  without  the  incidence  of major 
1 conflicts  between  the  participating  representatives  of the  sectoral  employers'  associations 
I  and trade  unions.  Usually, the process is  initiated through close  contacts  between  represen-
i tatives  of the  BffiB,  vocational  training  experts  from  the  respective  trade  unions  and 
!  employers'  associations  as  well  as  experts  from  firms.  They  subsequently  form  the  group 
I  of experts that carry the process of training reform. 16 
The experts  delegated  by  the  organized  social  partners  to  the  BmB committees  frequently 
work  as  training  supervisors  in  firms.  They  focus  on  problems  arising  in  the  training 
practice  of  firms  rather  than  on  the  maximum  political  demands  from  the  delegating 
organizations.  This contributes indirectly to a less  ideological  approach to the  mediation  of 
interests.  Frequently,  as  representatives  of the  BffiB have  reported,  it  is  difficult  to  deter-
mine  on  the  basis  of substantive  contributions  exactly  who  was  arguing  for  the  employers 
or for the  unions.  In the  processes we  have described,  which to our knowledge  are typical, 
the  dominance  of the  sector  tends  to  reduce  conflicts  significantly.  However,  the  profes-
sional  orientation  of the  experts  also  results  in  the  raising  of standards  which  may  make 
their  subsequent  implementation  at  workplace  level  more  difficult.  These  dangers  are 
further increased by the  fact  that the  experts come from  firms  with a strong commitment to 
vocational  training.  Especially the  employers'  associations  try to  avoid the  setting of exces-
sively  high  standards  by  maintaining  close  contacts  with  a  large  number  of firms.  More-
over, the  BmB and the  employers'  associations encourage the  participation of experts from 
less ambitious firms  in the  process of developing training regulations. 
The  process  becomes  difficult,  lengthy,  and  conflictual  whenever  the  new  regulations  will 
have  effects  on  wage  groups  and  rates.  In  such  cases,  negotiations  between  employers' 
associations  and  trade  unions  will  not  only  revolve  around  minimum  training  standards  at 
the  workplace  but  also  include  wage  and  collective  bargaining  interests.  One  example  in 
this  context  is  the  vocational  reform  in  the  metalworking  industry  (see  below,  chapter  6). 
Complications  arose  because  it  had  to  be  decided  whether  an  integrated  training  scheme 
was to introduce into the  same  occupation different qualification standards and  consequently 
different wage levels. 
5 
In addition  to  experts  from  employers'  associations  and  unions,  the  research  staff of the 
BmB participate  in  the  development  of training  regulations.  The  original  aim  had  been  to 
use  scientific  expertise  for  projecting  future  qualification  requirements.  However,  hopes  of 
gaining  such  knowledge  scientifically  were  never  fully  realized.  Moreover,  scientific  pro-
posals  frequently  enlarged  the  agenda  for  negotiation  to  such  an  extent  that  the  ability  of 
employers'  associations  and  trade  unions  to  reach  a  consensus  suffered.  Ultimately,  the 
BmB  's  manpower  resources  are  too  limited  to  adequately  analyze  future  qualification 
requirements  for  all  occupations  subject  to  reform.  As  a  result,  agreements  between  sec-
toral  employers'  associations  and  unions  have  played  a  greater  role  in  drafting  training 
regulations than the scientific expertise of the BmB. 
5)  Similar  problems  in  the  reform  process  sometimes  arise  when  common  training  regulations  are  to  be 
established  for  related occupations  in  industry  and  in  the  artisanal  sector.  The  latter  has  a strong  interest in 
maintaining  a separate  identity  which  traditionally  has  been  expressed  in  independent  occupational  proflles. 
The  artisanal  sector  for  this  reason  is  skeptical  about  common  training  regulations.  Further  coordination 
problems may arise if such common training regulations affect other closely related artisanal occupations. 17 
J .1.3.  At Regional Level 
At  the  regional  level,  the  organized  social  partners  can  influence  the  determination  of 
objectives,  subjects  and  standards  of training  by  participating  in  the  Land  committees  for 
vocational  training  as  well  as  in  the  vocational  training  committees  of  the  Chambers. 
However,  the  regional  level  in  this  respect  is  less  important  than  the  national  or sectoral 
level.  A  Land  committee  primarily  must  try  to  influence  the  policy  of  the  respective 
Minister  of Education,  while  a  Chamber  directs  its  influence  at  the  policy  of its  peak 
association through the participation procedures provided at  the  national  level. 
Under  the  Vocational  Training  Act  all  eleven  federal  Lander  have  established  committees 
for  vocational  training  with  equal  representation  from  three  social  parties  (employees, 
employers,  and  instructors).  They  act  as  advisors  to  the  Land  government.  They  are 
among  other  things  concerned  with  the  implementation  of  vocational  school  curricula 
developed by  the  Conference of Ministers of Education and their coordination with training 
regulations  for  the  workplace.  In  addition,  the  organized  social  partners  can  use  the  Land 
committees as  a  vehicle  of interest representation with the  aid  of the  respective  Minister of 
Education in  the development of vocational  school  curricula at the  national  level.  However, 
this  only  occurs  in  exceptional  cases.  The  reason  why  employers'  associations  and  trade 
unions  do  not  take  advantage  of this  channel  may  be  that  at  this  stage  of the  process they 
can  also  intervene  via the  national  and  sectoral  levels.  As  both employers'  associations  and 
unions have stated, the  Land committees for their own purposes play a minor role. 
Chambers  are  regional  business  associations  with  compulsory  membership  for  all  firms  of 
a  region. 
6  The  responsibilities  and  powers  of Chambers  in  the  area  of vocational  training 
have  changed  significantly  during  the  past  20  years.  Before  the  Vocational  Training  Act 
was  passed  in  1969,  the  Chambers  alone  were  responsible  for  training  regulations.  At 
present,  on the  other hand,  they  can  only  influence  training  regulations  through  their peak 
associations  at  the  national  level  in  the  KWB.  Their responsibilities  now  lie  particularly in 
the  areas  of administration  and  control  (  cf.  3.3 .3.  and  3. 4.3.).  However,  since  training 
6)  In  the  Federal  Republic  there  are  a total  of eight different  Chamber  systems:  Chambers  of Commerce 
and Industry,  Chambers of Artisans,  Chambers of Agriculture,  Chambers of Lawyers,  Chambers of Consul-
tants  and  Accountants,  Chambers  of  Physicians,  Chambers  of  Dentists,  and  Chambers  of  Pharmacists. 
Occupations  not  organized in  Chambers  are  represented by  state  agencies  in  the  area .  of vocational  training. 
The  most important Chamber systems  are those of Industry  and  Trade  and of Artisans  (cf.  Chapter 2).  The 
following  remarks,  as  far  as  formal  rules are concerned, apply only to  Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 
But  they  also  tend  to  apply  to  Chambers  of  Artisans.  However,  the  employees  representatives  of 
the  Chambers of Artisans occupy one -third of the  seats  in  the plenary assemblies, whereas in  the  Chambers 
of  Conunerce  and  Industry  they  do  not  have  their  own  representatives  in  that  body.  In 
1  addition,  the  decision-making  powers  and  procedures  are  slightly  different  in  the  vocational  training 
committees of the artisanal sector. 18 
regulations  as  well  as  other  guidelines  leave  some  discretionary  power,  the  Chambers  in 
this  way  can  exert  an  indirect  influence  on  objectives  and  subjects.  They  have  another 
limited  way  of affecting  the  determination  of training  standards  through  their  authority  in 
the area of examinations.  On  the  basis  of recommendations  of the  BIBB  Central  Board,  the 
Chambers  issue  examination  regulations.  Moreover,  the  general  character  of examination 
requirements  set  down  in  the  training  regulations,  insures  that,  in  the  formulation  of 
examination questions the  specific training situation in  the  region can  be  taken  into account. 
In  a  few  cases  efforts  have  been  made  at  the  regional  and  local  levels  to  coordinate 
training priorities of firms  and vocational  schools with the  aid of the  Chambers. 
In  their  own  view,  Chambers  fulfil  the  functions  of  interest  representation  as  well  as 
self-government for  their  member  firms.  In  addition,  the  state  has  transferred a  range  of 
public  responsibilities  to  the  Chambers.  For this  reason  the  German  Trade  Union  Federa-
tion  has  been  calling  for  union  participation  in  the  decision-making  bodies  of the  Cham-
bers  for  a  long  time.  The  only  area  where  this  demand  has  been  partially  realized  is 
vocational  training.  Under  the  Vocational  Training  Act,  all  Chambers  have  established 
vocational  training  committees  made  up  of  six  representatives  from  each  social  party 
(employees,  employers,  and  instructors  of vocational  schools  - the  latter  only  with  an 
advisory  function).  Vocational  training  committees  are  to  be  kept  informed  and  consulted 
on  all  matters  pertaining  to  vocational  training.  They  also  have  to  pass  all  the  regulations 
for  the  implementation  of vocational  training  to  be  issued  by  a Chamber  (e.g.  regulations 
for  final  examinations).  The  employees'  representatives  appointed  to  the  vocational  training 
committees  are  nominated  by  the  DGB  union  local  at  the  seat  of the  Chamber  while  the 
employers'  representatives  are  nominated  by  the  Chamber,  and  the  vocational  school 
instructors,  by  the  responsible state  agency.  The chair of the  committees alternates annually 
between an  employers'  and  an  employees'  representative. 
Although  trade  unions  severely  criticize  the  inadequacies  of existing  arrangements,  they 
consider  their  participation  rights  at  the  Chamber  level  to  be  very  important  (John  1986). 
However,  it  is  often  regretted  that  the  existing  discretionary  power  is  insufficiently  exer-
cised.  This  is  explained  with  reference  to  the  honorary  nature  of the  work  of employees' 
representatives  and  their often  inadequate  preparation for  the  task.  The  Federal  Ministry  of 
Education  and  Science  had  for  several  years  financed  a project of the  DGB  federal  execu-
tive  designed  to  alleviate  these  problems,  entitled  "Preparation  and  Further  Training  of 
Employees  Representatives  in  Vocational  Training  Committees  and  Examination  Com-
mittees"  of the Chambers. 
3 .1.4.  At Workplace Level 
The  participation  of works  councils  in  the  area  of  vocational  tratntng  is  based  on  the 
Works  Constitution  Act  (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz)  as  well  as  on  farther  reaching  statutes 
of the  Co-determination  Act  (Mitbestimmungsgesetz)  of  1976.  Works  councils  in  large 19 
firms take their rights relating to vocational  training seriously.  They reinforce at the  work-
place level the commitment of trade unions at other levels. 
At  the  workplace  level  it  is  decided  how  to  fill  the  discretionary  space  left  by  federal 
training  regulations.  In  large  firms  room  for  innovation  is  extensively  used,  creating 
training  standards  that  often  exceed  minimum  requirements.  The  initiative  is  frequently 
taken  by  works  councils.  In  many  small  and  medium-size  firms,  in  contrast,  interest 
representation of employees in  the  area of vocational training leaves much to be desired. 
Under  the  Works  Constitution  Act  works  councils  can  be  set  up  in  any  finn  with  more 
than five  employees.  About half of all  firms  with  more than  20 employees,  however,  have 
no  workplace interest representation.  In  the  on  average even  smaller artisanal  firms,  works 
councils  rarely exist.  Thus  more  than  one-third of all  employees  remain  without  interest 
representation  at  the  workplace  (Muller-Jentsch  1986,  220).  In  this  group  of firms,  the 
organized  social  partners  have  no  influence  at  workplace  level,  a  fact  that  underscores 
demands for more participation rights for employees representatives in  Chambers. 
According  to  the  Works  Constitution  Act  works  councils  can  co-determine  the  imple-
mentation of vocational training at the workplace.  They do not possess  any  formal  right to 
co-determine the  construction  and  equipment  of workplace  facilities  for  vocational  train-
ing.  De facto,  however, they can make these  questions  subject to  negotiation.  Chances  for 
successfully  implementing  high training  standards  are greatest  for  works  councils  in  about 
500  firms  with  mandatory  co-determination.  This  covers  all  joint  stock  companies  with 
more  than  2,000  workers  and  employees.  They  employ  a  total  of 4.5  million  people  or 
one-fifth of the workforce. 
Not all  works councils offensively pursue high  training standards.  However,  it  is  generally 
true  that  especially  in  large  firms  existing  opportunities  are  used.  Three  considerations 
seem to be of particular importance here: 
High  training  standards  improve  the  performance  and  flexibility  of the  workforce  and 
thus make the  firm  more adaptable.  This in  tum provides job security and creates more 
bargaining power vis -a-vis management. 
Well-trained and  flexible  employees  reduce  the  necessity  of having  to  recruit  person-
nel  from  the  external  labor  market  in  response  to  changing  market  conditions.  It  is  a 
precondition  for  the  works  councils'  ability  to  use  co-determination  in  personnel 
planning  exclusively  in  the  interest  of their  workforce.  In  this  way  they  can  largely 
avoid  the  loyalty  problems  that  arise  when  they  have  to  agree  to  laying  off insuffi-
ciently qualified employees and at the same time to hiring new qualified personnel. 20 
Many  large  firms  prefer  to  hire  children  of  their  employees  as  apprentices  (Hohn 
1983).  If under these  circumstances the  works council  pursues  high  training  standards, 
it  will  represent  at  the  same  time  the  interests  of their  workforce  in  high-quality 
training for their children. 
3.2.  Financing: The Mobilization of Financial Resourres for Training 
In the  dual  system  of the  Federal  Republic:  the  costs  of vocational  school  training  are 
covered by the state,  while  firms  carry the  costs of training at the workplace.  The explicit 
goal  of all  state  agencies  responsible  for  vocational  training,  as  well  as,  of employers' 
associations  and trade  unions,  is to provide for  all  interested young people training oppor-
tunities  in  the  dual  system  leading  to  an  occupational  qualification.  Since  firms  are  not 
legally  required  to  provide training,  this  goal  can  only  be  realized  if employers offer and 
finance  a sufficient number of training sites. 
In  the past 10 to 15  years,  financing  of workplace training has  been at the  center of many 
controversies.  The major point of contention has  been the  so-called "apprenticeship gap". 
According to the  Vocational  Training  Report  presented by the  Federal  Minister  of Educa-
tion  and  Science  (BMBW  1986,  25),  in  1985  there  were  roughly  756,000  young  people 
seeking  an  apprenticeship  as  opposed  to  about  720,000  available  training  sites,  supply 
matching  about  95  percent  of  demand. 
7 
Shortfalls  in  the 
provision  of  training  sites  first  occurred  in  the  mid-seventies.  Since  1982  vocational 
training policy has been regularly confronted with this problem. 
There are various reasons  for the  "apprenticeship gap". The first is  related to demographic 
factors.  Since  1980  graduates  have  entered  the  training  market  in  large  numbers  every 
year.  In addition,  interest in training in the dual  system has significantly risen.  Thus, many 
more Gymnasium  (high  school)  graduates  than in  the  past  are  today  applying  for  appren-
ticeships.  Other factors  held responsible particularly for the decreasing willingness of firms 
to provide training  in  the  1970s  include  greater work  intensity  and growing  specialization 
of production,  greater  training  costs  as  a  result  of higher  standards  as  well  as  growing 
competitive pressures felt  in many sectors of the German economy. 
The  second  motive  for  the  debate  on  fmancing  was  the  desire  to  raise  the  quality  of 
vocational  training.  Especially  the  trade  unions  argued that  this  could  only  be  achieved  if 
7)  Methods  used  for  determining  the  demand  for  apprenticeships  are  controversial. 
Trade  unions  put greater emphasis than  the  Vocational  Training Report on  applicants that in  previous years 
have  not found  any, or not a suitable,  apprenticeship and  continue to search.  The DGB  Vocational  Training 
Evaluation for  1985 shows 325,700 young people without apprenticeships (DGB  1986, 6Sff). 21 
all  firms  were  required by  law to contribute to financing.  Different forms  of a levy  system 
were  at  the  center  of discussions.  By  the  end  of the  1970s,  however,  all  such  plans  had 
1  failed.  Under  present  political  conditions  it  is  unlikely  that  new  efforts  in  this  direction 
1  would be successful. 
Regardless of fundamental  disagreements  on  the  question  of financing,  employers'  associa-
tions,  unions,  and  state  agencies  have  made  considerable  efforts  to  mobilize  additional 
resources  within  the  existing  system.  As  a  result,  training  opportunities  could  be  signifi-
cantly  expanded.  In  both  1983  and  1984,  record  numbers  of new  training-employment 
contracts  were  signed.  However,  this  was  not  enough  to  satisfy  demand:  the  number  of 
l unsuccessful applicants also reached record levels (see  below,  Appendix E). 
i 3.2.1.  At National Level 
:The peak  organizations  of employers  and  unions  are  not  directly  involved  in  mobilizing 
i  resources  for  vocational  training  at  the  national  level.  Funds  for  creating  and  subsidizing 
I  training  sites  do  not  exist.  There  are  also  no  negotiations  or  decisions  that  would  be 
I  binding  on  firms  to  provide  training.  Nevertheless,  the  peak  organizations  of the  social 
1  partners  do  have  influence  on  the  mobilization  of resources.  The  intensified  conflict  bet-
~ween employers'  associations  and  trade  unions  in  the  wake  of shortages  on  the  training 
jmarket has  so  far  unfolded  mainly  at  the  national  level.  It  has  contributed to the  launching 
1of  state  programs  for  the  funding  of  additional  training  sites.  At  the  same  time,  the 
'willingness on the  part of firms to provide training has increased. 
!In  1985  about 900 million  DM  in  federal  funds  were provided for  vocational  training.  The 
t
ederal  Labor  Administration  spent  some  4  billion  DM  on  vocational  training  and  further 
aining.  A  large  part  of these  funds  were  used  in  the  form  of incentives  or  financial 
ompensation  for the  training  commitments  of firms.  It  was  allocated,  for  instance,  in  the 
rorm  of subsidies  to  firms  offering  training  sites  for  people  with  learning  disabilities,  the 
flisadvantaged  and  the  handicapped.  As  well  as  financial  incentives  for  the  creation  of 
tJ-aining  sites  in  structurally  underdeveloped  regions,  and  funding  of  external  training 
tenters  (BMBW  1986,  112ff.).  One  reason  for  the  launching  of such  programs  has  been 
iJle  need for  the  federal  government of the time,  to justify their reservations and opposition 
~  financial  reform  of vocational  training.  State  subsidies  relieve  the  financial  burden  of 
~rms and  in  this  way  increase  their  willingness  to  provide  training.  The  commitment  of 
~tate agencies  at  the  national  level  is  therefore  related  to  the  political  controversy  between 
4mployers'  associations and  unions  over the  financing  of vocational training. 
ts long  as  an  adequate  supply  of training  sites  is  not  insured,  the  pressure  of public 
rticism may  eventually  compel  legislators  to  undertake  financial  reform.  It was  also  with 22 
this prospect in  mind that employers' associations at the  national  level  launched a campaign 
for  creating  additional  training  sites,  which  in  fact  was  followed  by  significant  increases 
(see  below,  Appendix E). 
Employers'  associations,  trade  associations  and  Chambers  approached  their  members  in  a 
variety  of ways  in  order  to  enlist  their  cooperation  in  creating  more  training  sites.  Their 
efforts  included  public  appeals,  letters  to  the  membership,  and  the  cooperation  with  trade 
unions  and  the  Federal  Labor  Office  at  apprenticeship  conferences.  They  also  directly 
approached  firms  that  had  not  offered  training  in  the  past.  These  activities  occurred  pri- ' 
marily  at  the  regional  level  and,  in  part,  at  the  sectoral  level.  The  associations  especially 
appealed, to  the  employers  to  conceive  of  "training  as  investment  in  the  future".  By  the 
early  1990s,  it  was  argued,  a  shortage  of  apprentices  was  anticipated  and  there  was  a 
threat  of intense  competition  for  skilled  labor.  Providing  training  today  was  a  protection 
against  a  shortage  of  skilled  labor  tomorrow.  Moreover,  it  was  urged  to  demonstrate 
"solidarity with youth".  The  "apprenticeship gap"  was  portrayed as  a "crucial test"  for  the 
dual  system.  The  federal  government  had  abandoned  financial  reform  plans  in  favor  of 
entrusting  the  firms  with  the  challenge  to  create  more  training  sites;  it  was  said  to  be 
imperative now  not to  disappoint these expectations. 
The  contribution  of business  associations  relative  to  other  factors  in  increasing  the  supply 
of training sites  cannot be  accurately determined.  However,  no  one  in  the  Federal Republic , 
- including  the  unions  - would  deny  that  employers'  associations  have  played  a  signifi-
cant role  and continue to  do  so. 
3.2.2.  At Sectoral Level 
Employers'  associations, and  trade  unions  in  individual  sectors also  participate  in  the  efforts 
to create additional training sites described in  the previous chapter (3.2.1.).  Moreover, they  1 
contribute to  the  mobilization  of resources  through collective  bargaining agreements,  which! 
exist  in  some  sectors,  imposing  levies  on  firms  that  do  not  provide  training.  Employers'  1 
associations  and  trade  unions  at  the  sectoral level  also  negotiate  annually training allowance 
rates for  apprentices. 
In  the  construction,  landscaping,  stone mason,  stone  sculptor,  and  roofing  trades,  collective 
agreements  exist  for  the  financing  of vocational  training  provided  outside  the  individual ! 
enterprise.  By  paying a levy  all  firms  in  these  sectors  share training  costs.  In  1985,  a total : 
of about  80,000  apprenticeships  in  just  under  28,000  firms  were  funded  with  more  than 
570  million  OM.  The  construction  industry  with  funds  of 550  million  DM  is  the  largest 
and most important sector with a levy  system  (for further details,  see  Chapter 5). 23 
Apprentices  have  significantly  lower  incomes  than  skilled  workers  in  the  ~e  vocation. 
On  average,  an  18-year-old apprentice  receives  about  33  percent  of the  wage  of a 
skilled  worker.  As  Casey  (1986)  has  shown  in  his  study  of Germany,  France,  and  Great 
Britain  which  compared  wage  levels  of trainees  with  those  of young  ~ki11e<l  workers, 
incomes of German apprentices are, even by international standards,  very low. 
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Wages of Youg Workers (in  Germany:  Apprentices) in  Relation to ·Adult  Skilled Wages* 
16 Years Old  18  Years  Old 
1  West Germany 
' France 
20 
80 
50-60 
33 
100 
80-100  f  United Kingdom 
i •  Federal Republic:  training allowance  in  per cent of skilled Wage;  France:  legal minimum  wage;  United 
Kingdom:  own calculations on  the  basis of a sample of industrial agreements 
' 
\Casey (1986, 66;  Table  4);  according to Maier (1986,  21). 
1 Allowance  rates  for  apprentices  are  negotiated  annually  between  employers'  assoctatlons 
! and  trade  unions  in  collective  bargaining.  The  comparatively  low  income  of apprentices  is 
f not  a  result  of a  superior  bargaining  position  on  the  part  of employers'  associations. 
l  Rather,  trade  unions  as  well  consider it in  principle justified.  It  expresses  a view  of voca-
l 
I tional  training as  an  investment to which apprentices are expected to make  a contribution. 
lIn the  debate  over  shortages  on  the  training  market,  employers'  associations  frequently 
1 argued  that  a  lowering  of training  allowances  would  increase  the  willingness  of firms  to 
I 
!provide  training.  Although  this  suggestion  met  with  fundamental  resistance  from  trade 
I  unions,  in recent years, increases in  training allowances  have  become smaller.  This may  be 
'interpreted  as  a  contribution  of apprentices  in  favor  of those  young  people  who  have  not 
yet  been  able  to  find  a training  site.  However,  this  contribution  was  not  a decision  made 
by  apprentices  themselves  but  rather  by  the  organized  social  partners  during  collective 
!bargaining at the sectoral level. 
j8)  Data  on  wages  of apprentices  in  selected  occupations  in  comparison  to  collective  wage  rates  may  be 
~ound below,  Appendix E. 24 
3 .2.3.  At Regional Level 
The actors  playing  a  role  in  the  mobilization  of resources  at  the  regional  level  are  Land : 
governments,  cities,  municipalities,  regional  chapters  of employers'  associations  and  trade 
unions  as  well  as  Chambers.  These  organizations  in  all  regions  of the  Federal  Republic 
support campaigns for additional  training sites.  Moreover,  at the  regional  level,  it has  been 
possible  to tap  new  financial  sources.  On  top  of their  expenditures  for  vocational  training · 
schools  (about  7.5 billion  DM),  the  eleven  Land  governments  spent  an  extra  730  million  , 
OM on  vocational  training in  1985.  The  bulk of these  funds  flows  to  firms  in  the  form  of 
subsidies in  order to increase their willingness to provide training. 
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The organized social partners are  not directly involved in  the  development and  implementa-
tion of regional funding  programs,  but indirectly they play an  important role.  For example, 
in  1983/84 a number of district organizations of the  DGB  decided to lobby their  respective 
Land  governments  to  pass  financial  legislation  (Landesfinanzierungsgesetze).  To  make  up 
for  non-existent  legislation  at  the  federal  level,  firms  in  a  Land  were  to  contribute 
through  a  levy  to  the  financing  of vocational  training.  Proponents  of this  plan  hoped  at  · 
least  that  Social  Democratic  Land  governments  would  get  such  legislation  underway. 
Ultimately,  however,  these  initiatives  failed  in  the  face  of various  legal  and  political  diffi-
culties.  Even  within  the  DGB,  individual  unions  withdrew  their  support,  fearing  that 
separate  legislation  at  the  Land  level  would  undermine  the  unity  of vocational  training  1 
policy.  They  argued  that  it  was  in  the  employees'  interests  to  have  homogeneous  and 
comparable  occupational  qualifications.  Moreover,  regulations  that  differed  from  Land  to 
Land would tend to reduce the influence of trade unions on vocational training. 
At  both  federal  and  Land  level,  new  legislation  establishing  levy  systems  is  at  present not 
to  be  expected.  However,  in  the  Chamber  districts  levies  are  common.  They  are  used 
particularly  for  funding  external  training  centers.  More  than  600  such  centers  are  now  in 
existence,  most of them  in  the  artisanal  sector.  If employees have  parity co-determination 
in  the  organization  and  management  of external  training  centers,  they  are  eligible  for 
federal  and  Land  grants  towards . start-up  and  operating  costs.  The  rest  is  covered  either 
by  Chamber  budgets,  fees,  or a levy  imposed  by  the  Chamber on  all  firms  in  its  district, 
or by  a  combination  of all  three.  Since  Chamber  budgets  essentially  consist  of dues  from 
compulsory  members,  they  are  very  similar  to  levies  in  that  both  funding  methods  insure 
that firms  not providing training share the  costs of vocational  training. 
9)  Cities  and  municipalities  as  well,  often  provide  financial  and  organizational  support  for  trammg 
projects  and  private  training  finns.  No  reliable  data  or estimates  on  the  size  of municipal  subsidies  are 
available.  Brunn (1986) provides a preliminary survey of common training initiatives by municipal agencies, 
labor administrations, employers' associations and trade unions. 25 
i Whereas  at  the  regional  level  levy  systems  can  be  utilized,  at  the  Land,  federal,  and 
sectoral  levels  (with  the  exception  of the  construction  industry)  such  schemes  are  not 
1 feasible  at present.  There are a variety of reasons for this.  Chambers  as  organizations with 
; compulsory  membership  can  better  afford  to  demand  financial  contributions  even  from 
t members  not  providing  training  than  voluntary  associations.  In  addition,  there  are  the 
\ incentives in the form of state grants available for  external training centers.  It is much less 
1 problematic  for  Chambers  to  accept  employee  co-determination  in  organization  and 
I 
1 management,  than  for  associations.  Chambers in  any case  are subject to  regulations  requir-
1 ing co-determination in the  area of vocational training (cf.  3.1.3.). 
!Training cooperatives  (Ausbildungsverbiinde)  and training  initiatives  represent new avenues 
lfor  the  mobilization  of resources  at  the  regional  level.  In  training  cooperative  (BMBW 
~1982a, Braun-Schindel et  al.  1985,  BffiB  1982),  a  number  of firms  cooperate  in  work-
IPlace  training,  i.e.  an  apprentice  passes  through different  firms  during different  phases  of 
Ibis  training.  The aim  of such  a cooperative venture  is  to activate  unused training resources 
~n firms  that,  for  example,  as  a  result  specialization,  are  unable  to  offer  comprehensive 
~aining. In addition, training cooperatives are eligible for  state grants. 
JA>cal  job  initiatives  (Petzold  et  al.  1985,  Maier  and  Wollmann,  eds.,  1986)  respond  to 
tegional  or  local  economic  needs  not  served  by  private  and  public  enterprises  (e.g.  in 
~nvironmental protection).  They  are  usually  initiated  by  municipal  governments,  churches, 
t>r  trade union agencies.  Financial  support is  provided both by the  state  and  by  the  EC.  In 
the  context of such job initiatives,  workplace  training is  also offered in  most  cases.  Train-
tng may even be their main purpose (Maier,  F. 1983, 30ff.). 
~  .2.4.  At Workplace Level 
~  analysis  of decisions  at  workplace  level  to  invest  in  vocational  training  can  be  based 
-rst of all  on  a firm's cost-benefit calculus.  In small,  medium-size,  and  artisanal  firms 
4hances  of recovering  workplace  training  costs  in  the  course  of  an  apprenticeship  are 
*latively good.  In large firms,  apprentices in most cases stay with the  firm  for a long time 
tfter completing their training,  a fact  which allows firms  to base their training decisions on 
l~ng term cost-benefit considerations .
10 
tp)  Important  studies  on  the  cost-benefit  calculus  at  firm  level  are  SKFF  1974,  Noll  et  al.  1983;  on 
*eer patterns  after  completion  of workplace  training,  see  Hofbauer  1983,  Stegmann  and  Kraft  1983. 
~es  of these discussions can  be  found  in Maier, H.E.  1986 and Casey  1986. 26 
In the past ten  years,  the  organized social  partners have  influenced the  cost-benefit  calcu-
lus  of firms  with the  result that more training  sites  were provided than  had  been  originally 
anticipated.  Their  constructive  intervention  has  taken  two  forms.  First,  Chambers  seem  to 
have  exercised  their  advisory  and  control  functions  more  flexibly  so  that  especially  small 
and  medium-size  firms  were  able  to  (partly)  recover  training  costs  during  the  course  of 
an  apprenticeship.  Second,  works  councils  and  trade  unions  in  large  industrial  enterprises 
helped to increase the  number of training sites made  available  by  these  firms. 
In terms of the  ratio of training contracts to the total  number of employees,  large industrial 
enterprises  provide  very  little  vocational  training.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  indus  .. 
trial firms  with  1  ,000 and more employees in the early  1980s achieved greater increases  ia 
the  number  of new  training  contracts  than  the  traditionally  training-intensive  artisanal 
sector
11
•  Streeck  (1986,  22f.)  explains  this  with  reference  to  the  automobile  industry  ia 
terms  of efforts  by  works  councils,  convincing  employers  to provide  training  in  excess  of 
their  present  needs.  As  an  instrument  of persuasion  they  could  use  their  legal  rights  for 
co-determination (cf.  3.1.4.).  Moreover,  works  councils  wield  informal  influence  in  their 
role as  mediators between  management  and  employees  which they  can  exercise  in  favor  of 
greater training efforts. 
3.3.  Implementation and Administration 
3.3  .1.  At National Level 
At the  national  level  the  organized social  partners participate  only  to  a very  limited degree 
in  the  implementation  of vocational  training.  An  exception  exists  in  the  area  of examina-
tions.  Examinations are  held  by  regional Chambers which  for  this  purpose set up  examina-
tion  committees  for  each  vocation  with  equal  representation  of employers,  employees,  and 
instructors.  In  procedural  matters  they  are  normally  expected  to  follow  the  recommenda-
tions  of the  BffiB  Central  Board  which  equally  apply  to  all  occupations.  Examination 
subjects  are specified for  each occupation  in  the  respective  training  regulations.  Within this 
framework,  examination  committees  have  some  latitude  in  the  concrete  determination  of 
examination subjects since  they formulate the examination questions. 
11)  From  1981  to  1983,  the  above-mentioned  large  industrial  firms  increased  the  number  of  new 
training contracts by  15  percent, whereas the growth rate in the artisanal sector was only  12  percent (calcul4-
ted  with  data  from  Maier,  H.E.  1986,  14,  Table  5).  However,  the  artisanal  sector  had  already  reached  a 
relatively  high  training  rate.  In  artisanal  flrms  with  less  than  20  employees  slightly  over  8 apprentices  p4r 
100 employees  are  trained,  in  industrial  firms  with  1,000  and  more  employees  only  1.23  (cf.  Maier,  H.E. 
1986, 15, Table 6). 27 
, For many occupations,  examination  questions  are  set by  a central  agency  of the  Chambers 
· and subsequently administered by  individual Chambers.  Centralization simplifies administra-
tive  work  and  promotes  the  standardization  of  vocational  training.  Trade  unions  have 
i  criticized  that  the  inter-regional  setting  of  examination  questions  violates  employees 
1 participation rights  in  the  parity committees and  restricts the  scope  of regional  examination 
1 committees provided for by law. 
i 
I  This  conflict  can  only  be  understood  against  the  background  of the  unions'  general  criti-
1 cism of their limited participation rights  in  Chambers.  Trade  unions  can co-determine  all 
! important decisions  on  vocational  training  policy.  However,  when  the  implementation  of a 
I  decision  affects  a  Chamber's  finances  beyond  the  legally  prescribed  limit,  they  become 
1 dependent  on  the  vote  of the  Chamber's  plenary  assembly  and  thus  on  an  organ  of the 
!employers.  While Chamber executives try to cut costs  by  taking  advantage of inter-regio-
lnal  committees  for  setting  examination  questions,  trade  unions  insist  on  decentralized 
1 committees  in order  to  strengthen  their  claim  for  co-determination  in  Chambers  in  all 
!areas of vocational training. 
13.3.2.  At Sectoral Level 
IA.t  the  sectoral  level  the  organized  social  partners  mainly  participate  in  the  implementation 
pf vocational training in the  area of establishing and  administering external training centers. 
~  recent years external training centers have  been  increasingly utilized  as  a complement to 
~orkplace training.  These  centers  exist primarily in  the  artisanal  sector and  in  some  cases 
~  the  industrial  sector.  In the  artisanal  sector  responsibility  for  external  training  centers 
hes  either  with  the  Chambers  of Artisans  (as  regional  intersectoral  employers'  organiza-
tions)  or with  gilds  (as  regional  sectoral  employers'  organizations).  In the  non - artisanal 
;ector external  training  centers  have  been  established  mainly  in  the  construction  industry 
(see  below, Chapter 5). Trade union  representatives also participate in  the  administration of 
ihese centers. 
t
ricula  for  external  training  centers  are  in  part  contained  in  the  training  regulations  of 
respective  vocations.  Particularly in  the  artisanal  sector,  however,  they  are  supplemen-
by  the  respective  gild associations  at  the  national  level.  The  automobile  trades  in  addi-
.on cooperate closely with German car manufacturers (Meyer 1985). 
~ further  area  where  sectoral  organizations  of the  social  partners  play  a  role,  is  in  the 
taining of instructors.  While  formally  this  is  a responsibility  of the  Chambers,  the  exper-
4se  of the  respective  gilds  and  sectoral  associations  is  indispensable.  Instructors  acquire 
~ocational and teaching  skills in different ways in the  artisanal sector and  in  commerce and 
ifldustry.  In the  latter,  instructors have to take examinations at the  Chambers of Commerce 28 
and Industry.  Prospective  instructors take  preparation courses  offered  mainly  by  Chambers 
of Commerce  and  Industry  as  well  as  by  employers'  and  sectoral  associations,  vocational 
training~ institutes,  and  others.  These  courses  focus  on  teaching  skills,  though  vocational 
issues are also covered.  Cooperation with the  respective  sectoral  associations in this context 
is essential.  In the  artisanal  sector instructors must be  certified master artisans  (see  below, 
Chapter 4). 
3.3  .3.  At Regional Level 
It has become evident that Chambers of Artisans and  Chambers of Commerce and  Industry 
are  particularly  involved  in  the  implementation  of vocational  training.  In  cooperation  with 
the  respective  sectoral  and  employers'  associations  examinations  are  held,  instructors  are 
trained,  and external  training  sites  are  operated.  Chambers  have  autonomy  in  a number  of 
further  responsibilities.  A  particularly  important  one  is  the  decision  on  the  suitability  of 
firms  to provide  training.  Further,  they  maintain  files  on  all  training  contracts  and  autho-
rize  extensions  or  cuts  in  training  time.  They  also  arbitrate  conflicts  between  apprentices 
and firms. 
In  the  implementation  of vocational  tr&mng,  Chambers  are  bound  by  legal  guidelines  as 
well  as  by  decisions  of the  Central  Board  of the  BffiB.  Questions  of interpretation  can  be 
decided  by  the  vocational  training  committees.  Through  these  committees  trade  unions 
attempt  to  influence  the  Chambers'  implementation  of vocational  training.  As  mentioned 
before  (3.3.1.),  unions  criticize the  practice  of Chambers  to  use  examination  questions  set 
at  an  inter-regional  level.  Many  unions  also  consider  supervision  and  control  of work-
place training inadequate  (3.4.3.). 
A further  responsibility  of the  regional  level  in  the  area of implementation  and  administra-
tion  is  the  coordination  of vocational  training  between  school  and  workplace.  In  general 
terms, the  Conference of Ministers of Education when decreeing curricula,  makes  reference 
to  regulations  governing  workplace  training  (see  below,  Appendix  B),  but their application 
requires  further  specification at  the  Land  level.  Many  practitioners  criticize  that  the  Minis-
ters of Education  of the  Lander do not adequately deal  with this problem and point out that 
the  Land committees  are  not  in  a position to  solve  it on  their own.  Even  in  the  construc-
tion  industry  (see  below,  Chapter  5)  each  Land  has  different  regulations.  Obviously  even 
the  participation  of the  organized  social  partners  cannot  entirely  eliminate  the  problems 
resulting from the federal  structure of the German educational system. 
3.3  .4.  At Workplace Level 
In  the  implementation  of vocational  training  at  workplace  level,  works  councils  possess 
legal  co -determination  rights.  Training  regulations  require  firms  only  to  fulfil  certain 29 
nununum  standards.  An  individual  firm  may  of course  exceed  these  requirements  and 
provide  higher-quality training.  Works  councils  in  large  firms  frequently  use  their  legal 
co-determination  rights to create high training standards  (3 .1. 4.).  Works councils in  many 
small  and  medium-size  firms,  on  the  other hand,  have  neither  the  time  nor the  expertise 
to achieve comparable standards. 
,  3.4.  Supervision and Control 
3.4.1.  At National  Level 
Performance  and  flexibility  of the  vocational  training  system  are  evaluated  at  the  national 
; level  in  the  Federal  Government's  annual  Vocational  Training  Reports.  The  Report  is 
produced by  the  Federal  Ministry  for  Education  and  Science  (BMBW)  with  the  support of 
the Federal Institute for  Vocational  Training (BffiB),  partly in  cooperation with the  Institute 
of Labor  Market  and  Occupational  Research  of the  Federal  Labor  Office.  It  contains  data 
on  all  relevant  quantitative  and  qualitative  aspects  of vocational  training  policy  (e.g.  natio-
! nal  and  regional  trends  on  the  training  market,  subjects  and  structures  of vocational  train-
ing, situation of foreign  youth in  vocational training). 
\The Report serves as  an evaluation of experiences  with recent programs and  as  a basis  for 
i  future decisions. 
l  A  statement  by  the  Central  Board  of the  BmB  is  appended  to  the  Vocational  Training 
!Report.  The  issuing  of this  statement is  preceded by  an  intensive  discussion  of the  Report 
·where  the  parties  represented  on  the  Board  (trade  unions,  employers,  federal  government 
1and  Lander)  debate  their  different  interpretations of the  data.  In  recent  years  union  repre-
lsentatives  and  the  Lander with  Social-Democratic governments have  been  unable  to arrive 
~t a conunon interpretation of data on  the  shortage of training sites.  In these  cases both the 
~ajority and the minoritY view  were appended to the  Vocational  Training Report. 
trhe  organized  social  partners  do  not  fully  depend  on  the  services  of the  BmB for  their 
t!valuations  of vocational  training  policies.  Employers'  associations  and  trade  unions  run 
their own  research institutes that can  supply additional  or alternative information.  Especially 
the  unions,  moreover,  receive  support  from  scientists  in  universities  and  independent 
tesearch institutes.  These  research capacities on  vocational  training policy that  are  indepen-
~nt of the  state  force  the  Federal  Government  and  the  BmB  to  refrain  from  self-
+pplause as  well  as to address problematic issues in  the Report. 
tite Vocational  Training Report gives the  organized social  partners an  opportunity to draw 
.ntion to  strengths  and  weaknesses  of vocational  training,  not  only  in  the  context  of a 
seneral public debate.  More importantly,  it even forces  them to take  a position  and  defend 30 
it in discussions with other parties  with an  interest in  vocational  training.  It is,  in  effect,  a 
firmly  institutionalized  process  at  the  national  level  involving  the  organized  social  partners 
in the evaluation  of vocational  training policy.  Moreover,  in  the  Federal  Republic,  vocatio-
nal  training  policy  plays  a  large  role  in  party  politics.  This  is  a  result  of the  fact  that 
vocations  and  vocational  training  are  generally  highly  regarded,  and  it  is  one  reason  why 
successes and failures  in vocational training receive considerable public attention. 
3.4.2.  At Sectoral Level 
The  evaluation  of vocational  training  policy  belongs  to  the  routine  activities  of the  orga-
nized  social  partners in  the  individual  sectors.  The  sectoral  level  is  mainly  responsible  for 
implementing training regulations and for deciding whether revisions may be  necessary as  a 
response to changing conditions.  Sectoral employers' associations  and  unions maintain close 
contacts  with  firms  and  are  usually  informed about  implementation problems and  necessary 
changes.  As  past  experience  shows,  it  may  nevertheless  take  a  long  time  until  agreement 
can  be  reached  on  how  to  solve  such  problems.  Moreover,  it  should  be  noted  that  in 
sectors  with  a low  degree  of unionization the  unions'  ability  to  draw  attention to problems 
is also low  (see  below,  Chapters 5 - 7). 
The  interest  of sectoral  employers'  associations  and  trade  unions  in  the  actual  practice  of 
vocational  training  in  their territory has a number of reasons.  Sectoral  organizations play  a 
key  role  in  the  regulation  and  implementation  of vocational  training  and  have  to  send 
delegates  to  a  large  number  of advisory,  planning,  and  decision-making  bodies.  Trade 
unions  can  provide  qualified  interest  representation  only  if they  are well-informed  on  the 
situation in  the  workplace  and  if they  can  persuade  specialists  in  firms  to  assume mandates 
on  their  behalf.  In  addition,  vocational  training  plays  a  particularly  important  role  for 
employers'  associations  as  a means  of proving to the  membership their  value  as  an  organi-
zation.  By  supplying  qualified  information  on  legal  aspects  of vocational  training  and  the 
practice  of other firms,  employers'  associations  demonstrate the  benefits  of membership in 
their  organization.  In  this  way  they  hope  to  increase  the  association's  organizational 
strength.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  all  industrial  unions  in  the  Federal  Republic  empha-
size that high-quality  vocational training is  a necessary  precondition for  the  future  compe- ' 
titiveness  of  their  sector.  Finally,  the  importance  assigned  to  consistently  monitoring 
vocational  training  at  the  sectoral  level  is  underscored  by  the  fact  that  both  employers' 
associations and trade unions have  special departments for  vocational training. 
3.4  .3.  At Regional Level 
At the  regional  level  the  organized  social  partners  participate  in  supervision  through  their 
co-determination rights in Chambers. 31 
Under  the  Vocational  Training  Act,  Chambers  have  control  and  advisory  responsibilities 
for  workplace  training.  For  this  purpose,  they  employ  full-time  specialists,  so-called 
training  counsellors  (Ausbildungsberater).  The  number  of training  counsellors  varies  from 
Chamber  to  Chamber.  It  depends  on  the  policy  of the  social  partners  in  the  vocational 
training committee as  well  as  on the  fmancial  situation of the  individual  Chamber (and thus 
on decisions  of the  Chamber's plenary assembly  whose  members are all,  or in  their majo-
rity, employers' representatives). 
The supervisory activity of training counsellors consists  in  insuring that  vocational  training 
is  provided in  accordance with training  regulations.  Specifically,  this  may entail  examining 
whether firms follow training schemes or live  up to their obligation to provide free  training 
material.  If training  counsellors  become  aware  of problems,  their  first  step  is  to  inform 
firms  of their rights  and  obligations. If the  problems  are  not  resolved,  the  Chamber in  an 
extreme  case  may  nullify  an  existing  training  contract  and  refuse  the  firm  permission  to 
enter into  new  training contracts.  Usually  training  counsellors  act  only  on  concrete  indica-
tions  that  individual  firms  do  not  fulfil  requirements.  Such  indications  are,  for  example, 
complaints by apprentices,  repeated cases of weak  performance  in  examinations by  appren-
tices from a specific firm,  or comments by union representatives in  the  Chamber's vocatio-
nal training committee. 
Trade  unions  have  frequently  criticized  supeTVIsion  and  control  as  too  informal  and 
unsystematic.  If control  activity  remained  confined  to  cases  where  concrete  problems  had 
· become  known,  there  would  be  a danger  - especially in  times  where  training  sites  are  in 
• short supply  - that  apprentices  did  not  make  problems  known  out of fear  of losing  their 
; apprenticeship.  A  further  problem  of supervision  and  control  in  the  view  of the  trade 
• unions  is  that training counsellors report to the Chamber executive and are thus  subordinate 
1  to  an  organ  representing  employers'  interests.  As  a  result,  according  to  the  unions,  they 
I are often  confronted with a conflict of interest.  They have to insure that workplace training 
: is  conducted  according  to  regulations  while  at  the  same  time  having  to  take  into  account 
· employers'  interests  which,  especially  in  many  small  and  medium-size  firms,  means 
investing only the bare minimum in workplace training. 
,  However, the present form  of supervision and  control  of workplace  training by the  Cham-
1 hers  may  also  have  certain  advantages.  Particularly  in  times  when  apprenticeships  are  in 
i  short  supply,  it  may  be  prudent  in  some  firms  not  to  enforce  training  regulations  to  the 
!letter.  If individual  cases  are  treated  with  lenience,  while  at  the  same  time,  firms  are 
ladvised  on  how  to  improve  their  training  performance  in  the  future,  the  great number  of 
~obligations and requirements a  firm  has  to  fulfil  will  appear less  threatening.  The coopera-
ltiVe  approach  of training  counsellors  toward  firms  being  controlled  has  also  proved  bene-
lflcial  in  the effort to mobilize  additional  training  sites.  According to many  practitioners  in 
~  Chambers,  the  fact  that  training  counsellors directly  approached  individual  firms  deci-
~ively contributed to the success of the campaign against the  "apprenticeship gap" (3.2.). 32 
3 .4.4.  At Workplace Level 
The Chambers' supervision and control of workplace training can  only succeed if informa-
tion flows  from problem firms to training counsellors or to  vocational training committees. 
In this  context,  the  cooperation  of trade  union  representatives  in  the  vocational  training 
committees  with  works  councils  and  union  stewards  plays  a  crucial  role.  However,  espe-
cially  in  many  small  and medium-size  firms,  which  are  most  likely  not to fulfil  training 
requirements  fully,  there  is  no  workplace  interest  representation.  This  reduces  the  effec-
tiveness  of the  Chambers'  control  and  counselling  activities  and  supports the  trade  unions' 
demand for closer supervision. 
In  firms  where  they  exist,  works  councils  can  also  demand  that  management  fulfil  legal 
requirements for vocational training. 
They  can  exert  influence  through  their co-determination  rights  in  the  implementation  of 
vocational  training.  Whether  works  councils  do  in  fact  become  active  in  this  respect  will 
depend  on  how  well  they  are  informed  about  laws,  regulations,  guidelines,  etc.  In small 
and medium-size  firms,  trade  unions through their information campaigns  and  workshops 
continuously  have  to  make  works  councils  aware  of how  they  can  get involved.  Although 
unions believe  that  in  recent years they  have  made  progress in  this  respect,  they  neverthe-
less  assume  that  serious  problems  continue  to  exist  and  that  many  works  councils  are 
incapable of supervising and controlling workplace training. 33 
4.  The Role of the  Social  Partners  in Further Training 
In  contrast  to  initial  vocational  training,  for  which  the  state  and  the  social  partners  con-
sensually  regulate  training  curricula,  examinations  and  certificates,  further  training  appears 
in  a great diversity of forms.  In general,  further training is  defined  as  an  organized learn-
ing process that  is  continued or resumed after completing an  initial  training phase and  as  a 
,  rule  after  starting a working career,  and  which  serves to maintain  or upgrade  occupational 
knowledge and skills. 
f  This  definition  encompasses  learning  processes  at  the  workplace,  participation  in  work-
shops,  seminars  or courses  inside  or  outside  the  firm,  further  training  workshops  during 
working  time  or  spare  time,  courses  during  periods  of unemployment  as  well  as  work 
leaves  for  full-time study  periods.  Further training  is  offered by  a variety  of institutions, 
among  others  by  firms,  but  also  by  external  agencies  such  as  trade  unions,  employers 
associations,  churches,  community colleges,  as  well  as private (commercial) training institu-
tions and  (especially  in  the  introduction of new  technologies)  by  the  producers of machines 
and  equipment.  Most  of these  opportunities  for  further  training  are  not  formalized,  i.e. 
training  goals,  methods,  programs  and  formats  are  only  in  very  few  instances  subject  to 
federal,  regional,  or sectoral  regulation.  Entry  barriers  to  the  further  training  market  are 
low,  which  is  why  a  great  variety  of competing  and  complementary  products  can  be 
,  offered.  The  buyers  are  firms  and  individual  employees  who  have  to  decide  which  of the 
very different programs may  be  most useful to them. 
Until  the  late  1960s,  further  training  as  an  integral  component  of vocational  development 
had been  regulated only in  the  artisanal sector.  (In the artisanal trades further training is  of 
such great importance because it  awards the  certificate of artisanal  Meister (master artisan), 
a legal title prerequisite for  operating an  artisanal  firm  and for training apprentices). 
i With  the  Vocational  Training  Act  (BBiG,  Berufsbildungsgesetz  and  the  Employment  Pro-
: motion Act  (AFG,  Arbeitsforderungsgesetz)  of 1968/69,  a foundation  was  laid  for  regulat-
: ing  and  structuring  further  training  at  the  federal  level.  This  legislation  determined  indi-
. vidual  subjects  and  classified  further  training  according  to  their  purposes.  The  following 
: are currently distinguished: 
I 
continuing vocational training 
retraining 
i - on -the-job training. 
1 Continuing  vocational  training  refers  to  courses  that  promote  occupational  advancement 
1 (continuing career training)  and  are aimed  at preparing participants for a final  examination. 
i  Passing  such  an  examination  as  a  rule  means  receiving  a  certificate.  Continuing  career 
1 training usually  requires previous vocational  training and several  years of work experience. 34 
In most cases  it extends  over a longer period of time  (on  the  average  2 years).  In contrast 
to  continuing  career  training,  refresher  courses  do  not  result  in  any  new  occupational 
qualification  but  rather  supplements  or expands  existing  knowledge  and  skills  in  order  to 
keep  up  with  changing  occupational  requirements.  Most  courses  are  of short duration  (on 
the average 3 - 4 months)  and do not result in any  recognized further training certificates. 
Retraining  refers  to  programs  aimed  at  making  the  transition  into  a  new  occupation 
possible.  Retraining  can  mean  either  the  learning  of specific  skills  (but,  in  contrast  to 
continuing  training,  for  a  new  occupation)  or a 2-3 year  training  period  resulting  in  a 
certificate  recognized  in the  dual  system.  Only  in the  latter  case  does  retraining  lead  to  a 
generally recognized certificate. 
A  third  type  of further  training  recognized  by  the  Labour  Authorities  is  on -the-job 
training.  This  is  training  for  a specific  workplace  and  activity  of employees  that  have just 
been hired or relocated and receive more than  only one briefing. 
With  the  BBiG  and  the  AFG  the  definition  of  further  training  for  the  first  time  was 
extended beyond the training  of artisanal  Meister.  There  were two  areas  that  were  seen  to 
be  in  need  of regulation.  First,  types  of further  training  were  to  be  defined  for  which 
individual  employees  would  be  eligible  to  receive  public  grants  under  the  Employment 
Promotion  Act.  Second,  by  covering  further  training  under  the  Vocational  Training  Act, 
opportunities  were  to  be  created  for  greater  formalization  of the  rather  non-transparent 
further  training market.  The  goal  of formalization  was  to achieve  greater compatibility and 
openness,  particularly  between  firms  and  regions,  as  well  as  the  general  recognition  of 
certificates.  The  regulation  process  was  from  the  start  accompanied  by  political  contro-
versy.  Trade  unions  advocated  standardization  in  this  area,  arguing  that  only  generally 
recognized  training  certificates  would  insure  the  independence  and  mobility  of employees 
and  create  opportunities  for  acquiring  broad  qualifications.  Employers'  representatives,  on 
the  other  hand,  pointed  out  that  the  traditional  structure  permitted  a  high  degree  of flexi-
bility as  well  as  freedom  for  individuals and firms  that would  be  lost as  a result of regulat-
ing and standardizing subjects and  qualifications. 
The  participation  of the  social  partners  in  the  area  of further  training  is  distinguished  by 
the  fact  that  they  act  not  only  as  agencies  of general  interest  representation.  Rather,  they 
are themselves  in  the  business  of selling  further  training  courses.  Employers'  associations, 
Chambers,  and  firms  offer  a  considerable  number  of workshops  and  seminars.  The  trade 
unions  as  well  operate  vocational  training  institutes  that  usually  offer  further  training  for  a 
wide  range  of occupations.  This  makes  further  training  significantly  different  from  the 
system  of initial  vocational  training and  affects  the  commitment of the  social partners in  so 
far  as  all  initiatives  in  the  area  of further  training  also  relate  to  defending  or increasing 
market shares. 35 
4.1.  Regulation: The Determination of Objectives, Subjects and Standards of Training 
4.1.1.  At National Level 
The  most  essential  regulations  for  vocational  trruntng  outside  of public  schools  are  con-
1  tained in the Berufsbildungsgesetz  (BBiG,  Vocational  Training Act)  and  in  the  Handwerks-
ordnung  (HWO,  Statute  of Artisans).  They determine  that  further  training  regulations  can 
be decreed by individual Chambers for their respective territories as well  as  by the  Federal 
Minister of Education and Science for the Federal Republic as  a whole.  The same levels of 
regulation  also  apply  to  retraining  outside  of recognized  vocational  training  occupations. 
The  "Register  of Recognized  Occupations"  lists  further  training  examinations  at Chamber 
level regulated under the BBiG as  well as federally regulated further training courses. 
Most types of further training are not regulated under the BBiG.  An exception exists in the 
,  area  of artisanal  Meister,  where  under  the  Statute  of Artisans  federal  regulations  are  in 
force  for  virtually  all  occupations.  In  addition  to  specific  occupational  skills,  they  require 
economic and legal  knowledge as  well  as  vocational  teaching skills.  A  new  further training 
, occupation  is  that of Certified  Foreman  (Industriemeister).  The  need  in  the  non -artisanal 
sector to  create a  career occupation as  in  the  artisanal  sector,  which  initially  was  confined 
· to individual  sectors  or regions,  since  1977 has  resulted  in  the  decreeing  of the  first  fede-
, rally  standardized  regulations.  Whereas  at  Chamber  level  most  non-artisanal  sectors  of 
\ industry  by  now  have  instituted  examinations  for  Certified  Foreman,  federal  regulations 
. have been decreed for only 17  occupations.  Further training programs providing recognized 
' further  training certificates other than that of Certified Foreman are federally  regulated  for 
only 12 occupations. 
The  participation  of the  social  partners  in  drafting  federally  standardized  further  training 
examinations  runs  along  similar  lines  as  in  the  area  of initial  vocational  training.  If a 
: further  training  program  is  to  be  regulated  federally,  any  party  involved  in  vocational 
: training  may  submit  to the  Federal  Ministry  of Education  and  Science  an  application  for 
I  the decreeing of a  further training  regulation.  It will  be  decreed if a  hearing of concerned 
1 associations  and organizations of business  and trade  unions  indicates  a  corresponding  need 
i and  if the  peak  organizations  of the  social  partners  jointly  request  regulation.  Federally 
1 standardized further  training  regulations  are  likely  to  be decreed if a  sufficient  number of 
I  Chambers have  been holding examinations for the  program in  question and if these exami-
1 nations still differ considerably from each other. 
I
The  "Coordinating Group on  Further Training"  established in  1983  by  the  peak organiza-
tions of the social  partners (KWB,  DGB, DAG) has  set itself the task of jointly submitting 
!applications  for  federal  further  training  regulations.  Federal  regulations  are  prepared  by 
ldetermining  the  need  for  regulation  and  by  developing  subjects  and  examina-36 
tion  rules.  The  Coordinating  Group  can  also  advise  on  Chamber  regulations  and  present 
joint recommendations to the Chambers. 
Once an application has been submitted to the  Ministry, the peak organizations and sectoral 
associations  are  heard.  If a  federal  regulation  is  controversial,  experts  of the  BBiB  are 
consulted.  They contribute to the  clarification of issues and promote agreement by  present-
ing  relevant  research  results  and  by  mediating  between  the  various  interests.  If a  federal 
regulation is rejected,  a regionally limited Chamber regulation may be  proposed. 
4  .1.2.  At Sectoral Level 
In  contrast to the area of initial vocational training, employers and trade unions do not play 
a  prominent  role  in  further  training  at  the  sectoral  level.  For  a  variety  of reasons  it  is 
difficult  to  establish  a  sectoral  consensus  on  federally  standardized further  training  regula-
tions.  The  peak  employers'  organizations  do  not  respond  favorably  to  applications  for 
federal  regulation  since  they  have  an  explicit  interest  in  as  little  regulation  as  possible. 
Though trade  unions  in  principle profess an  interest in  the  establishment of federal  regula-
tions,  they  are  confronted  with  the  problem  that  this  entails  further  differentiation  in  the 
occupational  status  of employees  and  may  make  unified  interest  representation  more diffi-
cult.  The ambivalent position of trade unions is part of the reason why non-union occupa-
tional  associatons  ultimately  remain  as  the  only  party  interested  in  developing  further 
training regulations.  For them, a further training regulation may be a step towards securing 
"title protection" and thus towards  "professionalization".  Many applications by occupational 
associations  are  motivated by the  fact  that  in  their occupational  field,  no  established initial 
vocational  training  exists.  A  further  training  regulation  is  to  give  these  occupations  an 
officially recognized status.  Occupational associations,  however,  need the  support of one of 
the  formally  responsible peak  organizations  for  their application.  As in  the  case of "Certi-
fied  Security  Guards"  (gepriifte  Werkschutzfachkraft),  coalitions  may  be  formed  with  the 
large  trade  unions.  In  some  cases,  as  in  the  construction  industry,  the  establishment  of 
further  training  occupations  may  be  promoted  by  the  social  partners  at  the  sectoral  level 
(see below Chapter 5). 
The  establishment  of  a  further  training  regulation  usually  affects  collective  bargaining 
relations  in  the  concerned  sector.  At the  same  time,  as  in  the  case  of the  Certified  Fore-
man,  independent  associations  are  established  that  attempt  to  organize  new  occupational 
interests  outside  of trade  unions  and  employers'  associations.  Below  the  federal  level  of 
regulation,  a number of sectoral, workplace, or occupational further training programs exist 
for  which  subjects  are  coordinated  only  at  the  sectoral  or  regional  level.  Regulation  of 
further training subjects as part of collective  bargaining agreements exists only  in  very few' 
sectors as, for example, in the construction industry (see below Chapter 5). 37 
1 In the  context of collective agreements on  educational  leave,  it is  in  some  cases determined 
! what  form  of further  training  may  generally  qualify  in  this  category;  in  others,  specific 
1 training subjects and  institutions have been agreed upon  (e.g.  time-and-methods seminars 
1 at  the  RKW  or Meister  courses  at  the  HWK).  However,  the  quantitative  significance  of 
I  these  agreements  cannot  be  established.  These  agreements  are  a result of efforts to  specify 
l
't  what  programs  are  eligible  and  how  training  costs  are  to  be  defrayed.  In  agreements  on 
protection  against  rationalization,  on  the  other hand,  subjects  or personal  criteria have  not 
I  been  determined,  except  that  an  obligation  for  the  employer  to  provide  further  training 
lexists  only  if rationalization  measures  do  not  leave  room  for  alternative  forms  of employ-
lment protection. 
~.1.3.  At Regional Level 
! 
jm contrast to the  system of initial  vocational training,  for further training the  regional  level 
~s  of great  importance.  At  this  level  there  are  individual  Chamber  regulations  permitted 
~der the  Vocational  Training  Act  as  well  as  further  training  regulations  of individual 
bander for public training schools. 
fn  the  area  of further  training  outside  of schools,  Chambers  can  issue  regulations  on 
~
Urther training  examinations.  In  July  of 1985,  189  further  training  examinations  were 
gulated  by legal  directions  of the  Chambers.  In  the  extreme  cases,  an  examination  may 
taken  either anywhere  in  the  Federal  Republic  or only  at  one  Chamber.  For almost  all 
~dustrial sectors there  is  a further  training examination  for  the  Certified Foreman;  in  most 
4ases  these  examinations are offered  in  only  one  Chamber district  for  all  candidates  in  the 
~ederal Republic. 
I 
~e  Chamber's vocational  training  committee  deliberates  on  the  establishment of Chamber 
+anunations.  Under  the  BBiG,  trade  unions  are  also  represented  on  this  committee 
E
.J.).  Further  training  regulations  are  essentially  developed  by  entrepreneurs  from  the 
on  in a  respective  occupation,  supported  by  vocational  training  experts  and  personnel 
agers  of regional  firms.  Peak  organizations  such  as  the  DIRT and the  DHKT,  through 
*ir departments  of vocational  training,  coordinate  these  decentralized  further  training 
t;guiations  and  mediate  between  individual  Chambers  in  respect  to  updating  and  further 
~velopment. Applications  for  the  establishment  of a  further  training  examination  at  the 
gional  level  are  also  submitted  by  occupational  associations.  The  strong  position  of the 
gional  level  explains  the  broad  dispersal  and  the  regionally  unequal  distribution  for 
·  ·vidual  occupations.  Some  occupational  associations  conclude  agreements  with  individual 
hers on  making examinations available to candidates from  outside the  region. 38 
If an  association  does  not  succeed  at  the  Chamber  level,  it  can  attempt  to  get  further 
training established through the  Land governments in  the  public  school  sector.  The  Lander 
are  active  in  the  determination  of subjects,  e.g.  by  establishing  occupational  schools  that 
award  certificates  such  as  "Certified  Management  Assistant"  or  the  "Certified  Foreign 
Language  Secretary".  So-called  assistant  occupations  in  the  application  of new  techno-
logies  are  also  increasingly  offered  by  individual  Lander  in  occupational  academies.  The 
DIHT  has  criticized  the  growing  activity  of  individual  Lander  since  it  removes  further 
training  from  the  influence  of Chambers and  exerts  strong  competitive  pressures on  non-
governmental institutions. 
4 .1.4.  At Workplare Level 
Works  councils  under  the  Works  Constitution  Act  have  advisory  and  co-determination 
rights  in establishing and  structuring training facilities  at  the  workplace,  the  introduction  of 
workplace  training  programs,  participation  in  external  training,  and  selection  of  parti-
cipants.  Since a large part of further training occurs at  the  workplace,  and  is  not  subject to 
legal  regulations,  this  creates opportunities for  workplace interest representations to become 
active  (Maase  et  al.  1978).  However,  with  few  exceptions  in  large  firms,  the  influence  of 
works  councils  on  further  training  is  very  minor.  This  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that 
works  councils  merely  have  advisory  and  information  rights  in  respect  to  decisions  on 
personnel planning,  choice  of technologies  and  work  organization,  all  of which  are  closely  ! 
related  to  further  training.  Moreover,  only  a  small  number  of firms  have  any  systematic 
planning on  further  training at  all.  A few  large  firms  are  known  to  place  a  strategic  value 
on  planning  and  developing  further  training.  Given  this  unsystematic  approach  to  further 
training,  it is  difficult for  works councils  to force  firms  to set  up  further  training plans.  In 
co-determining  the  choice  of participants,  works  councils  are  frequently  confronted  with 
the  problem that  further  ~aining is  used  as  an  instrument  of selection  in  order to  achieve 
occupational  differentiation  and  to  secure  the  loyalty  of employees.  Moreover,  workplace 
training  programs  so  far  have  been  largely  aimed  at  employees  not  represented  by  works 
councils  (management  personnel)  or  those  they  have  been  less  committed  to  (technical 
specialists).  Further  training  policy  at  the  workplace  so  far  has  not  been  directed  at  the 
great mass of employees. 
The  increasing  commitment  of firms  to  further  training  has  confronted  a growing  number 
of works  councils  with  the  problem  of how  to  secure  influence  on  the  subjects  of further  1 
training.  Training policy  is  increasingly  incorporated into the  debate  on  work-time  reduc-
tion,  work  organization,  and  the  issue  of socially  responsible  technology.  Works  councils, 
moreover,  increasingly  address  unequal  occupational  opportunities  fostered  by  selective  , 
further  training  policies.  Agreements  have  been  made  in  some  cases  to  provide  special 
further  training  programs  for  workers,  semi -skilled employees,  and  women.  The  rise  of  ·1 39 
new  forms  of further  training  relating  to  work  organization  and  qualification,  such  as 
! quality  circles  and  "learning  centers",  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  large  portion  of strictly 
: workplace-specific  instruction  by  producers  of new  equipment  on  the  other,  have  stimu-
1 lated a growing activity on the part of works councils in the area of further training during 
• recent years. 
4.2.  Financing: The Mobilization of Financial Resources for Training 
! In  the  area  of further  training,  costs  are  borne  primarily  by  employees  themselves,  by 
'firms, the. state,  and the Federal Labor Administration through contributions (from employ-
!  ers and employees) to the unemployment insurance fund. 
4.2.1.  At National Level 
·  The mobilization  of resources  for  participants  in  further  training  was  the  main  motivation 
,  behind  the  1969  revision  of the  AFG.  Both  social  partners  at  that  time  were in favor  of 
1 using  unemployment  insurance  contributions  for  financially  supporting  participants  in 
!further  training.  In the  AFG  an  individual  right  to  funding  of further  training  was  esta-
lblished. 
!Rather generous individual  funding  provisions made it possible  for potential  participants to 
ttake  part  in  workplace  internal  or  external  training  without  requiring  any  significant 
lfmancial  contribution of their own.  Continuing career training at that time  was  funded  to  a 
~arge extent by the Federal  Labor Administration.  The traditionally held view that the  state 
!Was  to play a  subsidiary  role  not  only in  regulation  but  also  in  financing  of further  train-
~g, i.e.  that the  state  should  become  active  only  where the  private  initiative  and  strength 
~f social  groups  was  inadequate,  was  abandoned.  In addition  to the  AFG,  the  Bundesaus-
ildun  sforderun  s  esetz (BAfOG,  Federal Training Assistance Act)  included provisions for 
e  financial  support  of participants  in  further  training  in  schools.  Both  employers  and 
~mployees representatives at that time advocated adequate public funding  for participants in 
further  training.  In  contrast  to  the  area  of  initial  vocational  training,  the  financing  of 
further  training  was  not  controversial.  Since  the  further  training market  is  largely  outside 
the purview of the  state  and  funding  arrangements  under the  AFG initially  were  not  used 
to  influence  further  training  programs,  financing  and  regulation  existed  as  two  basically 
~parate areas.  The  individual  participant,  equipped  with  a  funding  coupon,  could  select  a 
further training program that seemed to make sense for his own occupational development. 
further,  the  AFG  made  provisions  for  the  Federal  Labor  Administration  to  fund  the 
+stablishment  of further  training  institutions  outside  the  area  of schools,  on  the  condition 
fun  these  institutions  would  offer  further  training  not  exclusively  to one  firm  or associa-
~on. 40 
As  a  result of high  and  continuous  unemployment  and  its  high  fiscal  costs,  the  fmancial 
commitments  of the  Federal  Labor  Office  in  the  area  of further  training  already  in  1975 
were  considerably  reduced.  Criteria for  individual  eligibility  were  tightened  and  the  group 
of participants  able  to  receive  wage  compensation  during  full -time  training  was  very 
narrowly defmed.  Thus less  and  less  participants are  able  to  receive any  living allowances 
and  the  once  important  area  of continuing  career  training  is  no  longer  eligible  for  any 
funding except for refundable loans (see Table 1). 
The  social  partners  expressed  different  views  on  these  financial  cuts.  Some  trade  union 
representatives  held  that  a  concentration  of funds  on  the  unemployed  made  sense  and  was 
the  essential  task  of unemployment  insurance.  Among  employers,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
abandoning of individual funding  in favor of predefined groups met with reservations since 
this  made  it  impossible  to  finance  further  training  at  the  workplace  through  AFG  funds. 
The  training  institutions  of employers'  associations  and  trade  unions  also  responded  in 
different ways.  Union-operated institutions soon offered training programs for  groups still 
eligible  for  funding  and  secured  special  projects  to  make  up  for  the  losses  resulting  from 
the  end of non-refundable  support for  continuing career training.  The training institutions 
operated by  employers'  associations  and Chambers,  on  the  other  hand,  did  not  adapt their 
programs so that either participants themselves or firms interested in further training had to 
pay course fees. 
4.2.2.  At Sectoral Level 
The most important instruments  for  mobilizing  financial  resources  at the  sectoral  level  are 
the  collective  agreements  on  educational  leave  and  on  protection  against  rationalization. 
They determine how and for  how long a paid or unpaid leave of absence may be taken for 
further  training.  Additional  collective  agreements  on  financial  arrangements  exist  only  in 
the scaffolding industry where all  employers transfer 1 percent of their total  wage  sum into 
a  parity  controlled  social  fund  which  defrays  course  fees  and  wage-reimbursements  for 
participants. 
4.2.3.  At Regional Level 
The actors  playing  a  role  in  the  mobilization  of resources  at  the  regional  level,  as  in  the 
case of initial training,  are Land governments,  municipalities,  regional chapters of employ-
ers  associations,  Chambers,  and  the  Labor  Administration.  The  federal  Lander,  in  addition 
to  their  financial  commitment  to  establishing  further  training  institutions  (schools,  aca- . 
demies,  etc.),  in  recent  years  have  increasingly  launched  funding  programs  of their  own  : 
for  further  training,  providing  opportunities  for  participants  not  eligible  under  the  AFG  : 41 
~wer Saxony)  or  subsidizing  further  training  at  the  workplace  (Berlin).  Municipal 
Bf>vemments  financially  support  community colleges,  one  of the  most  important  institution 
~  the  area of general  und  vocational  further  training.  The  organized social  partners,  how-
e~er, have  no  part  in  the  development  and  implementation  of these  regional  funding  pro-
gf-ams. 
~  Chamber  level,  workshops  in  continuing  career  training  as  well  as  workshops ·that  do 
n~t provide  recognized  certificates  are  primarily  financed  through  course  fees.  Moreover, 
~  training  institutions  of Chambers  have  access  to  funds  collected  through  a  levy  from 
*mber firms  that  allows  them  to  offer  courses  below  cost.  The  training  institutions  of 
Iqdustry and Commerce have always had  further training programs.  In the  artisanal  sector, 
e~ternal  training  centers  are  increasingly  used  for  further  training  below  the  level  of 
~  examinations  since  with  declining  numbers  of apprentices  these  institutions  are 
e~pected to  be  operating  below  capacity  and  since  technical  and  structural  change  have 
n$de  an  expansion of further training essential. 
4.fZ.4.  At Workplace Level 
Atcording  to  their  own  estimates,  in  1985  firms  spent  some  10  billion  DM  on  further 
tr+.ning,  both for their own programs and  for those offered to their employees  in  coopera-
tiqo  with  external  institutions.  It  is  difficult  to determine  accurately  what  portion  of these 
expenses were direct costs of further training (e.g. costs of instructors and  material) and  to 
w~t extent  indirect  costs  were  included  (e.g.  wages  for  participants  in  further  training, 
~terial expenses  for  participants,  deductions).  The  majority  of firms  does  not  record 
f~er  training costs at all  since a cost analysis for this purpose does not exist. 
R¢ent studies  for  the  C<?mntercial  sector  have  reported  the  following  results:  In  1982/83 
a~ut 18 percent of all  employees took part in firm-initiated further training;  specifically, 
~cipation rates  were  2.6 percent for  unskilled  and  semi -skilled workers,  8  percent for 
s  led workers,  40.2  percent  for  technical  staff,  32.1  percent  for  sales  staff,  and  65.2 
pe  nt  for  management  personnel.  The  investments  of firms  in  their  human  capital  are 
th  not only extremely selective,  but compared to public funding  rates also relatively small 
(v.  Bardeleben  et al.  1986).  Further training  usually  consists  in  short-term on-the -job 
tr~ng or  courses,  while  for  management  personnel  as  well  as  sales  and  technical  staff 
oi+>rtunities are also provided for external further training. 
In J  978 about 14 percent of all  employees covered by compulsory social insurance schemes 
wete eligible  for  educational  leave  under  collective  agreements  or Land  legislation.  How-
evct,  only  few  employees  actually  took  advantage  of  their  right  (Vocational  Training 
Ret>rt 1980).  This may  be  due  to the  fact  that paid leave  for external further training has 42 
T A B L  E  1 
OVERVIEW  OF  REGULATIONS  GOVERNING  fURTHER  TRAINING  IN  THE  EMPLOYMENT  PROMOTION  ACT 
Further Education  and  Retraining  On-the-Job-Adaptation 
Legal  Ba-
sis in 
force 
Since 
Persons  Entitled to 
Support  (§  42) 
Employment!  All  persons  who  have 
Promotion  I  had  or  who  desire  em-
Act  of  I  ployment  subject  to 
1969  I social  security tax 
I 
Budgetary 
Act  of 
1976 
I 
I 
I 
I - Employee  with  com-
1  pleted  vocational 
I  training if subse-
1  quently  employed  at 
I  least  3 years 
1- Employees  with  in-
1  complete  vocational 
I  training if employed 
I  at  least 6 years 
I Activity  as  house-
1 wife  counted  as  em-
1 ployment 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  4th  Amend-1 
I ment  of 
Recognized  as  occupa-
tions: 
I  Employment 
I  Promotion 
I  Act,  1978 
·I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
5th  Amend-
ment  of 
Employment 
Promotion 
Act,  1979 
- Housewife  activity 
- Periods  of  incom-
plete vocational 
training  I 
- Participation  in  vo-1 
cational  preparation! 
Unemployed  with  com- I 
plete vocational  I 
training can  also  be  I 
supported  if the  per- I 
son  has  worked  less  I 
than  3 years.  Unem- I 
played  with  incomplete! 
vocational  training  I 
must  have  worked  3  I 
years  I 
I 
Occupational  activity  I 
no  longer  necessary  ifl 
- unemployed  person  isl 
to be  reintegrated  I 
into his  field;  I 
- person  about  to  losel 
his  job  can  be  em- I 
played;  I 
- applicant  with  in- I 
camp 1  ete vocation a  1  I 
training can  acquire! 
professional  quali- I 
fication  I 
I 
Prerequisites for Mainte-
nance  Allowance  (§  44,  §  46) 
~unt of Mainte-1  Duration  of Wage 
nance  Allowance  I  Subsidy 
U  44)  I 
I 
Maintenance  allowance  for  Approx.  95  % of  1 year  (recom-
mended) 
Condition: 
full-time  and  part-time meas- net  wages 
ures  (if 1/3 of  the  work 
hours  are  affected),  Personal 
criteria for eligibility: All 
persons  who  qualify for 
support 
Maintenance  allowance  only 
for  full-time measures,  sub-
divided  into 
a)  necessary  measures  if par-I 
ticipant  unemployed,  aboutl 
to  lose  his  job,  or with  I 
incomplete  vocational  I 
training  I 
b)  sui tab  1  e measures  (a 11  I 
other  participants)  I 
Personal  criteria for eligi- I 
bility:  Employed  at  least  2  I 
of  last  3 years  at  a  job  sub-1 
ject to social  security tax  1 
or  obligation to work  for  3  I 
years  after completion  of  I 
measure  if participant must  I 
work  for  personal  reasons  andl 
if measure  is  "necessary"  I 
I 
Maintenance  allowance  in-
creased  for  training for 
"high-demand"  occupations. 
Personal  criteria for eligi- I 
bility:  3-year  qualifying  pe-l 
riod extended  for  time  spent  1 
- caring for  children  I 
(max.  3 years  per  child)  I 
- employment  abroad  I 
(max.  2 years)  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
a)  80  % of  net 
wages 
b)  58  % of  net 
wages 
Permanent  Job 
Max.  1 year  I 
Condition:  I 
Employee  must  havel 
already worked  1  I 
year;  on-the-job  I 
training must  lastl 
longer  than  4  I 
weeks  (activity asl 
housewife  counts  I 
as  employment)  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Condition:  I 
Employee  must  have 
worked  6 months 
(incomplete  voca-
tional  training 
and  participation 
in  vocational  pre-
paration  count  as 
occupational  acti-
vity). 
High-demand  occu- Max.  1 year 
pat ions: 
80  % net  of  wages 
Allount  of  I 
Wage  Subsidy! 
Max.  60  % 
of  net 
wages 
Max.  60  % 
of  wages 
Max.  ~0 % 
of  wa~es 
I 
I 
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TABLE  t  (continued) 
Further Education  and  Retraining  On-the-Job-Adaptation  I 
Lega}  Ba- I Persons  Entitled to 
sis  n  I Support  (§  42) 
Fore  I 
Sine  I 
I 
Suppl+nen-1 
tary  I 
Budge.  I 
Act,  1984  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
·1  7th  Antnd-1 
I ment  r:f  I 
I .£mplo~entl 
I  Promot  on  I 
I  Act,  1 86  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Prerequisites for Mainte- I  ~unt of Mainte-1  Duration  of  Wage 
nance  Allowance  (§ 44,  §  46)  I nance  Allowance  I Subsidy 
I  C§  44)  I 
I  I 
I  I 
Reduction  of  maintenance 
allowance  for: 
a)  necessary  measures 
b)  suitable measures  funded 
only  as  a  loan 
c)  maintenance  allowance  for 
unemployed  persons  with  I 
complete  vocational  train-! 
ing  is based  on  75  % of  I 
earnable  income  I 
Personal  criteria for eligi- I 
bi lity:  I 
- Period  for  child care ex- I 
tended  to  4 years  I 
-Persons paying  no  contribu-1 
tion  no  longer  receive  I 
maintenance  allowance,  only! 
reimbursement  of  tuition  I 
fees  I 
I 
a) 
b) 
Reduction  of  maintenance  I  a) 
allowance  for:  I 
a)  necessary  measures  I 
b)  loans  for  "suitable" meas-1 
ures  become  "nonobligatory! 
payments"  (no  longer  any  I 
legal  claim)  I 
c)  Maintenance  allowance  aft-1 
er  vocational  training  I 
based  only  on  50  % of  I 
earnable  income  I 
I 
- 75  % for 
participants 
with  child 
- 68  % for 
participants 
without  child 
58  % as  loan 
- 70  % for 
participants 
with  child 
- 63  % for 
participants 
without  child 
Increase  in  maintenance  I  a)  - 73  % 
allowance  for:  I 
a)  necessary measures  I  - 65  % 
b)  participant again  eligible! 
for  loans  for  suitable  I 
c)  maintenance  allowance  aft-1 
er vocational  training  I 
based  on  75  % of earnable  I 
income  I 
Maintenance  allowance  paid  I 
through  31  December  1989  for  I 
part-time measures  as  well  I 
if applicant  I 
- is under  25  years  old  and  I 
if measure  is necessary  I 
(part-time  employment  must  I 
be  between  12  and  25  hours)! 
- resumes  gainful  employment  I 
but  cannot  handle  full- I 
time  measure.  I 
Applicants  who  do  not  fulfill! 
qualifying  period  but  who  are! 
eligible for  unemployment  aid! 
now  receive maintenance  I 
allowance  matching  their un- I 
ployment  aid.  I 
I 
Condition:  I 
Person  must  be  un-1 
employed  or  about  I 
to  lose  job  I 
Max.  1 year;  I 
no  support  if  I 
on-the-job  train- I 
ing  conducted  with! 
same  employer  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Through  I 
31  December  1989  I 
Subsidy  for  I 
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remained a controversial issue  among the  collective bargaining partners.  At  the  same  time, 
in  a  general  situation  of lower job security  and  greater  work  pressures,  many  employees 
fear  the  loss  of their job or are  discouraged  by  the  intransparency  of the  courses  offered 
(BMBW  1984). 
If an  employee takes  part in  external  further  training  on  his  own  initiative,  he  can  usually 
not count on  funding  or a leave  of absence.  Frequently employers do  not  even  know  about 
such  self -initiated  further  training  (Berger  1985,40).  While  in  the  early  1970s  it  was 
possible  to  receive  financial  support  under  the  AFG  for  further  training  even  when 
employed,  this  opportunity  no  longer  exists.  Individual  expenses  for  further  training  are 
probably very high,  but more detailed data is  not available. 
The  financing  of further training at  the  workplace  is  only  to  a limited extent  controlled by 
trade  unions  and  works  councils  through  collective  or workplace  agreements.  The  selecti-
vity  of further training policy  at  the  workplace is  reflected in  the  area of financing.  This is 
one  reason  why  the  creation of a right to  further  training  for  all  employees,  in  connection 
with  comprehensive  funding  even  for  external  programs,  is  an  integral  part  of  union 
demands  in  the  area  of  further  training.  Employers'  associations  are  opposed  to  these 
demands  and  point  out  that  even  without  such  legal  provisions,  their  expenditures  on 
further training in  recent years have quadrupled (see below, Appendix E). 
4.3.  Implementation and Administration 
4.3 .1.  At National Level 
At the  national  level,  the  social  partners do  not participate  in  the  implementation of further 
training.  The  degree  ~f centralization  of examination  questions  in  the  area  of  further 
training  is  not  as  high  as  in  initial  training.  However,  efforts  in  this  direction  are  being 
made.  The  DIHT  has  set  itself the  task  of bringing  up  to  date  and  standardizing  further 
training examinations. 
4.3.2.  At Sectoral Level 
At  the  sectoral  level  the  implementation  of further  training  is  primarily  in  the  hands  e>f 
gilds  and  occupational  associations.  Trade  unions  can  take  part  in  the  administration  of 
external  training  centers  if  they  offer  further  training.  Their  cooperation  with  traini~g 
institutions  allows  the  continual  adaptation  of further  training  programs  to  new  deman4s 
and  changing  occupational  profiles.  Innovations  in  further  training  are  pursued particularly 45 
by sectoral associations while  large transsectoral training institutions take  up  these ideas and 
design corresponding programs. 
4.3 .3.  At Regional Level 
i In the  area  of public  further  training,  which  is  regulated  by  the  Lander  and  offered  by 
f  public  schools,  academies,  and  colleges,  the  Ministers  of Education  of the  Lander  are 
I
.  responsible  for  implementation  and  administration.  In  so  far  as  the  Lander  have  provided 
funds  for  further  training  to  institutions  other  than  schools,  these  public  agencies  usually 
I  are  unde~ the  supervision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.  The organized social 
1 partners  in  some  cases  have  parity  representation  and  certain  participation  rights  in  these 
, public institutions. 
! For public projects  funded  by  the  Labor Administration,  program  implementation  is  in  the 
I hands  of  the  authorized  training  institution.  However,  the  Labor  Administration  is  in 
1 charge  of selecting  the  participants,  financial  management  and  supervision  of the  project. 
I 
Labor  Adminstration  and  training  institutions  have  to  coordinate  projects  with  the  Cham-
bers  if they  are  aimed  at  providing  certificates  under  the  BBiG  or  retraining  in  a  recog-
1 nized  vocational  training  occupation,  since  Chambers  set  examination  schedules.  Chambers 
!  on  account  of their  examination  rights  thus  have  considerable  influence  on  public  training 
1 projects.  If,  for  example,  a training  institution  wants  for  a certain  group  of participants  a 
llonger  training  period  and  more  intensive  supervision,  the  Chamber's  permission  is 
1 required.  In the  area of further  training  regulated  under  the  BBiG,  Chambers  also  play  an 
lessential  role  in  implementation.  Since  they  have  the  right  to  set  up  Chamber-specific 
~further training examinations  or,  if further  training  is  regulated  federally,  to  hold examina-
jtions,  they play the  most important  role  at  the  regional  level.  All  other training  institutions 
lare  forced to comply with the examination schedules decreed by the  Chambers. 
rrrade  unions  at  the  regional  level  participate  in  the  parity  vocational  training  committees' 
rwhich  under  the  BBiG  in  addition  to  initial  training,  also  make  decisions  on  further  train-
~ng. As  in  the  case  of initial  training,  however,  the  participation of trade  union  representa-
tives is  quite  limited (3.3.3.). 
I 
~  .3 .4.  At Workplace Level 
¥\t  the  workplace  level,  works  councils  can  co-determine  the  implementation  of further 
training programs.  In the  area of further  training,  hardly any  formalized  training programs 
~xist, and  further  training  is  often  workplace-specific  or on-the-job.  Here  it  is  there-
fore even  more difficult for  works councils to  initiate intensive and high-quality programs 
Pum  in  the  area  of initial  training.  Only  in  a  few  large  firms  do  effective  participation 46 
rights  exist for  the  implementation  of further  training  programs,  e.g.  in  the  form  of insti-
tutionalized parity training committees. 
4.4.  Supervision and Control 
As  has  become evident,  the  area of further  training  is  distinguished  from  initial  vocational 
training particularly on account of the  fact  that training programs are hardly formalized a00 
training  standards  are  neither  uniformly determined nor  supervised.  Except  in  the  areas  of 
further  training  regulated  under  the  BBiG  and  training  projects  of the  Labor  Administra-
tion,  there  is  no  supervision  and  control.  The quality  of further  training  is  decided  by  the 
market,  i.e.  by  potential  participants  themselves  as  well  as  by  firms  as  buyers  of labot. 
The quality  of further  training programs usually 'is  known  neither to  individual  participants 
nor to firms  at the  time of selection  - though some  standards  have  emerged according to 
which  graduates  of certain  training  institutions  will  have  more  or  less  promising  career 
opportunities.  The  reputation  of a  training  institution  particularly  at  the  regional  level  is 
more  important  for  its  success  than  its  organizational  affiliation.  However,  firms  in  their 
implementation of external further training usually give preference to the  business- orient~d 
institutions  of Chambers,  gilds,  and  occupational  associations  or  to  those  institutions  that 
work closely with them. 
4.4.1.  At National Level 
The  annual  Vocational  Training  Report  in  its  description  of  vocational  training  policy 
includes sections on further training  (  cf.  3 .4 .1.).  Usually,  it  presents the  state  of regulation 
under the  BBiG  as  well  as  suggestions on future  directions  for  further  training policy.  The 
recommendations  of the  social  partners  remain  at  a  very  general  level.  Compared  to  the 
intensive  debate  on  initial  training,  the  area  of further  training  in  the  past  has  played  a 
minor  role.  However,  the  Coordinating  Group  of the  peak  organizations  is  determined  to 
scrutinize  and develop  individual  further  training programs.  This  should  create  new  oppor-
tunities for participation. 
4.4.2.  At Sectoral Level 
There is  little  participation by the  social  partners  in  supervision  and  control  at  the  sectortu 
level.  Particularly the  occupational associations have assumed the task of developing control 
mechanisms.  Except for the  construction industry, there  seems to  be  no  cooperation amoag 
the social partners in the evaluation of further training programs. 47 
~4  .4  .3.  At Regional Level 
!The  social partners are involved in  the  supervision and  control of further training programs 
jby  virtue of their participation rights in  Chambers and  in  the  Labor Administration.  Cham-
lbers  control  further  training  under  the  BBiG  and  have  influence  on  public  projects  under 
lthe  AFG. 
~he social  partners  are  represented  in  the  self-governing  committees  of  the  Labor 
~dministration and  thus  have  in  principle  an  opportunity  to  supervise  further  training  and 
~etraining policies of the  Labor Administration.  However,  they  have  rarely taken  advantage 
pf their  participation  right.  Employers  have  shown  little  interest  in  these  projects  since 
funding  has  been  redirected  to  the  unemployed.  Trade  unions  generally  are  in  agreement 
tmth  Labor  Administration  projects  and  only  occasionally  raise  specific  problems  (e.g.  if 
lt"aining  institutions that have  a record of offering unsuitable  subjects  and  inadequate  teach-
'ng  are  to  receive  new  project  funds).  In  general,  it  seems  that  members  in  the  Labor 
~dministration committees find  further  training policy  by  and  large  acceptable.  In  1985/86 
trade  unions  injected  their  own  proposals  into  an  intensified  debate  on  the  subjects  of 
public  training  projects  (Lotze  and  Otte  1986,  241).  Upon  recommendation  of the  Execu-
tive and the  Council of the  Federal Labor Administration,  local  Labor Administrations have 
'stablished self-governing  further  training  committees.  The  creation  of these  committees 
was  initiated  primarily  by  the  trade  unions.  Employers  representatives,. however,  are  also 
~terested, hoping that firms  and training institutions of employers'  associations  and  Cham-
E 
will  be  incorporated to  a greater extent into public funding.  The  responsibilities of the 
rther  training  committees  are  to  include:  discussion  of  proposals,  setting  of  quality 
dards,  supervision  of implementation,  and  evaluation  and  analysis.  In  the  past,  these 
(esponsibilities were the exclusive domain of Labor Administrations. 
4.4.4.  At Workplace .Level 
.t  the  workplace  level,  the  implementation  of further  training  is  primarily  the  domain  of 
~anagement, in  large  firms  of personnel  or training  departments.  Participants  in  AFG-
4,Inded  external  further  training  are  also  represented  by  the  works  council,  i.e.  the 
'P-determination  right  in  the  implementation  of  workplace  further  training  programs 
~plies to  external  programs  as  well.  Otherwise,  the  works  council  can  supervise  the 
itnplementation  of further  training  at  the  workplace,  and,  if a  formalized  further  training 
Jtlan  exists,  insure  that  it  is  being  followed.  However,  the  planning  of  further  training 
Jtograms is  not itself subject to co -determination. The co -determination right is  in effect 
I  ited  to  a  kind  of "implementation  control".  The  same  applies  to  the  works  council's 
ght  to  co-determine  the  selection  of  participants.  If  at  the  workplace  level,  parity 
aining  commissions  exist  (or,  as  in  the  construction  industry,  are  part  of  collective 
reements),  then they can supervise program implementation. '·  I 
" 
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5.  The  Role  of the  Social  Partners  in  Vocational  Training  and  Further 
Training in the Construction Industry
1 
In  the  late  1960s  the  political  parties  and  the  relevant  interest  groups  agreed  that  the 
German  system  of vocational  training  was  in  a  state  of "crisis"  and  in  need  of "reform". 
Three  internally  connected  reform  goals  were  debated.  First,  the  traditional  boundaries 
separating  different  vocations  were  to  become  less  rigid.  Related  trades  were  to  have  a 
common  initial  training  period,  with  specialization  being  introduced  gradually  at  later 
points.  The  idea  was  to  equip  apprentices  with  greater  flexibility  to  cope  with  changing 
tasks  and  technical  requirements.  Second,  the  portion  of  vocational  training  provided 
outside  the  firm  was  to  be  increased.  It  was  assumed  that  the  average  firm  - whether 
because  of small  size  or  increasing  specialization  - was  no  longer  in  a  position  to  pro~ 
vide  the  kind  of general  training  that  was  envisaged  particularly  for  the  initial  training 
period.  Third,  the  financing  of vocational  training  - to the  extent  that  it  was  not  directly 
controlled  by  the  state  - was  to  be  restructured  in  order  to  compensate  firms  for  the 
(rising)  costs  of apprenticeship  programs.  Particularly  important  in  this  respect  was  the 
proposal of a committee of experts reporting to the Federal Government,  suggesting to levy 
a  general  training  fee  from  all  firms  which  would  then  be  used  to  reimburse  firms  with 
apprentices.  This was  conceived as  a means  of increasing the  number of apprenticeships  as 
well  as  the quality of training. 
While  the  Social-Democratic  Party  and  the  trade  unions  pressed  vigorously  for  broader 
basic training  and  more  integrated training  curricula,  an  enlarged  role  for  external  training 
centers  and  some  form  of training  levy,  the  employers  had  strong  objections  especially 
against the  training  levy.  But  even  on  this  subject  a measure  of disunity  remained  among 
employers'  associations.  Within the  Federation of German Employers'  Associations  (BDA). 
the  two  affiliates  that  w~re most  inclined  to  find  positive  elements  in  the  Government'$ 
reform  plans  were  the  employers'  associations  of the  construction  industry.  In part,  this 
was due  to certain peculiarities of technology  and  industrial  structure which  spoke  strongly 
in  favor  not  only  of more  integrated  and  externalized  training  but  also  of new  forms  of 
funding. 
1.  Apart  from  the  requirements  created  by  increasingly  rapid  technological  change,  the 
narrow  specialization  of traditional  construction  industry  occupations  had  always  been 
in conflict with the  need  for different  trades  to  cooperate  closely  on  the  building  site i 
Moreover,  productivity  increases  if workers  skilled  in  one  building  trade  can  be  used 
temporarily  to  perform tasks  of other trades  - or at  least  to  prepare the  ground  fot 
1)  A detailed  case  analysis  of the  reform  of vocational  training  in  the  West  German  construction industry 
during the  1970s is presented in Streeck (1983). 49 
the other category of workers to do their job. Joint basic training of workers can thus 
facilitate the management of building sites and improve the organization of work. 
~- Construction  firms  at  any  given  time  are  usually  engaged  in  only a  small  number of 
large-scale and lengthy projects.  As a  result,  it  is possible that apprentices are  never 
exposed to certain jobs during their entire apprenticeship.  External training institutions 
are  therefore  a  useful  device  to  insure  that  all  apprentices  do in  fact  pass  through  a 
common basic  curriculum.  Further points  in  favor  of a  large  training portion  outside 
the  firm  are  the  great  dependence  of construction  work  on  weather  conditions;  the 
increasing  use  of  piece  rates  for  construction  teams,  which  leaves  little  time  for 
instructing  apprentices;  and  the  constant  pressure  of deadlines  on  construction  sites 
which may negatively affect the quality of training (Kath  1981, 326). 
~  Compared to other industries,  construction firms  are usually  small.  (The  average firm 
size in construction in  1979 was  21  employees.) Training costs therefore may become 
a  heavy  burden,  particularly  if  more  stringent  regulations  impose  higher  training 
standards.  Moreover,  the  fluctuation  of skilled  workers  between  construction  firms 
traditionally has  been  high,  which makes the  amortization  of training  costs  for  indivi-
dual  firms  even less probable than in  other industries.  Both factors  speak  for  a  finan-
cial scheme above the firm level which distributes the costs of training more equally. 
}flother reason  why  the  construction  industry  was  more  receptive  than  other industries  to 
~  reform  proposals  of the  early  1970s  was  its  deteriorating  position  in  the  market  for 
s~lled labor.  The  number  of apprentices  in  the  construction  industry  had  declined  almost 
cctntinuously  in  the  period  from  1950  to  1972.  While  in  1950  there  had  been  93,000 
agprentices,  only a decade later this figure  had been nearly cut in  half (1960:  52,000).  By 
1  t72  the  lowest  point  was  reached  with  26,100  apprentices.  Although  other  sectors  in 
~ufacturing also  suffered  from  a  decline  due  to  demographic  changes  as  well  as  the 
eJ\Pansion  of secondary education,  the  construction  industry  was  hit  much  more  seriously. 
A~cording to its associations,  in order to provide for a constant stock of skilled workers, a 
r~o  of 9 apprentices per. 100 skilled workers has to be maintained.  Around the year 1970, 
h<)wever,  there were only 3 apprentices to every 100 skilled workers. 
~us, when  in  the  late  1960s  the  modernization  of vocational  training  moved  onto  the 
J>4itical  agenda,  this  was  immediately  perceived  by  the  industry  as  an  opportunity  to 
~rove  the attractiveness of the  skilled construction trades.  But while  the employers were 
qtfte  willing  to  pursue  the  reform  ideas  that  were  being  floated  at  the  time,  they  were 
cl~ly not prepared to accept greater influence on  vocational  training by the  state.  In part, 
~  was because direct state regulation  would inevitably have meant a general  transsectoral 
sofution,  particularly with respect to financing.  Only a sector-specific approach,  however, 
c~ld give  the  construction  industry  a  competitive  advantage  over  other  sectors  in  the 
*ket for  apprentices.  This  view  was  shared  by  the  trade  union  which  was  no  less 
~cemed  about the declining numbers of apprentices and skilled workers than  the employ-
er$. so 
Interest Organization in the German Construction Industry 
Firms  in  the  construction  industry  are  organized  by  two  employers'  associations,  both  of 
which at the same time function  as trade associations.  Artisanal firms are represented at  the 
federal  level  by the  Zentralverband des  Deutschen Baugewerbes (ZDB,  Central Association 
of the  German  Building  Industry).
2  Non -artisanal  firms  are  represented  by  the  Haupt-
verband  der  Deutschen  Bauindustrie  (HDB,  Association  of  the  German  Construction 
Industry).  Both  associations  negotiate jointly with  the  industrial  union  for  the  construction 
industry,  IG  Bau-Steine-Erden  (IG  BSE,  Industrial  Union  of Construction  Workers). 
These  three  organizations  played  the  decisive  role  in  the  reform  of vocational  training  in 
the  construction industry. 
There were about 50,000 artisanal  construction firms  in  West Germany in the  early  1980s. 
About  90  per cent  of these  were  organized  in  686  local  guilds  that  were  affiliated  to  29 
regional  guild associations.  These,  in  turn,  were joined at  the  national  level  in  the  Zentral-
verband (ZDB  Diagram n.  Together with  other artisanal trade and  employers' associations!' 
the  ZDB  forms  the  Federation  of Artisanal  Associations  (Bundesvereinigung  der  Fachver-
bande des  Handwerks,  BFH)  and,  ultimately,  the  Central  Association  of German  Artisans 
(Zentralverband des  Deutschen Handwerks,  ZDH). 
Of  the  10,000  non-artisanal  construction  firms  in  1980,  about  one-third  - almost 
exclusively  the  larger  ones  which  specialize  in  civil  engineering  - were  organized  in  the 
16  regional  associations  of the  Hauptverband  (HDB).  Four of these  organize  also  artisanal 
firms  and  are  therefore  at  the  same  time  affiliated  to  the  Zentralverband  (ZDB).  The 
Hauptverband, just like the Zentralverband,  is  a member of the  BDA.  It  is  also affiliated to 
the  Federation  of German  Industry  (BDI)  which  is  the  non-artisanal  counterpart  of the 
ZDH. 
The differences between the  domains of the  two main employers'  associations  explain  their 
different  interests  in,  and  contributions  to,  vocational  training.  Although  in  1970  nonarti-
sanal  firms  employed about 33  per cent  of all  workers  in  the  industry,  they  accounted  fo~ 
only  13  per  cent  of the  apprentices.  Artisanal  firms,  by  contrast,  with  67  per cent  of thd 
workforce,  were  training  87  per  cent  of the  industry's  apprentices.  This  unequal  distribu~ 
tion was  due  to a variety of factors.  Training in the  artisanal  sector typically takes place in 
firms  \\-ith  close  paternalistic  ties  between  employer  and  employee.  Since  these  firms  are 
mostly located  in  rural or small  town  labour markets of limited size,  the  internal amortiza-
tion  of training  costs  is  comparatively  more  likely.  Moreover,  the  legally  protected  privi-
2)  On  the  distinction  between  artisanal  and  non-artisanal  firms  in  Germany,  see  Doran  (1984),  Streecl~ 
(forthcoming).  ! Oiag/'8111/ 
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leges  and  the continuity  of artisanal  firms  are  conditional  on  their  owners  or leading  staff 
passing  a  series  of formal  examinations  to  certify  their  command  of a  prescribed  set  o{ 
practical  skills  and theoretical  knowledge.  Vocational  training,  for  this  reason,  is  a central 
concern of artisanal firms and their associations (Streeck,  forthcoming). 
The  condition  is  different in  non-artisanal  firms  which  for  a long  time  did not even  have 
a formal  system of training.  Originally they either provided informal,  on -the -job training 
or relied on the training efforts of the  artisanal  sector whose  skilled workers they  absorbed 
in large  numbers.  This  became  less  than satisfactory  with  technical  change  (e.g.  the  intro~ 
duction  of armoured  concrete)  and  growing  mechanization.  More  and  more,  large  firms 
began to  look for  a type of skilled worker who  was  more flexible  and  able  to  cope  with a 
variety  of tasks,  who  had  comprehensive  qualifications,  and  in  particular  was  capable  of 
acquiring  additional  skills.  The  kind  of training  required  for  this  was  both  costly  and 
difficult to  provide on the construction  site.  When  in  addition the  number of apprentices  iQ 
the  artisanal  sector began to  decline  dramatically  in  the  1960s,  the  HDB  as  the  representa~ 
tive  of the  large  firms  realized  that  a  comprehensive  reform  of vocational  training  in  the 
construction industry, artisanal  as  well  as  non - artisanal,  was  inevitable. 
The reform of vocational  training in  construction in  the  1970s was  promoted jointly by  the 
two  large  employers'  associations.  Given  the  different  problems  and  interests  of the  twd 
associations  and  their  members  with  regard  to  training,  this  common  effort  appears  quite 
extraordinary.  There  were  of course  structural  factors  favouring  a joint approach,  such  as 
the fact that many of the  firms  represented by the HDB  and  ZDB  operate in  the same  local 
labor  markets.  But  at  least  as  important was  the  existence  of a single  trade  union  for  the 
entire  industry  which  strongly  supported the  introduction  of an  integrated,  unified  training 
scheme.  This  union,  the  IGBSE,  is  one  of 17  industrial  unions  belonging to  the  DGB.  In 
addition  to  construction it  covers the  building  materials  industries.  In 1970 the  IGBSE  had 
a membership of 504,230,  18 percent more than  in  1960 (Bayer et al.  1981). 
Trade  union  and  employers'  associations  in  the  German  construction  industry  have  a long 
history  of cooperation  (Streeck  1981).  In the  1960s  in  particular,  the  industry's  growing 
recruitment  problems  gave  rise  to  an  elaborate  sectoral  social  policy  based  on  collective 
agreements  which  as  a  rule  were  declared  binding  on  all  workers  and  employers  in  the 
industry  by  the  Government.  Out  of these  common  efforts  grew  the  "Social  Funds  of the 
Construction  Industry"  which  are  jointly  controlled  by  the  union  and  the  two  employers 
associations  (Spemer et al.  1976).  In 1980,  the  funds  collected  what  in  effect amounted to 
a legally enforceable payroll  tax of 20.0 per cent of total  wages from  each employer in  the 
industry.  The  money  is  paid  to  construction  workers  under  a  number  of social  policy 
programs  aimed  at  compensating  the  various  disadvantages  construction  workers  suffer  in 
comparison  to  workers  in  other  industries  as  a  result  of casual  employment.  Apart  from 
their  main  functions,  the  funds  provide  an  institutional  opportunity  for  informal  meetingS 53 
and  cooperation  between  employers  and  trade  union.  From  the  perspective  of the  latter, 
they also offer a form  of parity co-determination adapted to the  specific conditions of the 
construction industry. 
The  vocational  training  reform  in  the  1970s  was  a  remarkable  event  for  a  number  of 
reasons.  Not only was  it one  of the  first such projects to  be  started after the passage of the 
Vocational  Training  Act  of 1969.  In addition,  it  was  one  of the  most  comprehensive  and 
innovative,  and  it  was  pursued  with  unusual  speed  and  strategic  determination.  For  the 
, most part, this  was  due  to the  close  cooperation of the  social  partners at  the  sectoral  level 
which  between  them  developed  the  project  and  defended  it  against  resistance  among  both 
; their  own  rank  and  file  and  powerful  employers'  associations  outside  the  industry.  More-
l over,  the  two  sides  successfully  worked  together  to  ensure  that  the  reformed  training 
! system,  and  the  considerable resources that came  to  be  invested in  it,  remained  under their 
l  joint control  rather  than  that  of the  state.  By  demonstrating  to  the  various  other  interests 
I involved in  the governance of the training system the enormous potential power of employ-
i ers and  trade unions  at  sectoral  level  acting  in  unison,  they  also  inadvertantly gave  rise  to 
\efforts to  safeguard the  unity  of the  training  system at  large  and  prevent  its  sectoral  frag-
\ mentation  as  a  result  of training  becoming  de  facto  another  subject  of sectoral  collective 
! bargaining ("Vertariflichung der beruflichen Bildung"). 
i 
I  The Vocational Training Reform of 1974 
!The  reform  project  that  was  negotiated  in the  early  1970s  between  the  three  associations 
~had three  main elements:  (1)  the  introduction of a new,  integrated training  curriculum;  (2) 
the creation  of a  levy  system  to  finance  training  activities;  and  (3)  the  establishment of a 
~etwork of training centers to provide training outside  individual firms. 
-.  The Integrated Training Scheme 
fhe strategy of the  three  associations  was  to  produce  complete  and  mutually  agreed  draft 
tegulations  that  without  modification  would  then  have  to  be  accepted  by  the  Government 
(see  below,  Appendix  B).  The  objective  was  to  exclude  as  far  as  possible  outside  inter-
ference.  This  was  directed as  much  against  the  state  as  against  the  BDA -and  ZDH  which 
were hostile to significant elements of the  reform project. 
¢oncerning the  substance  of the  new  training  scheme,  there  was  agreement  among  union 
t4Dd  employers  that  in  order to  increase  the  attractiveness  of the  industry  for  young  people, 
~  duration of apprenticeships had to be  reduced,  a large  portion of the training had to  be 
~fted from  the  construction site to training centers  outside  the  firm,  and  standards had to 54 
be  raised.  The  latter  was  to  be  achieved  by  reorganizing  the  training  curriculum  on  the 
model  of what is  called in  German  "Stufenausbildung"  - a training concept that was new 
and considered rather avantgard.istic  at the time.  It involved essentially two things: 
1.  a  curriculum  starting  with  broad basic  training  in  the  first  year  and  leading  gradually 
and  stepwise,  with  an  intermediate  level  of specialization  in  the  second  year,  towards 
specific occupational qualifications.  An examination was to be taken and passed not only at 
the end of the apprenticeship but also after the second year; 
2.  the  integration  of as  many  construction  industry  occupations  as  possible  in  the  ~e 
training· scheme,  with  common  basic  training in  the  first  year and  only  limited differentia-
tion  between  occupations  in  the  second.  This  implied  integration  also  of artisanal  (e~g., 
tilers)  and  non-artisanal  (e.g.,  concrete  workers)  construction  occupations,  as  well  as 
identical  curricula for  identical  occupations  regardless  of whether training  was  provided in 
artisanal  or non-artisanal firms  - something that  was  almost  revolutionary  especially  for 
the artisanal sector. 
Working closely  together,  trade  union  and employers'  associations produced a first draft of 
a  new  training  regulation,  complete  for  the  Minister  to  decree.  Several  other  such  drafts 
had to follow,  however,  in  successive attempts  to  accommodate as  many  as  possible of the 
objections  that  were  raised  by  other  interested  parties.  For  example,  enormous  technical 
and  political  complications  arose  from  the  need  to  coordinate  the  new  construction  curri-
culum  with  the  public  school  system  and  the  - different  - educational  policies  of· the 
Uinder.  Another cause  of delay was opposition of employers'  associations  of other sectors 
and of the national peak associations  such as  the BOA and the  ZDH which had to formally 
heard by the Minister. 
The fmal  version of the  Integrated Training Scheme  for  Construction  Industry Occupations 
(Stufenausbildung  fiir  Bauberufe)  which  was  turned  into  a  governmental  decree  in  May 
1974  provided  for  one  year  of common  basic  training  for  no  less  than  14  constru¢tion 
trades,  artisanal  and  non - artisanal  (Diagram  II). 
3  In  the  second  year, 
3)  Detailed  inspection  of the  list  of occupations  included,  and  not  included,  in  the  Integrated  Training 
Scheme reveals its impact on the  building industry (as distinguished from civil engineering) ~d  on the ismall 
fmns  - which is  what this project is particularly interested in. Most of the  fli'IllS  that engage in  buil~g are 
small;  hardly  any  small  construction  firm  does  civil  engineering  work;  and  the  vast  majority  of ~small 
construction  firms  have  artisanal  status.  The law recognises  17 artisanal construction trades, or occupations. 
This includes c~ey  sweepers and painters but not plumbers or building electricians which in Germally are 
not  classified  among  the  construction  industry.  Five of the  17  trades,  including  the  chimney  sweepers  and 
painters,  are  not  represented  by  the  ZDB  but  by  separate  artisanal  associations,  and  significantly  enough 
these  were not covered by the reform and the integrated curriculum. Most conspicuously aloof have ~n  the Oiaqram/1 
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apprentices  were  to be  divided  in  three  groups,  building,  finishing,  and  civil  engineering. 
Having passed  their first  examination,  they  would then  proceed to  nine  months  of training 
in  one  of the  14  specialized  occupations.  The fmal  examination  was  to certify  their  status 
as skilled workers in  these occupations. 
Another innovative  aspect of the  training scheme was  the  way  in  which  it  divided training 
time  between  the  workplace,  the  (public)  vocational  school,  and  external  training  centers. 
The construction industry was the  first  to rely extensively on a  "third training location"  in 
addition  to  the  workplace  and  the  vocational  school  system.  Since  this  seemed  to  under-
mine the dual  system, it added to the controversy between the construction industry and the . 
peak  employers'  associations.  Construction  industry  apprentices  in  their  first  year  today 
spend  only  six  weeks  at  the  workplace,  and  as  much  time  in  the  training  center  as  at 
school.  While  later  this  relationship  changes,  in  the  second  year  the  training  center  still 
occupies more than  one third of the time an  apprentice spends outside the  school. 
2.  The Levy System 
A  foremost  concern  of the  authors  of the  Integrated Training  Scheme  were  its  effects  on 
the firms'  willingness  to  train.  The  larger training  portion  outside  the  firm  both increased 
training costs  and  reduced  the  productive contribution  of apprentices.  Moreover,  the  intro-
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roofers which, being one of the major building trades in Germany, refused to join the ZDB after the war.  In 
the  1970s they rejected all pleas to participate in the reform project  - in  part because they  were concerned 
about their occupational and organizational independence. 
All  12  construction trades organized by  the  ZDB but one  were merged in  the  Integrated  Training  Scheme. 
The  one  exception  was  baking  oven  building  which  is  a  highly  specialized,  traditional  occupation  that  is 
expected to wither  away  soon.  Three of the  eleven  artisanal  trades  covered by the  Scheme  were  finishing 
trades:  the  tilers,  the  concrete  stone  and terrazzo  makers,  and  the  floor  fmishers.  Especially  the  first  two 
were later to fmd  the  Scheme  less  than  congenial  and  highly  unsatisfactory,  and  in  fact  the  concrete  stone 
and  terrazzo  makers  managed  in  1984  to be  given  permission  by  all  three  parties  to the  1974  decree  to 
return to their traditional training system. 
The eight main artisanal construction trades that were integrated in addition to the three finishing trades were  i 
the bricklayers,  the concrete and armoured concrete builders,  the  furnace  and  chimney builders, the carpen-
ters, the road builders, the  insulation builders,  the well  builders, and the  stucco makers.  Before the  reform,· 
formal training in some of these occupations, especially concrete and road building, was also provided in the 
non-artisanal sector,  albeit under different curricula.  The reform eliminated these  differences,  and training 
in the respective occupations was standardized for artisanal and non -artisanal fUlllS. 
Finally,  in  addition  to the  11  artisanal  and  "mixed"  occupations,  three  more  occupations  were included  in 
the  Integrated  Training  Sc.heme  that  were,  and  continue  to  be,  trained  only  in  the  non-artisanal  sector. : 
These  were  the  pipeline  builders,  the  canal  builders  and  the  dry  construction  assemblers  (Trockenbau-
monteur)  - i.e. three typical  civil engineering occupations.  All  non-artisanal manual  construction occupa-
tions  were  thus  included.  Later  in  the  1970s,  another  non-artisanal  building  occupation  - the  track 
construction worker (Gleisbauer)  - was created and also fitted  into the Scheme. 57 
duction  of the  scheme  coincided  with  a  deep  recession  in  the  construction  industry.  For 
these  reasons, the  inevitable  next step had  to be  a  reorganisation  of the fmancing  of voca-
tional training with the aim of reducing the costs for firms that provided training. 
In  September 1975, the  union  and the  employers'  associations  of the  construction  industry 
signed a  "Collective Agreement on Vocational  Training".  It  stipulated that each firm  in  the 
l industry had  to pay  a  levy  of 0.5  percent of its  payroll  into  a  central  fund  out  of which 
firms were to be compensated for part of their training expenses, especially for the costs of 
1  external  training.  Payments  were  to  be  collected  by  the  Social  Funds  of the  Construction 
i  Industry using the established procedure. The agreement was declared legally binding on all 
construction firms  regardless of association membership,  by Government decree.  In succes-
sive years,  the  levy  was  raised  to  1.5 percent in  1979 and  1.  7 percent in  1986 due  to the 
ensuing increase in training activities and a declining wage bill as  a result of the recession. 
Given  the  unequal  distribution  of training  between  artisanal  and  non -artisanal firms,  any 
!  system that  finances  training  by  a  payroll  levy  inevitably  redistributes  funds  from  HDB  to 
: ZDB  firms.  Since  the  share  of non -artisanal  firms  in  the  industry's  wage  bill  clearly 
1  exceeds  their  share  in  the  number  of apprentices,  such  firms  under  the  Industrial  Agree-
: ment in  effect subsidize training in  the  artisanal  sector.  There are  indications  that this  was 
seen  by  the  artisanal  firms  and their association  as  a  quid  pro quo  for  their  agreement  to 
:the integrated curriculum. 
:  The  introduction  of the  training  levy  in  the  construction  industry  coincided  with  plans  of 
i the  Government to establish a  comprehensive  national  training levy  by legislation.  For the 
1 associations of the construction industry, this coincidence was  both  an  asset  and a  liability. 
I  Since  the  peak employers'  associations  were at  the  time  fighting  an  intense  political  battle 
I  against the  Government proposal,  the emerging agreement in  the  construction  industry was 
~a  dangerous  precedent  for  them.  As  a  consequence,  ZDB  and  HDB  came  under  heavy 
~attack inside the BOA and the  ZDH, even more so than  over the  integrated training curri-
~eulum. To defend themselves,  they  argued that  separate funds  for  individual  industries  run 
~  the  "social partners"  were  more acceptable  than  one  comprehensive fund  controlled  by 
•  state  bureaucracy.  In  this  sense,  they  presented  their  solution  as  an  altemati  ve  to  the 
Government's  plans.  In  any  case,  while  the  peak  associations  ultimately  defeated  the 
Government  proposal,  they  were  unable  to  make  the  construction  industry  associations 
~thdraw from  their  collective  agreement,  or  to  prevent  the  agreement  being  declared 
senerally binding by the Government. 
tJ.  The Establishment of Training Facilities Outside Firms 
fhe next problem on the agenda after the introduction of the levy system was the provision 
C>f  adequate facilities  for training outside the firm.  Since  it  had been  one of the  motives of 
~e reform to prevent such tr1lining  taking place in  state  institutions,  these  facilities  had to 58 
be  created  and  operated  by  the  industry  itself  through  its  employers'  associations  and 
Chambers.  There was  agreement that artisanal  and non-artisanal  firms  had to provide for 
training  facilities  in proportion to their  share  in  the  number  of apprentices.  This  was  not 
difficult  for  the  non-artisanal  firms  represented  by the  HDB  which  were  responsible  for 
only a  minor fraction  of the  apprentices.  The situation was  different in  the  artisanal  sector 
whose existing external training capacity was small  in  comparison to its number of appren-
tices  and  to  the  requirements  of the  Integrated  Training  Scheme.  It  was  because  of this 
problem  that  the  decree  of  1974  provided  for  a  transition  period  of four  years  during 
which  the  Integrated  Curriculum  was  obligatory  only  in  regions  with  sufficient  external 
training facilities. 
For obvious reasons, the  creation and management of the new external training centers had 
to be the  responsibility  of local  and  regional  associations.  The  ZDB therefore  had to wait 
for  its  affiliates,  or the  Chambers  of Artisans,  to  take  the  initiative.  This,  however,  was 
not  forthcoming.  In  part,  the  reluctance  of  local  associations  reflected  the  high  initial 
investment costs.  Under the demanding  Integrated Training Scheme,  there  needs to be one 
external  training  post  for  every  four  apprentices.  Initial  capital  investment  per  external 
training post amounted to between 50,000 and 70,000DM  (Kath  1981,  324).  Although the 
Government  was  willing  to  contribute  up  to  90  percent of investment  costs  as  a  subsidy, 
external  training  capacity  in  the  artisanal  sector  of the  construction  industry  grew  only 
slowly.  Thus,  the  ZDB had to ask  the  Ministry three times  for  an  extension  of the  transi-
tion period,  and it was  not until  the  middle of 1982 when,  after eight years, the decree on 
the Integrated Training Scheme could finally take force in the entire country. 
The  main  reason  why  even  large  Government  subsidies  failed  to  induce  local  artisanal 
associations  to  set  up  external  training  facilities  was  growing  opposition  on  the  part  of 
artisanal  firms  against the  Integrated  Training  Scheme.  When the  new  scheme  was  gradu-
ally  implemented,  it  turned  out  that  many  of the  firms  represented  by  the  ZDB  had  not 
been quite  aware of its  implications when  it was passed.  The  ZDB went through a  critical 
period  in  the  second  half of the  1970s  when  its  members  were  demanding  in  growing 
numbers that the  new training system be  revised or abandoned.  But due to the  "consensus 
principle",  modification of what was by then already a ministerial decree was possible only 
with the  agreement of both the  union  and the  HDB,  and  this  is  an  important  reason  why 
the system has  remained essentially unchanged up to now. 
4 
4)  Since  1974,  there  have  been  a  series  of minoir  changes  in  the  system  all  of which  were  negotiated 
between  the  three  associations.  Most  important  among  these  was  the extension of the  training  period to  full 
three  years, upon  pressures from the ZDB.  Many other demands of the artisanal frrms  were rejected.  At  the 
time of writing,  the HDB has served notice of its intention not to prolong the levy system, but it appears that 
this is only a tactical move. 59 
!  The Coosequenres of the Reform:  The Situation in the Early 1980s 
I  During  the  time  the  new  training  regulations  were  gradually  introduced,  the  number  of 
1 apprentices in the construction industry increased strongly. According to both the  union  and 
I  the  employers'  associations,  the  quality  of  training  also  improved.  The  construction 
i  industry now  has an  extensive  system of external training centers  operated and  financed  by 
I  its  associations.  Although there  continues  to be  a  considerable degree  of discontent  among 
!employers with  the  integrated  training  scheme,  especially  among  small  firms,  there  is  not 
I  likely to be any significant  "reform of the reform" in  the  near future. 
!Between  1974, the  year when  the  integrated training  scheme  was  introduced,  and  1980 the 
1number  of apprentices  in  the  construction  industry  increased  by  more  than  one  half  to 
162,000.  The  percentage  of apprentices  in  the  construction  industry  workforce  grew  from 
12.4  to  4.9 percent,  and  in  1980  there  was  one  apprentice  to  every  nine  skilled  workers 
lwhich  exactly represented the  necessary reproduction ratio. 
IThe  increase in the  number of apprentices in construction was  significantly higher than  the 
~eneral increase in  apprenticeships that occurred in  the  1970s.  Between  197  4 and 1980, the 
~umber of apprentices  in  manufacturing  grew  by  32  percent  to  979 ,400;  the  respective 
-rowth rate  in  the  construction  industry  was  93  percent.  As  a  consequence,  the  share  of 
~nstruction industry  occupations  in  the  total  number  of apprentices  in  the  West  German 
~onomy increased  from  4.4  percent  in  197  4,  to  6.4  percent  in  1980.  Since  due  to  the 
introduction  of  the  Vocational  Basic  Training  Year  (Berufsgrundbildungsjahr),  in  three 
Jlinder construction industry apprentices  in  their first  year are  counted as  pupils  of secon-
~  schools,  these  figures  still  underestimate  the  dimension  of the  change  (Glaser  et  al. 
J981). 
lt  is of course difficult to say whether the considerable gains of the construction industry  in 
the  inter-sectoral  competition  for  apprentices  were  indeed  caused  by higher attractiveness 
f,>f  the new,  integrated training scheme.  Many other factors  have  undoubtedly played a role . 
.A-ccording  to  the  union  and  the  employers'  associations,  the  most  important  effect  of the 
teform seems to have been that the  levy  system made firms  more willing to take advantage 
•f the  higher  demand,  due  to  demographic  factors,  by  young  people  for  training  opportu-
~ties.  It  needs  t0  be  emphasized  that  the  disproportionate  increase  in  the  number  of 
~pprenticeships in  construction  took  place  in  a  period  in  which  the  industry  underwent  a 
~ore serious economic  crisis  than  any  other sector,  and  in  which  its  total  number of em-
iloyees declined sharply. 
the  suggestion  that  the  reform  had  greater effects  on  the  behaviour  of firms  than  on  the 
freferences of young people  looking  for  training opportunities,  is  borne out by  subsequent 
4evelopments.  As  the  number of school  leavers  entering  the  dual  system  began  to  decline 60 
for demographic reasons in the mid1980s, the first  industry that was affected was construc-
tion.  Between  1984 and  1985, the  number of new apprenticeship contracts in  the  construc-
tion industry decreased from  21,000 to 13,000  - which was  registered with  alarm  by the 
unions as well as the employers' associations.  For the future all  sides expect the number of 
apprentices to fall  far short of the  1984 peak of 72,100. 
Outside the industry,  the  new training scheme  had only  limited  repercussions.  In part, this 
was because the peak employers' associations did their utmost to prevent a further  "sectora-
lization"  of training  policy.  Thus,  the  use  of collective  agreements  to  establish  a  levy 
finance  system  remained  basically  confined  to  the  construction  industry.  Similar  schemes 
are in force  in only three small,  construction-related trades (e.g. roofing or gardening and 
landscaping),  and a fourth  one  will  shortly be introduced in  the  concrete stone and terrazzo 
industry.  Moreover,  the  proportion of vocational  training time  spent outside the  firm  is  in 
all  other economic sectors far lower than  in construction.  On the  other hand,  it is  true that 
it has  generally  increased.  Also,  while  no  other  industry  has  embraced  the  idea  of inte-
grated  curricula  and  common  basic  training  for  a  large  number  of occupations  quite  as 
enthusiastically as  the  construction  industry,  at least the  division  between basic  and specia- , 
lized training has today become generally accepted. 
The  Social  Partners in Further Training 
In line  with  their  tradition  of innovative  joint  initiatives  to  increase  the  governability  of 
their unwieldy industry, the  social partners in  the construction sector have been engaged in 
various  efforts  to  extend  the  scope  and  improve  the  quality  of further  training.  Leaving 
aside the  Meister training in the artisanal part of the industry (see above, Chapter 3), these 
initiatives  were, just as  the  reform of initial  vocational  training,  motivated  by  the  need  to 
alleviate  the  disadvantages  of casual  employment  for  both  workers  and  employers.  They 
were also a reaction to changing technical and economic requirements in  an industry whose 
labor  force  had  become  comparatively  unskilled  during  the  period  of expansion  in  the 
1950s and 1960s, resulting in  considerable skill deficits that were impossible to remedy just 
by expanding initial vocational training. 
In particular,  the  main  incentive  for  the  employers  to extend and  upgrade  further  training 
was that this  was  expected to  facilitate  efficient  utilization  of ever  more  expensive  machi- 1 
nery  through  reduction  of downtime  and  swifter  repairs.  Moreover,  further  training  was , 
seen as a way of attracting and keeping a core labour force of German skilled workers at a ,' 
time  when  heavy  reliance  on  unskilled  foreign  labour  was  creating  growing  management 
problems  on  the  building  site.  For  the  union,  the  primary  objective  was  to  increase 
employment stability by making employers invest in  human capital;  to enlarge the opportu- · 
nities of workers in the external  labour market through certification of acquired skills;  and i 61 
1to  improve the  social  security  status  of redundant construction  workers  (unskilled  workers 
1are  expected to accept any job offered to them by the labour administration whereas skilled 
!workers  have  certain  rights  to  reject  employment  outside  their  occupation  without  losing 
IUJlemployment benefit). 
jfu  close parallel to their activities in other areas, trade union and employers' associations in 
~e German  construction  industry  have  created,  by  industrial  agreement,  a  separate, 
lSector-specific  system  of further  training  and  certification  adding  to  and  complementing 
J}le  three transsectoral systems:  the  artisanal Meister training,  the  further training for  other 
~sanal occupations under the supervision of the Chambers of Artisans, and the system of 
rurther training organized by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.  All three "general" 
$ystems  are  available  to the  construction  sector  as  well;  but  there  are  also  qualifications 
that  are  certified  exclusively  by  special  examination  boards  for  the  construction  industry 
,mt are set  up by the  social  partners.  The respective  certificates  are  valid  only inside  the 
lndustry;  they do,  however,  carry an  entitlement to  be  grouped in  a  particular wage  cate-
gory under the collective agreement. 
he main  areas of further  training  in the  construction industry,  again  apart from  the  arti-
~  Meister training, are the following: 
J.  The Training of Machinists 
the use  of heavy  machinery  in  construction  has  considerably  increased  since  the  second 
l'!orld  war.  In the  1970s,  already  about  one third of the  construction  workforce  were  no 
1onger  working  in  traditional  occupations  such  as  bricklayers  or  carpenters  but  were 
frivers, mechanics or machine operators. Normally these workers were not formally skilled 
•ither in a  traditional  construction  occupation  or in  their actual jobs.  They also  were paid 
~ss than  the  traditional  skilled  occupations.  While  this  may initially  have  appeared attrac-
fve  to  many  employers,  the  high  costs  of the  new  equipment  and  the  increased  capital 
~tensity of construction work made wages less important.  At the  same time,  they placed a 
tremium on a workforce of drivers and machine operators who were capable of preventing 
~reakdowns and reducing downtime,  as  well  as  maintaining a  high level  of safety.  Profes-
$onalization  of the  new  category  of workers  could  thus  be  expected  to pay  for  its  costs 
1frrough  more  efficient  utilization  of equipment  and  lower  contributions  to  the  accident 
~surance system. 
~  the early 1970s, the social partners of the construction industry took part in a number of 
~rojects to create new formal  occupations for the industry's growing workforce of machine 
qperators and drivers.  In 1974, they agreed,  together with  other trade unions  and employ-
ts' associations,  on the  introduction  of the  occupation  of "certified driver"  (Berufskraft-
~),  specializing at the skilled workers level in the  operation and maintenance of motor 62 
vehicles.  Admission  to  the  examination  requires  two  years  of training  or  four  years  of 
practical  experience.  Almost  ten  years  later  the  occupation  of "certified  driver-foreman" 
(Gepriifter Kraftverkehrsmeister) was  created at the  Industriemeister level.  Here,  admission 
is  limited to  applicants  with  a  skilled  occupation,  including  that  of "certified driver",  and 
required  standard  training  time  is  about  1,000  hours  - i.e.  one  half year  - of course 
work.  A  "certified driver-foreman" is  to  be  able  to  manage  the  entire  driving equipment 
and the  respective  workforce  of a large  construction  firm.  Examinations  for  both  occupa-
tions are given by either the Chambers of Artisans or the Chambers of Industry. 
A parallel initiative was  taken with regard to machine operators.  In 1978, the  occupation of 
"certified .construction  machine  operator"  (Gepriifter  Baumaschinenfiihrer)  was  introduced 
in  the  skilled  workers  category.  A  few  years  later,  the  Meister  qualification  of "certified 
machine foreman"  (Gepriifter Baumaschinenmeister) was  added,  designed to enable trainees 
to build up,  maintain  and  operate the  complete  mechanical  equipment  needed  for  a large-
scale  building  project.  The  curriculum  provides  for  800  hours  of course  work.  Again, 
examinations are administered by  the  respective Chambers. 
Two  further  occupations  were  created  by  collective  agreement  outside  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Chambers  and  government agencies.  Examinations  for  the  occupations  of "construction 
machinist"  (Baumaschinist)  and  "construction machine  foreman"  (Baumaschinenfachmeister) 
are given by  special examination boards composed of two  representatives each of the  union 
and the employers' associations.  In 1978, these  occupations  were  included in  the  industry's 
skeleton agreement and thereby guaranteed a skilled wage. 
2.  The Training of Foremen (Poliere) 
One  of the  central  figures  in  the  organization  of a  German  building  site  is  the  foreman 
(Polier), who is  responsible  for  quality,  safety and timely  completion  of the  work and  who 
wields  considerable  authority  over  the  other  members  of the  workforce.  Foremen  always . 
come from  the  ranks  of the  traditional  manual  construction occupations  although their tasks . 
are  effectively  managerial.  While  in  the  past  foremen  were  appointed  by  the  employers  at · 
their discretion,  the  union  has  for  long  pressed for  standardization  and  certification of their 
career trajectory.  For this  purpose,  a  Further Training  Regulation  was  negotiated  with the 
employers'  associations  which  was  accompanied  by  a jointly  agreed  training  curriculum.: 
After 620  hours of course  work,  applicants  can  take  an  examination with either of the  two . 
types  of  Chambers  to  become  "certified  construction  foreman"  (Gepriifter  Polier).  In 
addition,  the  traditional  system  of foreman  training  inside  individual  firms  was  preserved 
but  became  subject  to joint regulation  by  collective  agreement.  The  occupation  of "works · 
foreman"  (Werkpolier)  was  listed in  the  skeleton  agreement as  the  highest level  of internal 
advancement  for  manual  construction  workers  and  was  assigned  to  a  separate  category  of 
pay and conditions. 63 
3.  The Further Training Scheme in the Scaffolding Industry 
Scaffolding  in  Germany  is  by  law  a  so-called "minor  trade"  (Nebenhandwerk)  which  is 
• 
under  the  jurisdiction  of the  Chambers  of Artisans  but  is  not  recognized  as  a  qualified 
artisanal  occupation.  As  a  consequence,  the  industry  cannot  provide  initial  vocational 
training,  and  scaffolding  firms  typically  employ  an  unskilled  labour  force  with  extremely 
high  turnover.  There  is  also  a  high  rate  of accidents.  To increase  the  skill  level  and  the 
professionalization of the  workforce, the trade union and the  employers' association  in  1982 
1  concluded an  industrial agreement under which the  Social  Fund of the  Scaffolding  Industry 
(which is  an equivalent to the  Social  Fund of the general construction industry) collects one 
per cent of the  wage  bill  of all  scaffolding employers.  The agreement was  declared binding 
. by  the  Government on  all  firms  in  the  industry  regardless  of association  membership.  The 
money  is  used  to  finance  the  participation  of workers  in  training  courses  leading  up  to 
examinations  as  "Skilled  Scaff  older"  (Geriistbau-Obermonteur)  or  "Certified  Scaffolding 
Foreman"  (Gepriifter  Geriistbau-Kolonnenfiihrer).  The  fund  pays  the  workers'  wages 
. during  the  training  period  and  covers  the  course  and  examination  fees  and  all  related 
expenses. Examinations are given by  the Chamber of Artisans. 
I 4.  The Further Training of Skilled Building Workers in  Restauration Work 
In  recent years a growing share of the  workload of the building industry was  related to the 
restoration of historical buildings.  As post-war needs for  reconstruction and infrastructural 
investment  have  abated,  a  new  concern  has  developed  with  the  preservation  of historical 
monuments.  In  the  1970s,  local  and  regional  governments  have  begun  to  extend protection 
not  just to  churches,  castles  and  monasteries  but  also  to  a  large  number  of more  recent 
, buildings.  Today,  it is estimated that about  1.5 million  buildings  are in  some  way or other 
~  protected, which amounts to  about  15  per cent of all  buildings in  the  country. 
, Restauration  work  has  thus  become  a  new  growth  area  for  an  industry  that  is  otherwise 
i undergoing  secular  decline  and  contraction.  However,  restoration  requires  traditional  skills 
1 and knowledge of traditional  materials  and  techniques  which  have  no  longer been  provided 
i in the  era of "modem",  "industrialized"  building work.  One  result  was  that  many  restora-
1 tion  projects  in  the  1970s  had  to  be carried  out  by  foreign  specialists,  in  particular  from 
Poland,  in  spite  of high  and  rising  unemployment among German  building  workers.  In the 
j early  1980s,  the  union  and  the  employers'  association  of the  artisanal  building  sector,  the 
I  ZDB,  recognized that  in  order to  open  up  and  serve  this  potentially sizeable  market,  they 
1 had first to invest  in  recreating the  required  skills.  A  number of Further Training Regula-
ltions  were  negotiated  between  the  social  partner in  1984  and  1985,  creating  various  certi-
1 fied  occupations  in  restoration  that  were  based  on  the  vocational  education  and  experience 
tof building occupations such as  bricklayer, painter and carpenter. 64 
Two main  categories  of Further  Training  Regulations  for  restoration  work  can  be  distin-
guished.  The  first  regulates  access  to  the  occupation  of  "Restorator"  and  requires  that 
participants have passed their Meister examination.  In 1985, regulations of this  kind existed 
for  painters,  stone  masons,  bricklayers,  carpenters,  and  stucco  workers.  The  approximate 
training  time  required  to  pass  the  examination  is  estimated  at  900  hours  of course  work. 
The  second  category  concerns  the  further  education  of journeymen  and  skilled  workers 
who  can  be  trained  to  to  become  masons,  stone  masons,  carpenters  etc.  "for  restoration 
work".  To be  admitted,  applicants  have  to have  at  least  two  years  of practical  experience 
in their occupations. 
Further Training Regulations  are  negotiated between the  union  and the  artisanal  employers 
association  of the  sector where  they  apply.  They  are  then  finally  approved  by  the  respec-
tive  national  peak  associations,  the  DGB  and  the  ZDH.  Under  the  Statute  of Artisans 
(Handwerksordnung),  they  have  to  be  formally  adopted  by  each  individual  Chambers  of 
Artisans  which  administers  the  respective  examinations.  IGBSE  and  ZDB  have  also  de-
veloped nationally standardized curricula for the courses leading up to these examinations. 
For many  of the  further  training  occupations  in  the  construction  industry,  especially  at  the 
skilled  workers  level,  training  courses  are  offered  not  just by  employers'  associations  or 
third  parties  but  also  by  the  union.  Among  other  things,  this  serves  to  intensify  the 
commitment of workers to the  union.  The IGBSE has  also successfully insisted that at  least 
for  a transition period, practical experience on the building site  is  recognized as a substitute 
for  participation  in  formal  training  with  respect to  admission to  examinations.  This applies 
in  particular  to  those  occupations  that  were  introduced  by  the  social  partners  through 
collective agreement, outside the  control of state agencies or Chambers. 
Apart  from  the  industry's  manpower  needs,  union  and  employers  in  construction  have 
another,  more  frugal  reason  to  be  interested  in  intensified  further  training.  As  the  demo-
graphic  structure  of the ·population  changes,  the  external  training  centres  created  in  the 
1970s  for  the  new  vocational  training  scheme  find  it  increasingly  difficult  to  utilize  their 
capacity.  Extending their activities into further training would appear to be  a logical way of 
avoiding  rising deficits that would have to be covered by  higher fees  or out of the  budgets 
of Chambers  and  employers'  associations.  However,  because  of the  demanding  curricula 
and  since  most training  centres  serve  large  geographical  regions,  attendance  concurrent to 
work  is  often  impossible.  As  a  consequence,  the  industry's  social  partners  have  a  vested 
interest  in  public  support for  workers  attending  further  training  courses,  and  they  have  in 
fact jointly objected to the  respective cuts in the budget of the Federal Labour Office. 65 
6.  The  Role  of the  Social  Partners  in  Vocational  Training  and  Further 
Training in the Metalworking Industry 
The metalworking industry in the  Federal Republic of Germany is one of the most impor-
tant  economic  sectors.  It  includes  14  industrial  branches,  among  them  such  important 
1 industries  as  the  automobile  industry,  the  electrical  industry,  the  machine  tools  industry, 
1 and  steel  and  light  metal  construction.  With  about  3.  7  million  employees  (1984)  and  54 
! percent  of the  total  workfore  in  manufacturing,  the  metalworking  industry  is  the  largest 
, industrial  sector in  the  Federal  Republic  (Gesamtmetall  1985,  2).  In addition,  there  is  the 
· non-industrial or artisanal sector in metalworking with about 500,000 employees. 
National  and  international  competition  has  accelerated  technological  development  in  the 
I  different  sectors  of  the  metalworking  industry.  Comprehensive,  integrated  automation, 
1 increased  use  of microelectronics,  and  new  materials  have  resulted  in  rapid  changes  in 
I  products and production processes.  This  has  been  connected  with  changes  in  the  organiza-
i tiona!  structure of firms  and  enterprises.  In  the  automobile  industry,  for  example,  compu-
lterized  information  systems,  automated  manufacturing  processes,  and  flexible  production 
i  systems  have  largely  superseded  the  once  dominant  assembly  line.  Changed  market 
ldernands,  increased  product  diversification,  and  high  quality  standards  in  connection  with 
mew  technologies  and  principles  of organization  have  modified  production  processes  and 
1Work  contents.  Routine  and  monotonous  assembly  work  is  increasingly  replaced  by 
!Planning,  supervising,  and  controlling  activities  (Schleef  1986).  In  areas  where  the  work 
tforce  used to be trained on-the-job and be composed mainly of foreign workers, there is 
Ia  growing  need  for  new  skills.  Comprehensively trained  skilled  workers  increasingly  take 
jover  work  in  production.  The  systematic  introduction  of new  technologies  and  organiza-
~onal  principles  is  a  threat  to  unskilled  and  semi-skilled  workers,  who  are  likely  to 
~orne out on the losing side of the rationalization. 
trhese  new  technologies  mark a  turning point  in  the  development  of workplace  structures. 
Not  only  do  they  make  obsolete  the  traditional  distinction  between  mass  production  and 
pustomized production,  but in  principle,  they  also provide  opportunities  for  creating  diffe-
tent workplace structures.  On account of their flexibility,  these technologies are compatible 
~th almost  any  system  of work  organization.  They permit a  choice  between  hierarchical 
~ecision-making  structures  and  split-up  work processes  on the  one  hand,  and decentra-
Jized  decision-making structures and increased introduction of team work on the  other.  In 
'orne areas both management and trade  unions pursue integrated work processes and work 
.,rganization in groups. 
the systematic  use  of industrial  robots  and  automated manufacturing  systems,  computer-
~ded control  systems  and  fully  automated  warehouses  implies  that  the  skills  of many 
;mployees  are  no  longer  adequate.  In  many  areas,  traditional  qualifications  threaten  to 66 
affect adversely the competitiveness of firms  (Pitz  1986).  This is due to both the qualifica-
tion  structure  of semi -skilled workers  and  the  fact  that  the  occupational  profiles  in  the 
metalworking industry were more than  40 years old.  In  the  early  1970s, the discrepancies 
between practical  requirements  and  old training  regulations  became  so pronounced that  it 
was necessary to throw out obsolete  skills  and replace  them with new qualifications.  This 
also provided an opportunity to examine whether, and to what extent, different occupations 
had similar skill  structures and might therefore be merged,  and also whether new occupa-
tions  would have to be created.  The aim of the actors  taking  part in these  efforts  was  to 
modernize  skill  structures  and  to  broaden  the  qualifications  of  individual  occupations. 
Problems arose because of the  heterogeneity of workplace  conditions as well  as  the  scope 
of the task. At the start of the reform in the early 1970s, the metalworking industry trained 
about 160,000 apprentices  in  42  different occupations.  This is equivalent to 60 percent of 
all apprentices in the German industry.  In addition, there were another 200,000 apprentices 
in artisanal metalworking. 
Interest Organizations in the German Metalworking Industry 
The central actors  in  the regulation of initial  vocational training and further training in the 
metalworking  industry,  in  addition  to  state  agencies  and  the  Bundesinstitut  fiir  Berufsbil-
dung  (BffiB,  Federal  Institute  for  Vocational  Training),  are  business  and  employers' 
associations,  Chambers of Industry  and  Commerce,  Chambers of Artisans,  artisanal  asso-
ciations, and trade unions. 
Employees  interests  are  represented  by  the  Industriegewerkschaft  Metall  (IG  Metall, 
Metalworkers  Union).  The IGM is  affiliated  with the  Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund  (DGB, 
German Trade Union Federation). Its organizational scope encompasses both non-artisanal 
and  artisanal  sectors  of. metalworking.  Extensive  financial  resources,  more  than  1,000 
full-time  functionaries,  and  almost  3  million  members  make  the  IG  Metall  by  far  the 
most powerful industrial union in the Federal Republic. 
The  central  actor  for  firms  in  the  metalworking  industry  is  the  Gesamtverband  metall-
industrieller Arbeitgeberverbande  (Gesamtmetall,  Federation of Employers'  Associations of 
the  Metalworking  Industry),  the  national  peak  employers'  association.  It  is  affiliated  with 
the  Bundesvereinigung  der  Deutschen  Arbeitgeberverbande  (BDA,  Federal  Association  of 
German Employers'  Associations).  12  independent  regional  employers'  associations  of the 
metalworking industry are affiliated  with Gesamtmetall.  The member firms  of the associa-
tions  of  the  metalworking  industry  employ  more  than  half  of  the  total  workforce  in 
German industry. 
The bulk of collective  negotiations  between  IG  Metall  and Gesamtmetall  take  place at the 
regional level (Weber 1987).  In addition to Gesamtmetall, other business associations of the 67 
metalworking industry  took  part in the  reform of metalworking  and electrical  occupations. 
Moreover,  Chambers  of Industry  and  Commerce  associated  in  the  Deutscher  Industrie -
und  Handelstag  (DIHT,  German  Diet  of  Industry  and  Commerce)  also  participated  in 
negotiations.  Since  vocational  training  for  metalworking  occupations  is  also  provided  by 
t  other  sectors  of the  metal  industry,  other  trade  unions  aside  from  the  IG  Metall  were 
·  included as well. 
The leading actors in  the  reform process were the  Gesamtmetall and the  IG  Metall.  It was 
their  responsibility  to  unify  the  interests  of different  groups  in  their  own  camps.  The  IG 
Metall  participated  not  only  in  the  reform  of non-artisanal  occupations,  but  also  in  arti-
,  sanal  occupations.  The  central  role  in  the  artisanal  sector  was  played  by  the  Deutsche 
Handwerkskammertag (DHKT,  German Diet of Chambers of Artisans),  which was  respon-
sible  for  coordinating the participating Chambers of Artisans and  sectoral artisanal  associa-
tions.  Sectoral  associations  are  affiliated  in  the  Bundesvereinigung  der  Fachverbiinde  des 
deutschen  Handwerks  (BFH,  Federation  of  Gerffian  Sectoral  Artisanal  Associations). 
DHKT and BFH  share  office  facilities  with the  Zentralverband des  Deutschen  Handwerks 
,  (ZDH,  Central Association of German Artisans).  The following  diagram provides a  survey 
of the  ~sociational system in the metalworking industry. 
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1 In  the  process  of  incorporating  new  requirements  into  the  redefinition  of  occupational 
, profiles,  four  different  arenas  for  negotiations  emerged  in  the  metalworking  industry, 
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The Reform of Vocational Training in the Metalworking lndustry
1 
Participants  in the  reform of non-artisanal  metalworking  occupations  were  Gesamtmetall, 
the  DIHT, the  IG Metall,  training instruction experts,  and  representatives of the  BffiB.  In 
the  early  1970s,  because  of the  small  number  of occupations  to  be  reformed,  the  actors 
initially  turned  to  electrical  occupations  in  the  non - artisanal  sector.  In  order  to  allow 
apprentices  to  postpone  their  final  decision  on  occupational  specialization  as  well  as  for 
reasons  of training  instruction,  the  reform  followed  the  model  of the  Integrated  Training 
Scheme.  It is characterized by a  common basic training period for several occupations and 
an examination  after  the  second  training  year  which  has  to  be  passed  in  order to  quality 
for continuation in the program (see above Chapter 5). 
Due to negative experiences with this model,  however, the Integrated Training Scheme was 
abandoned  in  the  further  reform  of metalworking  occupations.  As  a result  of the  required 
1)  For a detailed analysis,  see  Hilbert et al.  (1986) 69 
I examinations  after  the  first  training  phase,  some  apprentices  were  not  admitted  to  the 
second phase.  This led to conflicts between firms,  works councils and  youth  representatives 
as  well  as  within  the  trade  union  itself.  When  in  the  mid -1970s employers  in  the  metal-
working industry suggested that graduates  of the  two-year training phase  receive  a lower 
wage  than those  who  had completed the  three-year training period, the  IG Metall  decided 
, to  change  course  in  order  to  avoid  additional  differentiation  within  the  workforce.  The 
: reform  of industrial  metalworking  occupations  was  not  to  be  along  the  lines  of the  Inte-
l grated  Training  Scheme  but  instead  was  to  establish  a  general  three  to  three -and-a-
:half  -year training period.  In  spite  of the  conflicts  in  firms,  employers  continued to  main-
!  tain  the  Integrated  Training  Scheme,  which  led  to  vehement  public  confrontations  (IG 
I Metall  1979). 
As  a result,  talks  were boycotted until  1977  when  the  Ministry of Economics called on  the 
1parties to resume negotiations.  The  IG Metall  drew up  a position paper which was  to serve 
1as  the  basis  for  reform.  After  intensive  discussions  Gesamtmetall  and  IG  Metall  came  to 
lagree  on  a common  catalogue  of points  to  be  taken  into  account  ("Basic  Standards  for  the 
!Reform  of Non-Artisanal  Metalworking  Occupations").  The  agreement  reached  between 
IGesamtmetall  and  IG  Metall  brought about  a restructuring  of the  negotiating  system  and  a 
!redistribution of competencies.  In  effect,  the  other parties to the  reform process  lost  much 
k>f their influence. 
jAs  a  first  step,  the  trade  union  and  the  employers'  association  subsequently  agreed  to 
Uevelop  a  procedure  for  examining  the  current  training  situation  as  well  as  for  assessing 
future  training  requirements.  For this  purpose the  BffiB  conducted  comprehensive  surveys. 
Pn  the  basis  of this  data,  individual  qualification  profiles  for  42  occupations  were  drawn 
pp  and  examined  for  existing  overlaps.  During  a  second  phase  the  actors  dealt  with  the 
turrent state  of the  occupational  system  and  with  expected  future  requirements.  In  1984  a 
l>reakthrough  was  made:  The  IG Metall  and Gesamtmetall agreed that in  the  future  training 
was  to  be  provided  for  only  6  occupations  with  16  different  specializations  (see  Diagram 
t»eiow). 
the  result  achieved  by  the  social  partners  during  the  reform  process  of metalworking 
~cupations should  be  seen  as  a compromise  between  greater  concentration  of occupations 
~ demanded  by  the  union  and  greater  differentiation  as  originally  advocated  by  the 
.mployers.  The  system  of 6  occupations  with  16  specializations  reflects  these  different 
.xpectations. Instead of  an  integrated training scheme,  a model  was  developed that provides 
(or a common phase of basic training during the  first year, general technical training in  the 
~nd, and  finally  specialized  technical  training  in  the  third  and  fourth  year  (see 
(>iagram). 5
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Representatives  of Gesamtmetall  were satisfied with the  result  of "skill-oriented training" 
~  combining  high  qualitative  standards  and  a  breadth  of training  with  a  large  degree  of 
flexibility  for  implementation at  the  workplace.  The IG  Metall  representatives  were equally 
1  satisfied  since  they  were  able  to  stop  the  examinations  of the  integrated  model  and  avoid 
i premature specialization.  (For an  analysis of the  role of the associations in  this process, see 
! Weber 1986.) 
· The Reform of Vocational Training in the Artisanal Sector of Metalworking 
As in the non-artisanal  sector, the  reform of the  artisanal  sector of metalworking became 
1 necessary 'due  to technological  change.  New  requirements  could  not  be  adequately  met  by 
· skill  structures  established  in  the  1950s.  In addition  to  new  technologies,  new  workplace 
!  structures  in  artisanal  firms  as  well  as  recruitment  problems  in  individual  sectors  made 
revisions  in  career profiles  imperative.  The  need  for  reform  was  given  further  impetus  by 
the  process  of restructuring  taking  place  at  the  same  time  in  non-artisanal  metalworking 
and electrical occupations. 
1 The IG  Metall tried to utilize  models  and procedures from  the  non-artisanal  sector in  the 
I 
i reform of the  artisanal  sector.  The  aim  of the  union  was  to  keep  differences  between  the 
I 
two sectors at  a minimum.  The  union  was  interested  in  transferring to the  artisanal  sector 
central  elements  of the  non-artisanal  model,  such  as  common  basic  training  and  the 
I  concentration  of a  large  number  of different  occupations.  Initially,  22  career  profiles  in 
I  arti.sanal  metalworking were  under discussion.  Subsequently, the  actors concentrated on  the 
, 17 most important occupations. 
•  In 1979  negotiations  started  between  the  DKHT  and  the  concerned  artisanal  occupational 
1associations  on  the  one  side,  and  the  IG  Metall  and  other  DGB  unions  on  the  other. 
I  Initially,  negotiations  were difficult because  a number of artisanal  occupational  associations 
1refused  to  negotiate  with ·the  IG  Metall.  This  may  have  been  motivated by  fears  of the  IG 
I  Metal I'  s  organizational  power  as  well  as  by  the  high  standards  emerging  in  the  industrial 
lreform process.  Moreover,  rivalries existed among  individual  occupational  associations that 
jdid  not  want  to  lose  control  over  their  own  occupations.  Artisanal  occupations  define 
!themselves primarily in terms of skills and training subjects. 
!After  a  number of preliminary talks,  in  1981  the  IG  Metal  presented a position paper that 
!became  the  subject  of further  discussions  between  the  IG  Metall,  the  DKHT  and  the 
joccupational  associations.  After several talks  that were  often threatened by  failure,  in  1982 
jan agreement was  fina1ly  concluded that  fixed  "positions"  on  the  reform  of artisanal  occu-
~J>ations.  Problems that subsequently  remained to  be  solved  resulted  from  the  fragmentation 
jof  this  negotiating  arena.  After  a  consensus  was  achieved  in  1984,  experts  have  been  at 
jwork  fleshing  out the agreement on the basis of the common positions reached.  Completion 
pf the process is  anticipated for  1987. 72 
The  vocational  training  reform  in  artisanal  metalworking  has  had  the  following  results: 
Training for all  occupations takes at least three years.  Basic training during the  first year is 
by  and  large  concentrated  although  there  is  some  room  for  specialization  in  one  of three 
occupational  fields  (automobile  trades,  building  and  fitting  trades,  precision  engineering 
trades).  New  qualification  profiles  of individual  occupations  allow  apprentices,  as  in  the 
construction  industry,  to  acquire  knowledge  and  skills  in  a number  of related  occupations. 
External training  is  to  be  made  available  so  that  smaller  artisanal  firms  will  be  in  a posi-
tion to fulfil  these qualification requirements. 
The  reform  in  the  artisanal  sector  required  less  time  than  in  non - artisanal  metalworking 
for  sever~ reasons.  The  number  of occupations  subject to  reform  was  smaller.  Moreover, 
subjects and  procedures developed  in  the  non-artisanal  sector could  be  utilized.  However, 
trade unions did not immediately realize that the  commercial statutes of artisanal  regulations 
are a significant variable  in  this  negotiating  system,  and  that  in  this  respect  training  policy 
runs  up  against  the  general  limits  of artisanal  policy.  This  also  explains  the  lower degree 
of concentration of artisanal  as  compared to industrial occupations.  The standards contained 
in the  regulations for Meister artisans facilitated the determination of new  skill  structures. 
The  Implementation  of the  Reform  in Industrial  Metalworking  Occupations  at Workplace 
Level 
Gesamtmetall and IG  Metall  have  a common interest in  avoiding  conflicts  in  the  process of 
establishing the new occupations at the  workplace level.  For this  reason,  both organizations 
jointly  run  information  sessions  in  the  firms  for  instructors,  works  councilors  and  youth 
representatives.  The participation  of employers'  and  union  representatives  in  these  informa-
tion sessions facilitates a consensual implementation of the  reform at the 
workplace level.  Conflicts have been  reduced since both parties are  no  longer following  the 
extreme  positions  advoc.ated  in  their  respective  camps.  A  successful  coordination  of 
interests was  also achieved  since  workplace  representatives of the  trade  union  were  able  to 
contribute their expertise in the  vocational training committee of the  IG  Metall. 
The  automobile  industry  on  account  of its  large  number  of employees  and  apprentices  is 
particularly affected by the  reform.  At  Volkswagen,  for  example,  70  percent of the  4,000 
apprentices  are  trained  in  reformed  metalworking  occupations.  When  the  structure  of the 
reformed  occupations  took  shape  in  1984,  works  councilors  and  youth  representatives 
began to develop ideas on implementation with the  IG  Metall.  At Volkswagen,  management 
and  works  councils drew  up  position  papers  on  the  implementation  of the  reform.  Subse-
quent  negotiations  resulted  in  agreements  between  works  councils  and  management  on 
transition  periods,  improvements  in  training  organization,  new  teaching  and  learning 
methods,  and  improved  qualifications  of  instructors.  In  other  firms  of the  automobile 73 
lindustry  as  well,  agreements  were  made  on  the  implementation  of the  reform  and  other 
trelated  projects.  The  current efforts  of employers'  associations  and  trade  unions  to  insure 
lcooperation  in  the  introduction  of the  new  metalworking  occupations  is  an  indication  that 
~  social  partners  not  only  played  the  decisive  role  in  setting  the  standards  for  the  new 
pccupations, but also have important functions  in  their introduction at  workplace level. 
further Training in tbe Metalworking Industry 
~ince the new system of vocational training in the metalworking industry is  largely in place 
~d  the  rt?form  in  artisanal  metalworking  is  scheduled to  be completed  in  1987,  the  social 
tartners will  next focus  on  structuring further training.  The need  for  action  in  this  area is 
4!so  primarily  the  result  of technological  change.  Moreover,  at  the  workplace  level  there 
~ve been  growing  pressures  for  more  comprehensive  further  training  for  the  following 
~ons: 
;- the  skills  of employees  in  many  firms  are  not  adequate  to  meet  requirements  of new 
1  production processes and high-quality  products,  thus  reducing  the  firm's  competitive-
ness; 
+  employment opportunities for  the  semi-skilled labor force in  production are decreasing 
due  to  new  technologies  and  production  methods.  A  significant  increase  of  skilled 
workers  in  production  indicates  how  great  the  risk  is  for  unskilled  and  semi-skilled 
workers  to  end  up  as  the  "losers  of rationalization".  Traditional  methods  aimed  at 
short-term adaption in the skills of these employees are usually insufficient; 
-t  opportunities  created  by  new  technologies  for  the  reorganization  of the  work  process 
I  toward  integrated,  primarily  team-based  work  forms  can  only  be  exploited  if ade-
,  quately qualified personnel is available; 
--..  fmally,  occupational  reform  has produced a  new  type  of skilled  worker more com  pre-
, hensively qualified than workers in older occupations.  If the  position of the latter is  not 
to decline, they also have to acquire skills of the  newer occupations. 
~  workplace  system  of continuing  and  further  training  has  a  structure  fundamentally 
different from the  "dual system" of vocational training.  There is  no systematic coordination 
ofl workplace  and  public  training  concepts.  Aside  from  the  Chambers  of Industry  and 
C~erce  and  the  trmning  programs of some  employers'  associations  at  the  Land  level, 
f~er training  is  primarily  a  matter  of individual  firms.  In  the  automobile  industry,  for 
e~ple, further  training  takes  place  almost exclusively  in  the  firms'  own  further  training 
facjlities.  In artisanal  metalworking,  on the other hand, the traditional institution of Meister 74 
training as well  as the  relatively  small  size of firms  explain why the Chambers of Artisans 
and occupational associations play a more significant role in further training. 
While  employers'  associations  also  emphasize  that  greater  efforts  in  the  area  of further 
training  at the  workplace  are  necessary  and  are  aware  of the  difficult  situation  of semi -
skilled  workers,  especially  in  assembly  (Gesamtmetall  1986),  the  IG  Metall  considers  the 
whole  structure of continuing and  further training in  the  metalworking industry in  need  of 
modernization and regulation  (IG  Metall  1986).  Employers are  much less  convinced of the 
need for regulation since they see  further training to be  dependent on  specific conditions in 
individual  workplaces  and  firms.  The  current situation  is  characterized by  the  fact  that the 
social partners have suggested some  similar and some different models  for  further training. 
There  are  currently  no  negotiations  between  the  social  partners  above  firm  level.  At  the 
workplace  level,  on  the  other  hand,  works  councils  try  to  adapt  further  training  to  new 
requirements by concluding agreements with management (e.g. in the automobile industry). 
Although  employers  and  trade  unions  share  certain  views,  their  positions  differ  on  a 
number  of points.  Whereas  the  IG  Metall  demands  further  training  for  all  employees,  if 
possible  to be  regulated  by collective  agreement,  Gesamtmetall  maintains  that participation 
in  further  training  programs  should  primarily  respond  to  the  needs  of firms.  Different 
views  exist  also  in  respect  to  subjects  of further  training  programs.  The  union  considers 
further training as  an element of a  general  training system.  They would like to  see  oppor-
tunities  created for  acquiring  formal  training qualifications during  working time and  insure 
that qualifications are certified.  Employers are critical about the  "certification" of qualifica-
tions  acquired  through  further  training.  The  costs  of institutionalizing  potentially  misdi-
rected further training programs, it is  argued,  may outweigh their benefits.  In the  artisanal 
sector,  on  the  other hand,  artisanal  associations  are  issuing  further  training  certificates  to 
acknowledge participation in workshops. 75 
7.  The  Role  of the  Social  Partners  in  Vocational  Training  and  Further 
Training in the Banking Industry 
Structures and Trends in the German Banking Industry 
The  Federal  Republic  of Germany  has  a  dense  network  of banks  with  currently  about 
4,800 credit institutes  and 45,000 branches.  The present structure  is  the  result of a  strong 
decline  in  independent  institutes  and  a  simultaneous  increase  in  the  number  of  branch 
operations.  This  structure is  characterized by three types  of credit institutes dominating the 
banking business: 
1.  Private  banks;  in  this  group three  large  banks  are  particularly  important  for  loans  to 
industry. 
2.  Public  banks  in  municipalities,  cities,  and  the  Lander  (savings  banks,  state  savings 
banks, and clearing houses). 
3.  Cooperative  banks  (Volksbanken,  Raiffeisenbanken),  a  union  of  formerly  separate 
commercial and agricultural credit cooperatives. 
In addition  to these  three  groups,  there  are  a  number of special  banks  such  as  real  estate 
credit banks,  mortgage savings  banks,  etc.  Although both cooperative and public  banks  are 
legally  autonomous  institutes,  competition  in  the  banking  sector  - which  for  a  long  time 
was considered dispersed and dominated by a market leader  - takes  place  mainly between 
I the three groups. 
I Private banks, however, also compete with each other whereas within the  other two groups 
~  regional  market  boundaries  are  respected  and  there  is  basically  no  competition  within  the 
group.  This  form  of group  competition  is  further  strengthened  by  the  'principle  of uni-
\ versal or general banks', a peculiarity of the German banking industry.  In contrast to other 
\countries, the majority of institutes offer the entire  range of banking services, while specia-
:.,  lized banks play a minor role. 
t The Interest Intermediation System in the Banking Industry 
1 The structure of the  German  banking  industry,  which  is  characterized essentially  by  three 
:!groups,  finds  its  corresponding  expression  in  an  associational  structure  based  on  three 
pillars.  The  economic  interests  of private banks  are  represented  by  the  Bundesverband der 
IJ>eutschen  Banken  (Federal  Association  of German Banks).  Negotiations  with  trade  unions 
Fd interest  representation  in  the  area  of social  policy  are  undertaken  by  the  Employers' 
I 76 
Association  of the  Private  Banking  Industry  (Arbeitgeberverband  des  privaten  Bankgewer-
bes).  It is  affiliated  to the  Federal  Association  of German  Employers  Associations  (BDA, 
Bundesvereinigung  der  Deutschen  Arbeitgeberverbande).  The  German  Association  of 
Savings Banks and Clearing Houses  (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband),  organizing 
regional  associations  of  savings  banks  and  clearing  houses,  represents  the  economic 
interests  of public  banks.  In  collective  bargaining  with  trade  unions,  they  are  represented 
by  the  Association  of Municipal  Employers'  Associations  (V  erband  kommunaler  Arbeit-
geberverbii.nde),  an  organization  also  representing  other  municipal  and  state  institutions. 
The economic  interests of cooperative  banks  are  represented by the  Federal Association of 
German  Cooperative  Banks  (BVR,  Bundesverband  der  deutschen  Volksbanken  und  Raiff-
eisenbanken).  It  is  affiliated  to  the  peak  association  of  the  German  cooperatives,  the 
German Association of Cooperatives  (DGRV,  Deutscher Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisen-
verband)  which  is  the  central  organization  of  commercial  and  agricultural  cooperative 
associations.  Since  1979  negotiations  with  trade  unions  have  been  the  responsibility  of the 
Employers'  Association  of German  Cooperative  Banks  (Arbeitgeberverband  der  deutschen 
Volksbanken  und  Raiffeisenbanken).  The  Employers'  Association  has  close  organizational 
connections with the BVR. 
Employees interests are  represented by  German Staff Union  (DAG,  Deutsche Angestellten-
gewerkschaft)  and  the  Union  of Commercial,  Banking  and  Insurance  Employees  (HBV, 
Gewerkschaft  Handel,  Banken,  Versicherungen),  which  is  affiliated  to  the  German  Trade 
Union  Federation  (DGB,  Deutscher  Gewerkschaftsbund).  Though the  HBV  is  interested in 
organizing  employees  of public  banks,  the  area  of public  institutions  generally  is  also  the 
domain  of the  Union  of Public  Service,  Transportation  and  Communications  Employees 
(OTV, Gewerkschaft Offentliche Dienste,  Transport und Verkehr).  In  1975  DAG and OTV 
each  had  organized  about  10  percent  of employees  (Bayer  1980);  in  recent  years  these 
numbers  have  probably  increased.  According  to  the  OTV,  DAG  and  OTV  each  have 
organized  about  9  percent  of  savings  bank  employees.  In  collective  bargaining  in  the 
private  and  cooperative  sectors,  employees  are  represented  by  the  DAG  and  the  HBV, 
while  employers  have  formed  a  collective  bargaining  unit  consisting  of the  employers' 
associations of the banking industry listed above. 
Personnel and Qualifications 
In  spite  of the  concentration  brought  about  by  structural  change,  as  well  as  new  techno-
logies  and work organization  (data processing,  automated  tellers,  computerized data entry, 
etc.),  between  1971  and  1981  the  number of employees  in  the  banking  industry  increased 
by 31  percent to a total  of 570,000.  This  increase  should  be  seen  against  the  background 
of a  high wage  level  in  the  industry  and a  70  percent share of wage  costs  in  total  expen-
ditures. 77 
·  The quantitative and qualitative  significance of personnel  for  the  banking  industry is  related 
1  to the products supplied, the characteristics of their production,  and the  business policies of 
banks.  Bank  services  are  client-oriented,  require  explanation,  are  of a  sensitive  nature, 
and  provide  abstract  and  largely  homogeneous  goods.  A  differentiation  of the  production 
process into  "manufacturing" and  "sales" would seem to make  little  sense. 
"The  importance  of product  differentiation  in  the  non -artisanal and  artisanal  manufactur-
ing  has  its  counterpart in  the  banking  industry in  the  differentiation  that  banks  can  achieve 
in  the  expertise  of their  personnel.  In  order  to  succeed  with  their  services  in  the  market, 
banks  will  have  to  focus  on  the  quality  of the  training  and  further  training  of  their 
employees'  (Siichting  1984, 318). 
The quality of personnel  gained  in  importance  as  a result of saturated  markets  (95  percent 
·  of the  population  have  bank  accounts),  the  dissolution  of the  traditionally  limited  range  of 
services  provided  by  the  three  groups  of institutes  and  their  transformation  into  general 
banks  as  well  as  the  entry  of other  sectors  (e.g.  insurance)  into  the  financial  market. 
'  Market  shares  can  only  be  gained  at  the  expense  of other  competitors  or  by  intensifying 
existing  client  relations.  The  result  has  been  a  new  organizational  philosophy  according to 
which the previous product-oriented form of organization is  replaced by  a client-oriented 
~  approach.  In the  framework  of this  market-oriented  approach,  clients  can  get  advise  on 
the  entire spectrum of their financial  and investment needs,  while  specialization is  based on 
client  groups  (mass  market,  wealthy  private  clients,  firms).  This  marketing  conception  is 
aimed at increasing the  client's acquisitive potential and at  securing his  loyalty  (cf.  Siichting 
1984, 312). 
·  This trend is  supported by  the  rapid diffusion  of new  technologies  in  the  banking  industry. 
Labor saving effects  and  reductions  in  time-consuming  routine  activities  in  client services 
have  freed  capacities  for  more  important  transactions  requiring  extensive  counselling,  and 
thus  for  a  general  improvement  in  client  services  (Kulins  1984,  184).  Labor  savings  are 
'  reinvested into client counselling. 
Initial Training 
As  a  result  of  efforts  to  improve  the  quality  of  personnel,  the  share  of  highschool 
graduates
1  increased  from  about  10  percent  in  the  early  1970s  to  over  50  percent  (in 
large  banks  70  percent)  in  the  1980s.  Intensive  training  efforts  have  reduced  the  share  of 
1)  The  German  school  system  is  three-tiered.  Graduates  from  the  highest  level,  the  Gymnasium,  have 
'  had a total  of 13  years of schooling,  graduates  from  the  second level  (Realschule)  10,  and  those  completing 
the third level (Hauptschule) 9 years. 
Highschool graduates here refers to graduates from  the  fast or the second level. 78 
unskilled  employees  (e.g.  in  savings  banks  to  10  percent).  In  addition,  vocational  training 
in  the  banking  industry  is  very  attractive  since  it  offers  high-quality  training  and  good  : 
career prospects both inside  and  outside the  industry.  Aside  from  the  positive  image  of the 
occupation,  the  fact  that a large  number of apprentices  (about  85  percent)  upon  completion  · 
of their training  receive  permanent employment  in  their  firm  has  also  played  an  important 
role.  Moreover,  it should be  noted that SO  percent of apprentices are women. 
In  1985  the  banking  industry  as  a  whole  provided  initial  training  for  the  occupation  of 
Bankkaufmann  (bank  clerk)  to  some  56,000 people,  or about  95  percent of all  apprentices 
in  the  banking  industry.  On  average  8.5  percent  of the  total  workforce  in  the  banking 
industry  were  apprentices.  For  savings  banks  this  figure  is  at  about  13  percent  while  in 
large banks it is  still above  10 percent.  In  1985,  22,500 new  training contracts were  signed 
(Arbeitgeberverband  des  privaten  Bankgewerbes  1985,  12).  Private  and  cooperative  banks 
each have  about 16,000 apprentices,  savings banks about 24,000.  A high  rate  of success  in 
final  examinations,  a  low  quota  of dropouts,  and  little  fluctuation  after  completion  are  an 
indication of the  high quality of training in the  banking industry. 
Occupational Profile of Bankkaufmann 
The occupational  profile  of a bank  clerk is  up  to date.  Compared to  other sectors  - such 
as  in the metalworking industry where  they may  be  up  to  40  years  old  - it is  a relatively 
new  occupational  profile established in  the  early  1960s.  The  current occupational  profile  is 
a result of the  reforms of 1973 and  1979. 
The  1973  reform  in  the  banking  industry,  in  contrast to the  rather  drawn  out  processes  in 
other sectors,  was  completed  in  a short time.  Upon  request  of the  Ministry  of Economics, 
a  concept  was  developed by  the  Employers'  Association  of the  Private  Banking  Industry. 
Subsequently,  it was coordinated with representatives of the  German Association of Savings 
Banks  and  Clearing  Houses,  then  with  the, DAG  and  finally  with  the  HBV.  The  draft 
occupational  profile  then  was  legalized  in  the  usual  way  by  the  Ministry  of Economics. 
The  1973  reform  was  triggered  by  the  1969  Vocational  Training  Act  and  by  the  need  for 
modernizing the  occupational profile of bank  clerk as  a response to  the  introduction  of new 
computer technologies. 
The  1979  reform  became  necessary  because  public  vocational  schools  as  well  as  some 
banks  encountered problems  fulfilling  standards  in  respect  to  data processing.  The  core  of 
the  reform  was  therefore  to  make  these  standards  more  flexible,  restructure  subjects 
relating to data processing,  revise  the  timing of individual  training  phases,  and  reformulate 
the  general  knowledge  and  skills  to  be  acquired.  A  fundamentally  new  aspect  of the  1979 
reform was that for  the  first time,  training curricula were coordinated with the  curricula of 79 
the  Liinder.  Regardless of this  achievement,  however,  it  is  still  necessary  to  coordinate  at 
1  local  level,  individual  vocational  schools  and  training  institutions.  The  training  curricula 
only  set minimum  standards  that  are  below  the  training  standards  actually  attained  by  the 
majority  of banks.  The  low  level  of regulation  leaves  room  for  firms  to  structure  their 
training practice competitively. 
The decentralized and regional  structure in the public and cooperative banking sectors gives 
a  prominent position  to the  regional  associations  of both  groups  in  the  implementation  of 
1  vocational training.  They are responsible for training subjects that individual banks may not 
be able to provide due to specialization or size.  Thus they serve to maintain high  standards 
1  of initial  training  in  the  banking  industry  and  are  the  functional  equivalent of the  training 
opportunities  large  banks  are  able  to  provide  within  their  own  organization.  Since  supra-
regional  associations  in  the  public  and  the  cooperative  sector  have  economic,  organiza-
tional,  and workplace control functions,  they also control the  area of initial  training.  Trade 
unions  exercise  certain  rights  of control  by virtue  of their  organizational  links  with  works 
I  councils. 
Further Training in the Banking Industry  - Function and Focus 
The banking industry  is  an  economic sector with  extensive  further  training.  This is  due  to 
the  eminent  importance  of qualified  personnel  for  a  bank's  success.  Since  the  federally 
regulated  vocational  training  program  for  bank  clerks  is  in  principle  the  same  for  all 
competitors,  further  training  is  the  mechanism  for  swaying  preferences  in  the  market 
(Oberbeckmann 1985, 383). 
The  combination  of new  marketing  concepts  and  new  technologies  results  in  a  specific 
social  selectivity  of further  training efforts.  In the  area  of routine  activities  both jobs and 
qualifications  are  at  risk.  In  the  area of client  services,  on  the  other hand,  more employ-
ment is  being created.  Under the  market-oriented concept client counsellors are to receive 
further training to become sales-oriented general counsellors. 
Specialized knowledge and sales training are at the  center of further training,  supplemented 
by leadership training for  managers,  since  "the market success of a  branch depends  on the 
motivation  and  leadership  qualities  of a  branch  manager  as  well  as  on  [the  stafrs] coun-
selling skills" (Oberbeckmann 1981 , 16). 
This specific orientation of further training programs restricts participation opportunities for 
1  the  "victims" of automation.  "One should not forget,  however,  that  not  any employee has 
what  it  takes  to  achieve  the  necessary  quality  improvement"  (Kulins  1984,  184).  Though 
firms  and  associations  in  the  banking  industry  emphasize  the  openness  of their  training 
system,  they do acknowledge existing  limitations.  The number of semi-skilled employees 80 
is  on  the  decline,  and  excess  labor  is  disposed  of in  the  process  of fluctuation  or through · 
early retirement schemes.  This is  facilitated  by  the  fact  that routine  areas have  a dispropor-
tionately high share of female employees. 
In  institutionalized  further  training  programs  provided  by  the  three  groups  of banks  (see 
below),  women  are  clearly  underrepresented  at  intermediate  and  higher  levels  of further 
training.  While  currently  over  50  percent  of  apprentices  are  women,  at  intermediate 
management  levels  of savings  banks  and  cooperative  banks  their  share  is,  according  to 
estimates  of interview  partners,  as  low  as  ten  percent,  and  among  top  management  posi-
tions  it  is  below  one  percent.  Similar trends  can  probably  also  be  found  in  private banks. 
Our impression  based on  the  interviews  we  conducted  is  that  this  is  not  necessarily  in  all 
cases  to  be  blamed  on  a  selective  strategy  on  the  part  of the  banks  but  may  also  result 
from  "self  -selection" on the part of women with additional  family  responsibilities. 
Systems of Further Training 
Since  personnel  quality  is  central  to  competitiveness,  it  is  difficult  for  private  banks  to 
entrust  external  institutions  such  as  their  associations  with  further  training.  As  a  result, 
they  cannot  benefit  from  the  specialization  and  economies  of  scale  made  possible  by 
external  further  training.  Large  banks  that  can  afford  to  establish  a  complete  further  , 
training  system  at  firm  level provide  their  training  internally.  Even  the  Employers'  Asso-
ciation of the  Private Banking Industry  are not  informed about these  economically  sensitive 
activities.  Small  (regional,  local,  foreign)  private  banks  that  could  not  make  the  fmancial 
and  organizational  commitment  necessary  to  establish  an  internal  training  system  have 
formed  the  "Vereinigung  fiir  Berufsbildung"  (Association  for  Further  Training).  The 
association  offers  further  training  programs  to  its  clients  "that  do  not  affect  their  relative 
competitive  positions",  financed  by  membership  dues  and  course  fees.  However,  because 
of this  neutral  effect  on  competition it may  be  assumed that even  medium-size  firms  have 
their own internal training programs designed to sway  market preferences in  their favor. 
2 
In addition to this  systematic,  firm-initiated form  of further  training,  regional  associations 
of the private .banking  industry and  a number of occupational  associations  operate a further 
training  institution  above  firm  level,  open  to  all  groups  of institutes.  This  bank  academy 
offers  courses  that  bank  employees  take  on  their own  initiative  in  their  spare  time,  and  at 
their  own  expense.  Programs  available  in  the  "general"  and  "non -competitive"  area 
2)  Reliable  data  on  the  extent of internal  further  training  are  not  available  (speculations  are  offered,  e.g., 
by  Liefeith  (1983,  116).  Liefeith  considers  this  a potentially  rewarding  task  for  the  Employers'  Association 
of the  Private Banking Industry. 81 
complement and  support  internal  further  training.  Attending  the  bank  academy  is  promoted 
and  honored  by  many  banks  since  it  is  an  indication  of  an  employee's  commitment 
(Liefeith 1983,  110). 
While systematic further training in  the area of private banks  is  largely provided internally, 
savings  banks  and  cooperative  banks  through their  associations  operate  an  elaborate  system 
of further  training at the  regional  and  federal  levels,  though  internal  further  training  is,  at 
least for the larger banks,  also essential  (Jansen  1984, 232). 
Savings  banks  as  institutes  under  public  law  for  a  long  time  have  had  their  own  external 
further  training  system  that  prepares  for  a  career  examination.  About  20  percent  of 
employees, at  the  regional  schools  of the  savings  banks  (operated  by  the  regional  associa-
'  tions of savings banks  and  clearing houses)  have  completed a special  course.  This  program 
,  of further  training  qualifying  graduates  as  "savings  bank  consultants"  (Sparkassenbetriebs-
wirt)  prepare them  for  effective  client  counselling  and  for  intermediate  management  func-
tions  (e.g.  branch  manager)  without  however  guaranteeing  any  such  position.  For  the 
7-month  program employees  get  a paid  leave  from  their  institute,  which  also defrays  the 
resulting costs  of the  regional  savings  bank  schools.  This  financing  mechanism  serves as  a 
control instrument for the  selection of participants and programs. 
;  The  central  academy of savings  banks  in  Bonn  forms  the  top  level  of the  savings  bank's 
own  training  system.  Graduates  - certified  savings  bank  consultants  (Dipl. - Sparkassen-
betriebswirte)  - are  considered  equal  to  university  graduates  and  qualified  for  top 
management  positions.  In  addition,  the  central  academy  increasingly  trains  specialists  for 
personnel departments. 
The training system of the  cooperative banks with its three-tiered structure corresponds to 
that  of  the  savings  banks  organization.  However,  intermediate  and  top -level  further 
training  programs  are  subdivided  into  a  greater  number  of segments  and  are  less  time-
consuming  than  in  the  savings  banks  sector.  The  regional  "intermediate"  program  of 
further training consists of a number of courses for  referees and  future  middle  management 
i  personnel.  Individual  training  programs  can  be  set  up  that  are  task-oriented  and  tailored 
to  the  specific  personnel  needs  of individual  institutes.  The  central  further  training  institu-
tion  is  the  "Akademie  der  Deutschen  Genossenschaften"  (Academy  of German  Coopera-
tives)  where future  top managers are trained in  14 -week courses after graduating from  the 
regional  further  training  program.  The  completion  of this  program  is  a  legal  precondition 
for managing any  cooperative bank  (Weiser 1983). 
The Role of Trade Unions and of Workplace Interest Representation in Further Training 
Trade  union  influence on  the  subjects  of further  training programs and  on  the  selection  of 
1 participants  is  small.  Employers  consider  the  area  of training  as  their  own  territory  and 82 
"will  not accept  any  interference"  (Interview  HBV).  Unions  have  direct  participation  only 
in the  committees  of the  least  important  further  training  institution,  the  bank  academy,  in 
the  examination of bank  consultants  through the  Chambers'  vocational  training  committees 
as  well  as  in  similar  committees  of regional  savings  banks  schools.  In  principle,  trade 
unions  advocate  a  mobility -enhancing  and  "egalitarian"  standardization  of internal  and 
external further training programs, though concrete conceptions do not seem to exist. 
Trade  unions  might  affect  the  regulation  of access  to  further  training  programs  through 
works  councils  or staff councils  which  under co-determination  legislation  are  entitled  to 
take part in decisions on  selection.  A  revision of a firm's further training strategies, e.g. in 
favor of underrepresented women,  may be difficult to achieve  since trade unions have only 
weak  ties  with  workplace  representatives  (about  40  percent  of works  councilors  do  not 
belong to any  union  (Bayer  1980)).  In practice,  participants  for  further  training  programs 
frequently  are  selected  without  workplace  interest  representations  being  consulted,  if such 
organs indeed exist at all. 
During the  introduction of new technologies,  a protection agreement was  concluded for the 
bank  sector giving  redundant  employees  a  legal  right to further  training.  However,  it  has 
not yet found application since layoffs so far have been avoided through fluctuation,  reloca-
tion, and internal further training. 
On the Role of the Social  Partners in Initial Training and Further Training 
The role and  function of the associations of private banks are essentially determined by the 
strong  market position  of the  large  banks.  In the  cooperative  and  public  banking  sectors, 
the  stronger  role  of regional  associations  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  they  fill  an 
organizational gap that has  resulted from the  low degree of centralization and concentration 
in the  individual groups. 
In  contrast  to  the  construction  and  metalworking  industries,  trade  unions  in  the  banking 
industry  did  not  play  a  significant  role  in  the  reform  of occupational  profiles.  The  pecu-
liarities of the banking industry,  the  low proportion of workers,  high wages  and job secu-
rity linked with career opportunities are not conducive to trade union activity.  Low degrees 
of unionization,  overlapping domains and the  resulting  competition  as  well  as  coordination 
problems  make  union  interest  representation  difficult.  The  minimal  commitment  and 
influence  of trade  unions  in  the  area of further  training  is  due  to the  fact  that  employees 
usually  are satisfied with the  working of the  further  training  system.  The victims of ratio-
nalization are confined to specific labor market segments (women) or to individual cases. 83 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  there  is  also  an  absence  of future-oriented  concepts.  This 
is  not  surprising  since  the  competing  employees  organizations  have  few  resources  to 
commit to the  issue of further training.  The  union  position,  moreover,  is  weak  because the 
"elitist"  (Interview  HBV)  mentality  of  bank  employees  and  their  individualistic  career 
onentation  imposes  obvious  limitations  on  trade  union  initiatives.  Collective  agreements  in 
the training area would also place restrictions on  wage  setting. 
1  Similar  effects  might  result  from  interference  in  established  qualification  and  career 
1  patterns. 84 
8.  Industrial  Training  as  a  Subject  of State-Facilitated  Societal  Self-
Governance:  Problems, Challenges, and Trends 
Industrial  training  in  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany  is  regarded  as  a  subject  of public 
interest  and  as  a  societal  resource  whose  provision  should  not  be  left  to  the  economic 
interests of individual  firms.  This  is  not to say that  industrial training is  seen  as  a respon-
sibility of the  state.  Rather,  it  has  emerged as  a highly  institutionalized and  complex  public 
policy  system  whose  administration  is  shared  between  the  government  and  the  sellers  and 
buyers  of occupational  qualifications  as  represented  by  their  associations.  Participation  in 
public  policy -making in  the  area  of industrial  training  occurs  in  a  great  variety  of ways 
which may be classified into four  major categories: 
1.  Participation  of associations  as  lobbies  and  interest  representatives  according  to  the 
classic  ~odel of pluralist  interest politics.  The  associations  of employers  and  employees 
participate  in  public  debates  on  issues  of industrial  training,  attempt  to  mobilize  public 
opinion,  and  exert influence  on  legislative  processes  relevant  to  industrial  training.  Plura-
list  interest  representation  is  particularly  important  in  situations  where  governments  or 
parties  undertake  to  pass  legislation  on  the  basic  structure of the  industrial  training  system. 
Examples  are  the  Vocational  Training  Act  or the  debate  on  the  financial  reform  of voca-
tional training in  the  early 1970s. 
2.  Participation  of associations  as  suppliers  in  the  market  for  training  services.  Trade 
unions  and  employers'  associations  in  the  Federal Republic  operate  as  suppliers  of training 
services on  an  impressive scale,  in  the  area of both vocational training and  further training. 
They  thereby  substitute  for  direct  commitment  of the  state,  for  example,  in  the  form  of 
occupational  schools.  In  many  cases,  the  state  provides  them  with  funding  and  support. 
Their  activity  as  suppliers  of training  services,  with  often  large  investments  and  high 
operating costs,  implies  for the  associations of both sides that their interest in  the  expansion 
of industrial  training  and  its  subsidization  by  the  state  takes  on  an  additional  and  indeed 
very  concrete  meaning.  Moreover,  their  direct  participation  in  the  implementation  of 
industrial  training  insures  that  practical  experiences  are  incorporated  into  the  associations' 
political decision -making process. 
3.  Participation  of associations  in  the  formulation  and  aggregation  of interests  relevant  to 
industrial  training  policy,  both  within  and  between  the  respective  associational  systems. 
Since peak  associations of employers and trade unions at  the  national  level  are  consulted by 
the  responsible  state  agencies  on  initiatives  of individual  economic  sectors,  they  have  an 
opportunity  to  urge  their  affiliated  associations  to  coordinate  the  interests  of  different 
economic  sectors  and  observe  a  certain  degree  of uniformity.  This  contributes  to  main-
taining  the  "administrability"  of and  the  chances  for  horizontal  mobility  in  the  industrial 
training  system.  Moreover,  it  frees  the  state  from  having  to  negotiate  a  compromise 85 
between  different proposals  from  the  same  camp  or even  to  decide  in  favor  of one  side, 
both of which  may  be  politically  risky.  The  highest  form  of delegating  political  risks  to 
the  internal relations of large associations is attained in those  cases where the  state  requires 
agreement  between  both  sides  before  using  its  legislative  or regulative  authority  to  resolve 
industrial training problems.  An example is the decreeing of training regulations according 
to the  "consensus principle". 
4.  Participation  of associations  in  the  exercise  of public  authority  by  their  incorporation 
into  authoritative  decision-making  processes  and  the  devolution  of regulatory  responsibi-
lities.  This  category  contains  very  diverse  and,  at  the  same  time,  characteristic  forms  of 
associational  participation.  First,  it  includes  the  legally  based  representation  of  trade 
r  • unions  and  employers'  associations  in  various  state  and  para-state  organizations,  such  as 
the  Bundesinstitut  f1  Berufsbildung  (BffiB,  Federal  Institute  for  Vocational  Training)  and 
the Bundesanstalt  f1}'  Arbeit (Federal Labor Office).  Second, it  includes the participation of 
trade  unions  in  the  vocational  training  committees  of  Chambers  and  gilds  which  are 
constituted as bodies under public law and which outside the  area of vocational training are 
exclusively  or  largely  interest  organizations  of  firms.  The  incorporation  of the  social 
partners  into  such  organs  performs  the  important  function  for  public  policy  to  make  it 
impossible for the  social partners to avoid addressing problematic issues and declaring their 
:  position.  (Note,  for example, the  requirement for  trade  unions  and employers to  comment 
,  on  the Federal Government's annual  Vocational  Training Report,  which  is  a  result of their 
membership  on  the  Central  Board  of the  BffiB).  Most  importantly,  associations  at  diffe-
i  rent  levels  and  in  various  functional  areas  are  charged  with  direct  responsibility  for  the 
organization  of industrial  training.  How  complex  the  interconnections  are  between  state 
and associations, or public and private organizations,  becomes evident in  an  institution such 
as  the  BffiB.  Depending  on  one's  perspective,  it  may  appear  as  a  state  administrative 
agency,  an  organ  in  the  service  of the  social  partners,  an  institutional  locus  of tripartite 
political bargaining and consensus creation, or a research institute  for policy advice. 
!  The  incorporation  of associations into public training policy and into the  public responsibi-
lity of controlling the  industrial  training system  fulfills  a  variety of functions  both  for  the 
state  and  for  the  associations.  In  particular,  those  forms  of participation  that  go  beyond 
mere  interest  representation  provide  associations  with  considerable  opportunities  for  secur-
ing,  expanding,  and  developing  their  organizations.  Generally,  with  a growing  number of 
activities  the  ability  of an  organization  to  offer  useful  services  to  its  members  increases, 
losses  in  one  area  can  be  compensated  by  gains  in  others,  and  bargaining  issues  can  be 
creatively  and  synergetically  combined.  Moreover,  the  immediately  affected  groups,  by 
assuming  public  responsibilities  through  self-governance,  have  an  opportunity  to  protect 
themselves  from  the  typical  negative  side-effects  of direct  state  regulation  which  result 
from  the  latter's  inevitable  lack  of practical  expertise  and  bureaucratic  formalism.  The 
interest in  self-governance is  more pronounced among employers' associations  since  trade 86 
unions  as  the  frequently  weaker  partners  at  least  in  principle  view  the  state  as  a potential 
ally.  Nevertheless,  even  trade  unions  - particularly  at  the  sectoral  level  - often  prefer 
negotiating  industrial  training  policies  bilaterally  with  employers'  associations  over  having 
them dictated by the state. 
The  devolution  of  public  regulatory  authority  to  the  interest  organizations  of  directly 
involved parties also  has  benefits  for the  state.  In  particular, the  state  is  relieved from  the 
difficult  tasks  of assessing  future  needs,  fmding  compromises,  mobilizing  consensus,  and 
dealing  with disappointed  parties.  Unloading  the  state through  associations  facilitates  access 
to the  crucial expertise of the  affected parties and  may  improve  the  quality  of authoritative 
decisions.  Of course  it  must  be  insured  that  self-governing  groups  do  not  use  their 
quasi-public  powers  to  the  detriment  of  other,  not  directly  involved  groups.  This 
requires  an  adequate  legal  and  institutional  framework,  the  definition  and  maintenance  of 
which  becomes  the  main  task  for  state  intervention  in  self-governing  public  policy areas. 
In  the  case  of industrial  training,  the  state  attempts  to  insure  the  compatibility  of self-
governance  with  the  public  good  by  setting  up  as  "countervailing  powers"  two  regulatory 
agents  with partly opposing interests,  namely trade unions  and  employers' associations,  and 
compelling  them  to  seek  compromise  and  agreement.  In these  and  other  ways  an  attempt 
is  made  to  institutionalize  in  the  principle  of "subsidiarity"  at  the  group level,  in  the  form 
of  state-facilitated  societal  self-governance  in  accordance  with  the  public  good  the 
organization of industrial training. 
The  social partners  participate  in  industrial  training  not only in  the  framework  of institu-
tions  that specialize in  this  subject.  They  make  and  influence  political  decisions  on  indus-
trial  training  also  as  participants  in  other  institutional  systems,  particularly  in  collective 
bargaining,  in co-determination at  workplace level  and  in  the  labor administration.  Trade 
unions  pursue  their  interests  in  the  area  of  industrial  training  not  only  through  their 
membership in the  Federal  Institute  for  Vocational  Training  or in  the  responsible  Chamber 
committees,  but also  in  their role  as  a party to  collective  bargaining,  through their links  to 
works  councils  and  their  presence  in  the  bcxlies  of the  Federal  Labor  Office.  Much  the 
same  applies  to  the  employers.  Industrial  training  policy,  sectoral  collective  bargaining, 
manpower  policy  at  the  workplace  and  government  labor  market  policy  are  highly  inter-
dependent given  the  density and  specificity of regulation  established in  all  these  areas, with 
programs  in  one  area  usually  presupposing,  effecting,  or  creating  the  conditions  for 
programs  in  others.  The  advantage  of trade  unions  and  employers'  associations  being 
simultaneously present in all  four  related systems  consists in  the  fact that it enables them to 
recognize  interdependencies  at  an  early  stage  and  to  use  them  for  strategic purposes.  This 
makes  it  at  least  in  principle  possible  to  coordinate  different  areas  of regulation  within  the 
associations  of the  social partners in  an  uncomplicated and  informal  fashion.  For example, 
further training may  be  controlled through rationalization  protection agreements  or, conver-
sely,  rationalization  may  be  made  possible  through  further  training  regulations;  collec-87 
tive  agreements  may  be  adapted  to  new  occupational  profiles;  institutions  offering  further 
training  programs  may  be  informed  of  new  workplace  requirements  and  requests  be 
submitted  to  the  Federal  Labor  Office  to  arrange  financing;  an  existing  system  of social 
funds  may be  used to institute a levy scheme for the funding of industrial training, etc. 
Coordinating the  different arenas  and  institutions  where  decisions  on  industrial  training are 
made  poses  problems  for  the  organizations  of  the  social  partners  which  are  no  less 
demanding  than  the  substantive  problems  of industrial  training  policy.  Especially  trade 
unions,  which  more  than  employers  are  interested  in  standardized  regulations  and  reduced 
local  autonomy,  are  making  efforts  to  increase  their  capacity  for  internal  control  in  this 
area.  The  project  for  improving  the  training  of union  representatives  in  the  Chambers' 
vocational  training  committees  and  other  bodies  that  was  funded  by  the  Federal  Govern-
.  ment in  the  1970s is  to be  seen in this context. 
i  However,  even if such  efforts tum out  to  be  more  successful  in  the  future,  conflicts  over 
goals  and  inconsistencies  between  the  different  policy  arenas  affecting  industrial  training 
cannot be  entirely eliminated,  and  unanticipated external  effects  cannot  always  be  avoided. 
This is  not just because the  numerous effects and  side -effects of collective  bargaining and 
labor  market  policy  on  industrial  training  cannot  be  anticipated,  or  because  individual 
policy  areas  develop  a  dynamic  of their  own  that  is  not  easily  subordinated  to  external 
1  purposes.  Particularly in  the  area of industrial training in  the  narrow sense  there is  reason 
to speak  of a  "policy community"  in  the  Federal  Republic  which  includes  training experts 
and  instructors,  specialists  in  the  associations,  the  responsible  bureaucrats  in  the  ministries 
and others who  have  a  strong interest in  maintaining  the  integrity  and  consistency  of their 
1  own  prerogatives.  In  addition,  industrial  training  policy  like  any  other  policy  area  is 
subject  to  effects  of political  decisions  made  outside  its  domain  that  it  cannot  influence: 
changing political majorities, problems in  coordinating training policies of federal  and Land 
levels  as  well  as  between  the  Under;  adaptation  problems  of the  public  training  school 
!  system;  autonomous decisions  of firms;  or changes  in  employees'  attitudes  and  behavior in 
i  respect to industrial training. 
Unforeseen  interdependencies  are  an  inevitable  characteristic  of a  policy  area with  relative 
autonomy.  Autonomy,  however,  is  no  less  important  for  successful  policies  than  the 
1  elimination  of so-called  "coordination  deficits".  Industrial  training  policy  and  collective 
bargaining have to be  coordinated with each other, but at the  same time the  two areas must 
not  be  mixed up.  The distribution-oriented conflicts  of collective  bargaining could  easily 
1  undermine  the  prcxiuction-oriented  cooperation  in  the  area  of  industrial  training.  A 
similar  situation  pertains  in  the  relationship  of  industrial  training  to  government  labor 
1  market  policies  that  may  be  instrumentalized  for  short -term political  goals,  or to  work-
1  place  C<?-determination  with  its  institutionalized  primary  interest  in  job  security  for  a 
j  firm's current workforce.  Dependence and independence,  control  and  autonomy,  coordina-88 
tion  and  pluralism thus  have  to coexist in  the  relations between  different policy  arenas.  It 
seems  that  creating  a  (always  precarious)  network  of different  arenas  linked  by  the  acti-
vities of large democratic associations may  be  a suitable framework for this purpose. 
The extent of the  social partners' participation in  industrial  training in  the  Federal Republic 
puts  great  demands  on  their  organizational  resources.  This  high  degree  of involvement 
would  no  doubt  be  impossible  in  the  absence  of trade  unions  and  employers'  associations 
that  are  centralized,  comprehensive,  have  a  factual  monopoly  of representation  and  are 
financially  strong.  The  resources  that  associations  invest  in  industrial  training  range  from 
the  often  elaborate  industrial  training  departments  of peak  and  industrial  associations,  to 
tens  of thousands  of voluntary  representatives  in  the  examination  or  vocational  training 
committees  of Chambers  and  gilds.  The  commitments  of associations  are  to  some  extent 
supplemented by the  state,  such as  through the expert staff of the  BIBB,  which in  principle 
is  at  the  disposal  of the  organizations  of the  social  partners  as  an  additional  resource;  by 
legislation  making  membership  in  Chambers  compulsory  which  allows  them  to  maintain  a 
full-time  staff for the  implementation of industrial training;  or by  subsidies  to  associations 
for  establishing  external  training  centers.  However,  it  is  characteristic  for  the  German 
system that  at  least the  large  associations  on  both sides  have  sufficient expertise  and  finan-
cial  strength  to  come  to  mutual  agreements  if necessary  without  the  support  of the  state. 
This  organizational  capacity  is  what  creates  and  guarantees  the  autonomy  of the  social 
partners.  It  originates  not  in  the  area  of industrial  training  but  rather  in  the  sphere  of 
industrial  relations  which  is  organized  on  the  principle  of collective  bargaining  autonomy. 
The  viability  of this  system,  in  turn,  largely  depends  on  legal  provisions  and  state  facilia-
tion.  The  cooperation  of the  social  partners  in  the  provision  of occupational  qualifications 
raises  and  stabilizes  the  level  of consensus  also  in  the  area of industrial  relations  and  thus 
contributes to maintaining the  institutional  configuration and  organizational  infrastructure  on 
which cooperation largely depends. 
The  concrete  forms  of participation  by  the  social  partners  in  industrial  training  differ 
considerably  between  vocational  training  and  further  training,  between  the  various  levels 
and  functions  of regulation,  as  well  as  between  economic  sectors.  The  resulting  complex 
picture  would  require  a  more  detailed  analysis  than  can  be provided  here.  The  following 
points, however,  may be  emphasized: 
1.  Associations play a more minor role  in  further  training  than  in  initial  vocational  train-
ing,  and  this  is  criticized  particularly  by  trade  unions.  The  reason  is  the  comparatively 
lower degree of formalization  of the  further training system  which in  tum can be  explained 
by  the  state's greater reluctance  in  respect to  its  legal  regulation.  As  a result,  the  impor-
tance  of the  market  vis-a-vis the  state,  trade  unions,  and  employers'  associations  is 
clearly  greater  in  the  area  of further  training.  In  their  efforts  to  intervene  in  further 
training,  the  associations  are  thus  highly  dependent  on  working  through  the  adjacent 89 
systems  of collective  bargaining,  labor  market  policy  with  the  Federal  Labor  Office,  as 
well  as  workplace  co-determination.  This  affects  particularly  the  trade  unions  which  in 
the  Chambers  - the  probably  most  important para-state  regulatory  agencies  in  the  area 
1  of further training  - are not represented equally but only, as it were, as junior partners. 
As a  result of its low formalization and regulation,  further training in the  Federal Republic 
as elsewhere, is much more embedded in the economic process at  firm  level  than  is  initial 
training.  There  may be  good  reasons  why  further  training  as  an  independent  institutional 
1  system  is  not  even  nearly  as  differentiated  as  initial  training,  even  though  the  desirable 
,  extent  of regulation  and  differentiation  will  always  be  controversial.  Further  training  is 
'  least differentiated where internal labor markets play an  important role,  i.e.  in  the banking 
i  sector  and  increasingly  in  large-scale  manufacturing  (e.g.  in  the  automobile  industry). 
The  trend  towards  increasing  importance  of  internal  labor  markets  in  large  industrial 
enterprises  points  to  future  growth  in  the  proportion  of further  training  activities  carried 
out at the  workplace  level  and  in  the  context  of new  forms  of work  organization  (quality 
circles,  partly  autonomous  groups).  These  are  likely  to  be  regulated  under  collective  or 
workplace  agreements.  (The  new  funding  policy  of the  Federal  Labor  Administration  in 
the  context  of the  "qualification  offensive"  follows  the  same  trend.)  Where,  as  in  the 
construction industry, no internal labor markets exist for structural reasons, a way has been 
found  to organize  at least  some  further  training  programs externally  with  the  participation 
of the social partners. 
2.  The  extent  of associational  participation  in  the  regulation  of industrial  training  also 
differs  by levels of regulation.  At the  national level  trade  unions  are  relatively  strong on 
account of their incorporation into the  "consensus principle". Much the  same applies to the 
sectoral  level  where  their  organizational  focus  lies  and  where  the  collective  bargaining 
,  system provides them  with additional  instruments for shaping industrial  training policy.  A 
:  different  situation  obtains  at  the  regional  level  which  is  dominated  by  the  Chambers  and 
where  power  relations  between  the  social  partners  are  asymmetrical,  notwithstanding  the 
unions'  representation  in  specific  areas.  (This  is  why  the  unions  demand  parity  co-
determination  in  the  Chambers.)  At  the  workplace  level  employers'  associations  are  not 
formally  represented,  though  of course  the  firm  as  a  social  system  is  dominated  by their 
r  members in their capacity as independent entrepreneurs.  Trade unions can affect industrial 
training  policy  at  the  workplace  only  through  the  adjoining  system  of co-determination, 
which  has  a  variety  of further  responsibilities  and  in  many  smaller  firms  does  not  even 
1  exist. 
As  in  any  multi -layered political  system,  problems  arise  in  linking  different  levels  with 
each other  as  well  as  in  coordinating  the  actors  of any  one  level.  As  far  as  the  vertical 
information flow  and the formation of political decisions on training are concerned, discus-
sion  and decision-making processes within  the  associational  systems of both  sides  contri-90 
bute  very  significantly  to  the  integration  and  "governability"  of  the  industrial  training 
system.  Here  the  role  played  by  the  vocational  training  committees  of trade  unions  and 
employers' associations no doubt is  indispensable for  public policy.  Moreover, the coordi-
nation capacity of internal  organizational processes  on the  part of the  social  partners  is  in 
many  cases  superior  to  that  of the  corresponding  governmental  system.  The  latter,  on 
account  of a  dispersal  of competencies,  is  at  times  incapable  of agreeing  on  federally 
standardized  training  curricula  for  initial  or  further  training  occupations.  This  gap  is 
frequently  filled  by the  social  partners.  State  school  administrations  in  such  cases  adopt 
the  curricula  developed  by  the  social  partners,  as,  for  example,  in  the  case  of the  basic 
training year for construction occupations. 
In  respect  to  controlling  and  coordinating the  lower  levels  of decision-making,  the  peak 
associations  of  the  social  partners  play  an  essential  role  in  containing  the  centrifugal: 
tendencies  of sectoral  industrial  training  systems.  The  coordination  of Chambers  as  the 
decisive  regional  agencies  is  largely in  the  hands of their national  peak associations,  DIRT 
and DHKT.  In this  area the  trade  unions,  which  are  not at  all  represented  in  the  Cham-
bers' peak  associations,  can  only  try to  coordinate  the  work of their delegates  in  the  res-
ponsible  committees  of individual  Chambers,  a  task  that  seems  to  go  beyond  what  an 
organization  with  many  other  responsibilities  is  able  to  do.  Since  employers  in  any case 
are  defending  the  autonomy  of individual  Chambers,  particularly  in  the  area  of further 
training, trade unions  here have  very little  influence.  Regardless of how  one  may evaluate. 
this  situation,  it  is  clear that  it  impedes  the  unions'  efforts  at  centralization  deriving  from 
both  labour  market  and  general  political  consideration.  Trade  unions  therefore  have  an 
interest to regulate as much as possible through training regulations established on the  basis 
of the  consensus  principle  and  in  this  way  bind the  Chambers.  For controlling the  work-
place level,  trade unions depend on the  Chambers'  counselling service, which  is  not under 
their  direct  authority,  as  well  as  on  the  goodwill  of  - already  overburdened  - works 
councils where they exist. 
3.  In the  industrial  training  system  of the  Federal  Republic,  the  social partners participate 
in  all  essential  regulatory  functions  - determination  of training  and  examination  regula-
tions,  mobilization  of financial  resources,  implementation  and  administration  as  well  as 
supervision  and  control.  The  scope  of  their  participation  and  their  relative  influence, 
however,  are  not the  same  in  all  areas.  Where  both trade  unions  and  employers'  associa-
tions  have  sufficient  resources  at  their  disposal,  standardization  of training  regulations, 
curricula, and examination rules is  impossible if one of the  two sides is opposed, except in 
closed  and  "union-free"  internal  labor  markets.  On  the  other  hand,  however, 
trade  unions  are not  always  able  to  achieve  standardization;  whether  or not  standards  will · 
be  set  depends  very  much  on  the  employers,  who  particularly  in  the  area .-of  further 
training often consider less regulation and more freedom for firms expedient.  In respect to : 
the  financing of industrial training the opposition of employers to giving a dominant role to  1 91 
the state  has  been  successful  and  thus  prevented  trade  unions  from  increasing  their  influ-
ence.  Except  for  sectoral  financial  schemes  under  collective  agreements  that  are  not 
necessarily  supported  by  the  employers'  peak  associations,  the  role  of trade  unions  in this 
area  remains  confined  to  (not  very  promising)  lobbying  activities  in  relation  to  the  legis-
lature, as  well  as  exercising their influence  in the  Federal Labor Administration or through 
co-determination.  Employers'  associations,  on  the  other  hand,  in  recent  years  have 
successfully  used  their opportunity for  appealing  to their  membership to  increase  the  num-
ber of training posts,  which no doubt has boosted their political  reputation. 
In the  implementation of industrial  training,  the  social  partners are  involved as  operators of 
external  training  centers  and  further  training  institutions,  most  of which,  to  be  sure,  are 
controlled by  employers  and  Chambers.  Where  public  funds  went  into their establishment, 
trade  unions  participate  in  their  administration.  The  immediate  administration  of  the 
1  industrial  training  system,  in  particular  in  the  area  of examinations,  is  in  the  hands  of the 
,  Chambers,  i.e.  of associations  of firms  under  public  law.  These  are  also  mainly  respon-
sible  for  supervising  and  controlling  industrial  training  in  conjunction  with  ~e Federal 
Labor Administration  - to  the  extent that it provides funds  for  further training and  has  the 
resources  required  for  performance  control  - as  well  as  the  works  councils.  On  the 
whole,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  industrial  training  system  in  the  Federal  Republic  is  to  a 
large extent  in  the  hands  of .quasi -public private  interest associations.  Even though  gene-
rally this  system allows  trade  unions  a comparatively high degree  of participation,  it  can  be 
1  seen  .. t  tL"'  same  time  that  in  respect  to  specific  functions,  particularly  in  the  areas  of 
financing  and  implementation of industrial training,  one  can  hardly  speak  of a symmetry of 
·  influence between the  associations of the  two sides. 
4.  Finally,  the participation of  associations differs by economic sector,  where the power of 
the union  organization is  no doubt a significant factor.  Thus  in  the  banking industry where 
trade  unions  have  been  traditionally  weak,  there  is  not  even  nearly  the  same  extent  of 
inter-associational  bargaining  over  training  regulations  as  in  the  metalworking  industry 
with  its  politically  and  financially  strong  union.  The  construction  workers  union  may  not 
be  considered  a  very  powerful  organization  either.  But  in  the  construction  industry  an 
i  established  system  of cooperation  between  employers  and  the  union  exists  at  the  sectoral 
level  E med at creating a common order for a sector that  for  outsiders is  difficult to  under-
stand and  that  is  confronted  with  serious  problems  peculiar to  the  industry.  Moreover, the 
sector  has  a tradition  of unideological  and  pragmatic  industrial  relations  that  are  relatively 
independent  of the  respective  peak  associations.  In  a  large  number  of cases  the  social 
partners  have  used  the  law  on  collective  bargaining  in  an  innovative  fashion  in  order  to 
exploit opportunities  for  action  at the  sectoral  level  as  fully  as  possible.  This tradition has 
also affected  industrial  training policy,  as  a result  of which  a sector-specific  ensemble  of 
opportunities for  initial  and further training was created that  in  its comprehensiveness  - as 
well  as  in  the  influence  exercised  in  it  by  the  social  partners  - is  unique  even  in  the 
German context. 92 
An analysis of all  three sectors,  moreover,  shows the  large extent to which the  moderniza-
1 
tion of training systems is  triggered by competitive  pressures.  These  may  originate  in  the 
labor market,  as  in  the  construction  industry;  or in  the  (world)  product market,  as  in the 
German  metalworking  industry;  or,  as  in  the  banking  industry,  they  may  result  from 
technological  and  social  changes  that  made  traditional  divisions  of the  market  obsolete. 
Reform of industrial training,  whether initiated by both social  partners or only by firms,  in 
all  three  cases  was  considered  an  important  instrument  for  adapting  to  new  economic 
conditions.  It  is  therefore  not  inconceivable  that  continuing  structural  change  in  the 
economy  will  further  enhance  the  importance  of  associations,  and  particularly  of trade 
unions,  in  industrial  training  if they  anticipate  and  prepare  for  their potential  new  respon-
sibilities. 
The  fundamental  political  question  whether  the  social  partners  should  participate  in  the 
organization  and  control  of the  industrial  training  system  in  the  Federal  Republic  has 
definitely  been  decided  in  the  affirmative.  No  one  doubts  that  the  system  of industrial 
training in  its historically evolved form  would  be  unable  to  function  without the  fundamen-
tal  and  extensive  incorporation  of  trade  unions  and  employers'  associations. 
For this  reason  the  principle  of associational  participation and self-governance  in  the  area 
of industrial  training  is  as  such  not  controversial.  Moreover,  projects  for  a  fundamental 
reorganization of industrial training in  the  Federal  Republic  are currently not  on  the  politi-
cal  agenda.  There  still  are  the  union  demands  for  financial  reform  and  for  greater,  if 
possible  legal,  formalization  of further  training.  However,  under  present  political  condi-
tions  they  stand  no  chance  of being  put to the  test.  For the  unions  there  is  thus  no  need 
for  a  "realistic"  moderation  of these  demands,  taking  into  account  current  conditions  and 
requirements  as  well  as  anticipated  side -effects.  Further,  the  existing  system  has  become 
so highly  complex as  well  as  institutionally dense  and  "settled"  that,  as  in  the  social  secu-
rity  system,  fundamental  changes  are  probably  precluded  by  the  sheer  inertia  of  the 
evolved structures  - quite  apart from  the fact  that most of those  involved  believe  that the 
system works quite  well  so that the  risks of radical reform would not  seem to be justified. 
The  current  state  of cooperative  participation  by  trade  unions  and  employers'  associations 
in  the  regulation  of industrial  training  in  the  Federal  Republic  is  not  being  challenged 
despite  the  fact  that  socio-political  conditions  have  become  more  conflictual  in  this 
country.  That  industrial  training  has  not  been  affected  by  the  evident  tendency  towards 
polarization  and  partial  fragmentation  of industrial  relations  is  due  both to  its  strong  legal 
institutionalization  as  an  autonomous  policy  area  and  the  restraint  exhibited  by  the  social 
partners,  who  value  highly  their  cooperation  and  past  achievements  in  this  area.  On  the 
other hand,  since government policy today is  significantly less  interested than in  the past in 
tripartite  regulation  of labor  markets  and  labor  relations,  an  expansion  of the  institutiona-
lized  role of the social partners in the  industrial training system is  not expected in the  near 
future.  This affects  in particular further training,  an  area that is  growing in  importance at 93 
a  time  when  government  policy  is  committed  to  putting  greater  emphasis  on  the  market 
mechanism.  For the  trade  unions  this  no doubt poses  a  problem  since the  value of know-
ledge  and  skills  acquired  in  vocational  training  is  increasingly  redefmed  in  terms  of its 
function  as  a  basis  for  subsequent  further  training.  The  latter,  however,  usually  tends  to 
be  finn -specific.  While  deregulation  of industrial  training  at  the  expense  of the  role  of 
the  social  partners  is  not  to  be  expected,  it  is  at  the  same  time  unlikely  that  in  the  near 
future  there will be state intervention enlarging the regulatory power especially of the trade 
unions in the area of further training. 
On  the  other  hand,  due  to  its  very  complexity  and  the  variety  of forms  in  which  the 
interested· parties  can  participate,  the  existing  system  creates  opportunities  for  pursuing 
"grand" reform goals via gradual changes of individual regulations in specific areas or with 
1  the  aid  of "functional  equivalents"  in  adjoining  areas  of regulation,  such  as  the  Federal 
Labor Administration.  Moreover,  in  many cases  one gets the  impression that trade  unions 
and employers'  associations  have  not  yet  fully  utilized  the  regulatory  instruments  at  their 
disposal.  The social  partners in the  construction industry,  for example,  have demonstrated 
that  the  instrument  of a  collective  agreement  offers  extensive  opportunities  for  autono-
mously  regulating  industrial  training  at  the  sectoral  level  - even  for establishing an  auto-
nomous finm,.cial  system.  It is  quite conceivable that such models may be  adopted in  other 
industries  as  well.  The  advantage  of  regulating  industrial  training  issues  by  collective 
agreement lies  not only in  the  opportunity for the  social partners to become  independent of 
the  contingencies  and  changes  of political  climate  and  parliamentary  majorities.  Rather, 
collective agreements  also  permit regulation to be  more  responsive  than  general  legislation 
to  specific  sectoral  conditions.  Also,  as  has  been  shown  in  the  case  of the  construction 
industry,  industrial  training  policy  by  collective  agreement  may  serve  to  improve  the 
position of a  sector competing with other sectors  for  skilled  labor by providing employees 
with  greater  career  opportunities  - a  goal  that  in  the  future  may  become  increasingly 
important  particularly  in. respect  to  further  training.  Here,  it  cannot  simply  be  assumed 
that in the long term only the trade unions will  have an  interest in  standardizing the increa-
singly  important further training  certificates.  The  associations  of employers,  if not  neces-
'  sarily  their  indiVidual  members,  are  interested  in  a  functioning  external  labor  market. 
Serving  as  a  control  instrument  vis -a-vis  special  individual  interests  on  the  part  of 
their members,  collective agreements have  for  a  long  time  demonstrated their effectiveness 
not least as  an organizational device for employers' associations. 
The general stability of the  status quo with respect to the participation of associations in the 
regulation  of industrial  training  does  not  mean  that  in  the  Federal  Rep~blic there  are  no 
fundamental  political  controversies  over the governance of industrial  training.  In  one  way 
·  or another they all  revolve  around the  question  of what  role  state  and  associations  - i.e. 
'  the  "neo-corporatist complex" as  a  whole  - should leave  or assign to the  market.  It is 
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- in  the  creation  of training  posts,  in  the  occupational  choice  of young  people,  in  deci-
sions  of employers  and  employees  on  further  training,  in  the  provision  of further  training 
programs,  etc.  At  the  same  time  it  is  generally  recognized  that  market  processes  in  an 
area as  sensitive  as  industrial  training  are  in  need  of public  control  and  regulation.  Simi- 1 
lary,  there  is  no  debate  on  whether,  in  addition  to  the  state,  associations  should  have 
regulatory  authority  - they  have  had  it  for  a  long  time  and  no  one  would  dispute  their 
role.  What  is  controversial  is  the  extent  to  which  intervention  may  be  required,  and  the 
selection  of instruments  for  fine-tuning  controls  that  would  produce  as  few  unintended 
side -effects  as  possible.  For  this,  e.g.  for  the  problem  of the  "right"  distribution  of 
apprentices,  male  and  female,  to  the  "right"  training  occupation,  there  is  no  panacea.  In 
many  cases  the  major  problem  for  the  participants  at  the  current  level  of regulation  is  no 
1 
longer  the  functioning  of the  industrial  training  system  itself  but  rather  the  control  of 
interdependencies  with  other  policy  areas,  such  as  the  labor  market,  collective  bargaining, 
technology,  and  regional  policies.  There  are  few  indications  that  the  solution  of  such 
difficult  problems  would  be  facilitated  by  altering  the  relative  influence  of  the  state, 
employers'  associations  and  trade  unions  on  the  organization  of industrial  training.  One 
may  therefore  expect  that  the  current  system  of participation  of the  social  partners  in 
industrial training policy  will  remain,  by  and  large,  stable  and that  necessary modifications 
as  in  the  1970s and  1980s will  be negotiated in  specific  areas,  but  will  not  affect the  basic 
structure of the  system as  a whole. 95 
9.  Appendix 
A.  A  Brief Outline of the  "Dual System" of Vocational Training in the  Federal Republic 
1 
of Germany 
The Basic Model 
'  The term  "vocational  training  system"  in  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany  refers  to  any 
public or private institutions or activities that directly or indirectly serve to provide occupa-
tional  qualifications.  School  attendance  is  compulsory  up  to  the  age  of 15  (or  16  in  some 
1  Lander).  After  completing  elementary  school,  students  continue  in  any  one  of three  types 
of  highschool:  Hauptschule,  Realschule,  or  Gymnasium.
2 
Graduates  of  the 
Hauptschule and Realschule proceed to  vocational  training whereas  students of the Gymna-
sium have a choice between vocational training or three further years of general  schooling. 
In the latter case, graduation (Abitur) qualifies students for acl'llission to university. 
While general education is provided by public schools, in vocational training the public and 
private sectors collaborate.  Vocational training takes place primarily in the so-called "dual 
system".  For one  or two days  a  week  apprentices  attend  a  public  vocational  school where 
!  both  general  subjects  and  more  theoretical  occupational  subjects  are  taught.  The  rest  of 
their  weekly  working  time  apprentices  spent  at  the  workplace  where  practical  skills  are 
acquired in the ongoing work process. 
3 
The  term  "dual  system"  denotes  a  combination  of two  different  training  locations  within 
the  same  training  program.  Vocational  training  follows  general  schooling  and  precedes 
actual working life.  As a rule,  vocational training programs have  a duration of three years. 
Workplace  training  is  based  on  training  regulations  that  under  the  federal  Vocational 
Training  Act  are  negotiated  among  the  organized  social  partners,  decreed  by  the  Federal 
Government,  and  supervised  by  the  Chambers.  Vocational  schools  are  institutions  of the 
Uinder.  The  standing  Conference  of the  Lander  Ministers  of  Education  passes  general 
'  curricula  in  an  attempt  .to  harmonize  the  school  components  of  initial  training  and  to 
coordinate them with the subjects of workplace training. 
In other countries of the European Community,  institutionalized efforts to  provide  occupa-
tional  qualifications  in  a  separate training phase after general  schooling and prior to  work-
1)  Unless indicated otherwise, this chapter is  based on Miinch (1984) and Cedefop (1982). 
2)  All  three  school  forms  may  also  be  integrated  in  one,  the  Gesamtschule.  However,  even  in  such 
1  integrated schools different diplomas  are  awarded corresponding  to the three-tiered school  system described 
above. 
3)  In  some  instances,  instead  of the  described  weekly  attendance  of public  vocational  schools,  a  "block 
system"  may  be  in  use.  Here more  extended  vocational  school  "blocks" of often  several  weeks  in  duration 
alternate  with  workplace  "blocks".  Proponents  believe  that  the  block  system  has  organizational  advantages 
for  instruction.  The  reasons  for  its  introduction,  however,  were  more  pragmatic.  In  occupations  where 
apprentices are dispersed over a large territory,  vocational  schooling is  only  feasible  if they come together at 
one place for  an extended period of time. 96 
ing  life  are  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  In the  Federal  Republic,  tnuntng  in  the 
"dual  system"  - the  so-called  apprenticeship  - is  the  classic  way  of  entering  the 
employment  system.  In total,  there  are  about  420  officially  recognized  training  programs. 
60  percent  of young  people  in  an  age  cohort  complete  a  training  program  in  the  dual 
system. 
Occupations  for  which  training  is  provided  span  the  entire  range  of public  and  private 
sector  activities.  Recognized  training  occupations  can  be  found  in  the  artisanal  and  the 
non-artisanal  sector,  in  banks  and  insurance  companies,  in  agriculture,  and  in  public 
service enterprises.  Only in exceptional cases  (e.g.  in  many health  service  occupations)  are 
occupational qualifications exclusively acquired in  schools. 
Any  young  person  who,  after  completing  Hauptschule,  Realschule  or the  tenth  grade  of 
Gymnasium,  does  not  pursue  his  Abitur  or any  other  highschool  degree,  and  who  is  18 
years  of age  or  younger,  is  by  Lander  law  required  to  attend  a  vocational  school.  The 
workplace component of training  in  the  "dual  system",  by  contrast,  is  based on  a training 
contract  between  an  apprentice  and  a  private  or public  employer.  Whether  the  supply  of 
training sites  in  the  economy  will  match the  demand for  apprenticeships  in  the  dual  system 
thus  depends  on  decisions  of private  and  public  employers.  These decisions  are  influenced 
by  a  variety  of factors,  among  the  most  important  of which  are:  the  requirements  laid 
down  in  the  respective  training  regulations  and  the  control  of implementation  at  workplace 
level;  the  extent  to  which  apprentices  contribute  to  productive  activities;  the  likelihood  of 
an  apprentice  staying in  the  firm  providing the  training after completion of the  program; as 
well  as  political  initiatives  (e.g.  incentives,  support,  and  persuasion  by  the  state,  trade 
untons,  and  employer's  associations)  aimed  at  convincing  firms  to  invest  in  occupational 
skills. 
Vocational  school  training  is  funded  by  the  state  while  the  costs  of workplace  training  are 
usually  defrayed  by  the  firms.  However,  at  federal  and  Land  levels  funding  programs  for 
limited  periods  of time  exist  that  financially  support  the  hiring  of additional  apprentices. 
The  employer  is  required  to  provide  training  materials  at  the  workplace  at  his  own 
expense.  Apprentices,  however,  also  bear part of the  training  costs  themselves.  They  have 
to  buy their own  materials  for  vocational  school  and  indirectly give  up part of their wages 
since allowances for apprentices are significantly lower than wages for  unskilled workers of 
the  same age. 
An  apprenticeship ends  with a final  examination.  Upon successful completion, the  candidate 
receives a skilled worker's certificate or, in  the  artisanal  sector,  a journeyman's certificate. 
Employers  hiring  workers  with  such  certified  qualifications  can  be  sure  that  they  possess 
basic occupational knowledge and skills. 
The  successful  completion  of an  apprenticeship  opens  up  a  variety  of opportunities  for 
further  training  and  career  advancement.  In  principle,  there  is  even  the  option  after  some 
additional  training  to  enroll  at  a university.  In  practice,  however,  only  very  few  graduates 
of the  "dual  system"  take  this  step  if they  have  not  been  eligible  for  admission  to  univer-
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Supplementing and Improving the  "Dual System" 
During the past two decades the dual  system has  been confronted with  two problems.  The 
first has  resulted from the fact  that a decreasing number of firms  is  able to provide all  the 
training components  required in  the more and more demanding  training  regulations.  Tech-
nological  development  as  well  as  specialization  and  automation  of production  frequently 
make it impossible to provide systematic and comprehensive training at regular workplaces. 
The second problem  has  been  quantitative  imbalances  on  the  training  market.  On  account 
of changes in work organization, general economic factors,  and particularly of demographic 
trends,  from  1975  to  1978  and  again  since  1982,  the  demand  for  vocational  training  has 
outstripped the  supply of training sites.  Thus in  1985, for example,  about 720,000 training 
sites  were  available  for  some  760,000  applicants,  a  ratio  of supply  to  demand  of 95.1 
percent only (BMBW 1986, 25). 
In  response  to  these  developments  the  dual  system  was  reformed.  Many  observers  now 
1  speak of a  plurality of training locations.  In the  non -artisanal sector,  particularly in  large 
firms,  regular  workplace training  is  now  supplemented  in  training  workshops  specially  set 
up for this  purpose.  Moreover,  some firms  supplement school training in  order to prepare 
apprentices  for  workplace  requirements that go beyond the canons of knowledge  and  skills 
specified  in  general  training  regulations.  In  addition,  particularly  in  the  artisanal  sector, 
numerous  external  training  centers  have  been .established.  They  are  funded  through  fees, 
levies on firms,  and public subsidies.  External training centers have  the  task of strengthen-
ing  and  supplementing  workplace  training  in  those  areas  where  firms  have  reached  their 
limits.  They offer courses of one  to several  weeks  in  duration.  A  further  aim  of external 
,  training  is  to  relieve  individual  firms  and  thereby  encourage  them  to  provide  vocational 
training. 
In  the  early  1970s  some  Lander  introduced  a  Berufsgrundbildungsjahr  (one  year  of 
common  basic  training).  It  was  designed  to  provide  a  first  year  of basic  occupational 
training exclusively in  schools,  later to be  credited towards the  training  period in  the  dual 
system.  For this  purpose  the  420  occupations  were  organized  into  groups  of occupations 
(e.g.  metal  engineering).  Employers  strongly  criticized  the  Berufsgrundbildungsjahr  and 
proposed  as  an  alternative  model  the  so-called  kooperative  Berufsgrundbildungsjahr 
(cooperative one -year common basic  training)  which contains  workplace elements  already 
in the common training phase. 
In 1984  about  103,000 young persons completed a  Berufsgrundbildungsjahr,  about  17,000 
in the  cooperative  form  (BMBW  1986,  129).  Both  forms  were  government-funded.  The 
Berufsgrundbildungsjahr,  particularly  in  its  school  variant,  frequently  does  not receive  full 
credit in subsequent vocational training within the dual system. 
A  further  modification  of  the  dual  system  is  the  Berufsvorbereitungsjahr  (one -year 
pre -vocational training  period).  It  was designed  for  schools  to  provide  support  for  young 
persons with learning disabilities  in order to improve their prospects for  an  apprenticeship 
in  the  dual  system.  In  practice,  however,  the  Berufsvorbereitungsjahr  serves  less  to 98 
promote persons with learning disabilities than as  a residual  pool  for  those  who have  been 
unable to find  a training site after graduating from  highschool.  At the center of the  Berufs-
vorbereitungsjahr  is  practical  training  in  training  workshops.  22  of 30  weekly  hours  of 
instruction are geared to specific occupational skills  (von  der Haar und von der Haar 1986, 
243).  In 1984  about  38,000  students  passed  through  the  Berufsvorbereitungsjahr  (BMBW 
1986, 129). 
Finally,  as  a  support of the  dual  system Berufsfachschulen  (vocational  colleges)  have  been 
strongly expanded in  recent years.  These are full-time schools conceived as  an  alternative 
to  the  dual  system.  They  offer  training  programs  for  a  recognized  occupation  that  may 
later be  credited in a recognized training program, or occupational certificates that  are  only 
available  in  these  colleges.  In fact,  however,  most  colleges  are  of the  second  type.  Since 
they focus  on preparing students for  the  dual  system,  they  are  not  really  an  alternative  but 
only a supplement to an  apprenticeship. 
Many  students  in  the  Berufsgrundbildungsjahr,  the  Berufsvorbereitungsjahr  and  in  voca-
tional  colleges believe that attending these  schools will  improve their chances  of getting the 
apprenticeship  they  desire.  For  this  reason,  these  training  institutions  are  occasionally 
referred to as  "waiting areas of the  dual  system"  or as  "switching yard"  for  the  victims  of 
imbalances  on  the  training  market  (von  der  Haar  und  von  der  Haar  1986,  233ff.).  This 
view  is  underscored  by  the  fact  that  particularly  students  that  have  completed  the  Berufs-
grundbildungsjahr  will  not  receive  any  credits  in  the  full-time  vocational  schools  of the 
dual system. 
B.  The Procedure for the Development of Training Regulations in Vocational Training 
The development of training  regulations  for  workplace training  and  their  coordination  with 
the  curricula  for  vocational  schools  is  a  complicated  and  lengthy  process.  This  is  a  result 
of the  complexity of the  subject-matter  itself as  well  as  the  need to establish a consensus 
among a large number of actors with often different interests. 
Participants  in  this  process  are  the  Federal  Government,  the  eleven  Lander Governments,
4 
the  peak  organizations  of employers  and  trade  unions,  as  well  as  the  employers'  associa-
tions  and  unions  from  those  sectors  for  which  a  training  regulation  is  to  be  decreed.  The 
4)  The  Lander participate through two committees that  are  very similar in  function  and membership.  The 
Uinderausschufi  (Linder  Committee)  functions  as  a  standing  subcommittee  of the  Central  Board  of the 
Bundesinstitut fiir Berufsbildung (BffiB,  Federal Institute for  Vocational Training).  On this  committee are  11 
delegates from the  Lander, as well  as  the Federal Government, employers, and employees with 3 representa-
tives each.  Its  task  is  to prepare the coordination of subjects in  curricula and training regulations.  However, 
fmal  decisions  are  made  by  the  Koordinierungsausschufi  (Coordinating  Committee).  It  is  composed  of 
representatives  of the  Federal  Government  as  well  as  of the  Land  Ministers  of Education.  The  organized 
social partners are not represented on this  committee.  The result of this arrangement is  that the  work of the 
Under Committee in  the  BIBB  is  confined to deliberating on proposals  for  training  regulations.  The  actual 
coordination takes place between the  Federal Government and the Lander in the Coordinating Committee. 99 
Federal  Government  as  a  rule  is  represented  by  the  Federal  Ministry  of Education  and 
Science  and  the  Ministry  responsible  for  the  sector  in  question  (usually  the  Minister  of 
Economics). 
The establishment  or reform of training  regulations  is  initiated  by employers'  associations 
and  trade  unions  at  the  sectoral  level  or by  employees  of the  BffiB.  In  a  research  and 
conception  phase  prior to  the  actual  procedure  the  necessity  for  reform  is  assessed.  For 
this  purpose  the  Kuratorium  der deutschen  Wirtschaft  (Joint  Committee  of German  Busi-
ness  for  Vocational  Training)  and the  Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund  (German  Trade Union 
Federation)  nominate  experts  from  the  associations  and  unions  of the  concerned  sector. 
Only if BffiB,  employers,  and  unions  unanimously  vote  in  favor  of reform  can  the  actual 
procedure, be  initiated.  The  process  is  divided  in  three  phases:  (a)  preliminary  procedure, 
(b)  development  and  coordination  procedure,  and  (c)  decreeing  procedure.  The  whole 
process should be completed in  two years. In  fact,  however,  it  frequently takes four to five 
years. 
a)  Preliminary Procedure 
:  The aim of the preliminary procedure is to draw up a project application which later serves 
as a basis for the detailed elaboration of training regulations and curricula.  The preliminary 
procedure should be completed in 6 months and contains the following  steps: 
'  1.  At  the  responsible  Minister's office  - usually  the  Federal  Minister of Economics 
preliminary  talks  are  held  with  the  participation  of the  social  partners  as  well  as 
representatives  of the  BffiB,  the  Federal  Ministry  of Education  and  Science,  and  the 
Kultusministerkonferenz  (KMK,  Standing  Conference  of the  Ministers  of Education). 
The  social  partners  are  represented  by  the  Joint  Committee  of German  Business  for 
Vocational  Training  (KWB)  and  by  the  German  Trade  Union  Federation  (DGB), 
which consult with representatives of their concerned member organizations. 
'  2.  These talks should result in  the determination of at least five  basic standards: 
- occupational title 
- duration of training 
- job description 
structure and set-up of training program 
subsequent  procedure  (e.g.  whether  certain  stages  of  the  procedure  can  be 
dispensed with since participating groups have reached a consensus). 
The social  partners should,  if possible,  negotiate  these  basic  standards  amongst each  other 
prior to the  preliminary talks.  The responsible Minister acts  merely as  a notary.  The BffiB 
is to assist the social partners in their negotiations. 
3.  After  successful  preliminary  talks  the  basic  standards  are  issued  as  an  order  by  the 
Minister  to the  BffiB  to draw  up  a  project application  and  project conception  for  the 
coordination  between  the  Federal  and  Lander  Governments  (in  the  Coordinating 100 
Committee),  taking  into  account  the  views  of the  social  partners.  This  includes  infor-
mation on the organizational  structure and the  duration  of the training program as  well 
as  a catalogue of knowledge and skills to be  acquired. 
4.  The  draft  is  submitted  to  the  Lander  Committee  and  at  the  same  time  to  the  respon-
sible  Minister  as  well  as  the  Federal  Ministry  of Education  and  Science.  The  Lander 
Comnuttee votes on the  draft. 
5.  The  responsible  Minister,  in  consultation  with  the  Ministry of Education  and  Science, 
draws  up  a  project  application  that  is  submitted  to  the  Coordinating  Committee.  The 
vote of the Lander Committee is taken into account. 
6.  The Coordinating Committee decides on the  project application. 
b)  lJevelopment and Coordination Procedure 
When  basic  agreement  has  been  reached  with  the  Lander  on  the  reform,  the  development 
and  coordination  procedure  commences  for  which  16  m~nths are  scheduled.  During  this 
period  the  BffiB  and  the  social  partners  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Lander  on  the  other, 
simultaneously  work  out  drafts  of the  training  regulation  and  the  curriculum.  The  proce-
dure is  organized in the  following  steps:  · 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
The  BIBB  develops  a  draft  training  regulation  in  cooperation  with  experts  from 
employers' associations and  trade unions of the concerned sector. 
At  Lander  level,  i.e.  by  the  Standing  Conference  of the  Ministers  of Education,  a 
curriculum committee  is  established  for  developing  a draft  curriculum  as  well  as  for 
coordinating it with the training regulation. 
The  Secretary-General  of the  BmB  informs  the  peak  organizations  of employers 
and employees  of the  decision  on  the  project by  sending them  both  drafts.  The  peak 
associations pass these on  to the  sectoral associations,  firms,  and Chambers. 
In joint meetings the  experts of the  Federal and  Lander Governments coordinate  first 
the general  structure and subsequently the  subjects and  aims  of the training regulation 
and the  curriculum. 
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Prior  to  the  last  joint  meeting  the  BIBB  consults  with  the  peak  organizations  of  : 
employees and employers on  the  result. 
The  Secretary-General  delivers  the  draft  training  regulation  to  the  Lander  Com-
mittee which can comment on it and which then  passes it on  to the Central Board. 
The Central Board examines the draft and  issues a statement. 101 
14.  The Secretary-General delivers the  draft with the  statements  made  by employee and 
employer  representatives  on  the  Central  Board  to  the  competent  Federal  Ministers 
(the  Minister responsible for the  sector and the· Minister of Education and Science). 
c)  Decreeing Proredure 
The decreeing procedure takes 2 months and consists of the  following  steps: 
15.  The  Federal  Minister  in  charge  examines  the  draft  and  the  statements,  and  the 
Federal  Minister  of Education  and  Science  passes  it  on  to  the  Coordinating  Com-
mittee. 
i  16.  If the  Coordinating  Committee  considers  substantive  changes  necessary,  the  peak 
organizations of employees and  employers are heard again  by the  Federal  Minister in 
charge. 
17.  The Coordinating Committee decides on the final  result. 
1  18.  The  Minister  responsible  for  the  sector  commences  the  decreeing  procedure.  The 
Federal  Minister  of Education  and  Science  will  endorse  the  decree  only  after  the 
concerned social partners have voted on  it. 
19.  The  Conference  of the  Ministers  of Education  decides  on  the  curriculum  which  is 
decreed by each of the Under Ministers of Education separately. 
20.  Training  regulation  and  curriculum  are  published  in  the  Bundesanzeiger  (Federal 
Register). 
C. The Development of Further Training in the Federal Republic of Germany 
In contrast to other areas  of the  industrial  training  system,  further  training  is  basically  not 
regulated by the  state.  This creates a large domain  for  the  activities  of interest groups and 
private  organizations  and  institutions.  The  area  of further  training  differs  in  its  structure 
and  degree  of regulation  from  school  and  university  training,  which  is  organized  in  a 
framework  of legal  rules  and  institutions.  It  also  differs  from  the  dual  system,  where 
i  training subjects are controlled by the social partners and the  state. 
The traditional  view  according to which  the  state  should  become  active  in  further  training 
in  a  purely  subsidiary  role,  i.e.  only  if private  commitment  and  the  strength  of social 
groups  proved  inadeqnate,  was  challenged  in  the  late  1960s.  In  1970  the  Educational 
Commission  (Bildungskommission)  of the  German  Educational  Council  (Bildungsrat)  stated 
that:  "It  is  necessary  to  establish  institutionalized  further  training  as  a  comprehensive 
system  for  supplementing  school  training.  Further training  as  the  continuation  or resump-
tion  of earlier  organized  learning,  forms  an  organic  whole  with  pre-school  and  school 102 
education"  (Deutscher  Bildungsrat  1970,  51).  The  goal  was  to  expand  the  area  of further 
training  into  a  "fourth public  training  sector".  The  scope,  quality  and  funding  of further 
training  opportunities  should  be  designed  to  meet  the  challenges  of a  modem  industrial 
society.  The debate  in  the  Federal Republic took  place  in  the general context of the  OECD 
model  of "recurrent education".  Rapid  changes  of workplaces  and  job profiles  as  well  as 
new forms of work organization and skills called for an  effective further training  system  in 
order to  avoid  unemployment  as  a  result  of inadequate  qualifications,  to  solve  adaptation 
problems,  and  to  provide  employees  with  opportunities  for  occupational  development  and 
reorientation.  Supplementing  initial  training  by  further  training  for  all  age  groups  and 
occupational levels was  considered imperative at that time. · 
During  this  debate  in  1968  and  1969  the  two  most  important  pieces  of legislation  for  the 
area  of further  training  were  passed  at  the  national  level:  the  Arbeitsforderungsgesetz 
(AFG,  Employment  Promotion  Act)  and  the  Berufsbildungsgesetz  (BBiG,  Vocational 
Training  Act).  The  AFG,  in  addition  to  providing  funding  opportunities  for  employees, 
was  to  lay  down  a  set  of standards  for  determining  what  forms  and  subjects  of further 
training  were  most  useful  in  the  context  of labor  market  policy  objectives.  The  BBiG 
created  a  legal  framework  for  structuring  and  organizing  the  subjects  of further  training 
programs.  At  Land  level  legislation  was  passed  on  adult  education  and  further  training 
which,  in  addition  to  financial  arrangements,  was  particularly  geared  towards  expanding 
further training programs in  schools. 
The  original  goal  to  transform  the  area  of further  training  into  a  full-fledged  public 
training  system  has  been  increasingly  toned  down  since  the  mid-1970s.  The  pressures  of 
growing  unemployment  and  the  resulting  financial  stress  on  the  unemployment  insurance 
fund  out of which further  training  under the  AFG  was  financed,  have  strongly  reduced  the 
funding  available for  further training.  By  1986 the  criteria of eligibility were very  narrowly 
defined  (Maier,  F.  1986).  Organizing  and  structuring  initiatives  under  the  BBiG  were 
limited to  a few  exceptional  cases,  mainly  because  of the  resistance  of Chambers  and  peak 
employers'  organizations.  A growing  public debt prompted  Federal  and  Land  Governments 
to reduce  their  financial  support  for  participants  in  further  training  programs.  (In  addition 
to  the  AFG,  the  Bundesausbildungsforderungsgesetz  - BAFOG,  Federal  Training  Assis-
tance  Act  - played  a  role  in  this  respect.)  Moreover,  the  expansion  of further  training 
programs  in  schools  was  slowed  down.  Finally,  as  a  result  of the  unfavorable  economic 
situation,  the  municipalities  also  reduced  further  training  programs  offered  in  community 
colleges. 
The  realization  of the  goals  set  for  the  further  training  initiatives  of the  1960s  has  largely 
remained  in  its  beginning  stages.  The  expansion  of further  training  into  a  fourth  public 
training  sector  has  been  achieved  neither  in  financial  nor  in  institutional  respects.  Never-
theless,  the  demand  for  further  training  has  continually  increased.  According  to  represen-
tative  surveys,  in  1982  some  12  percent  of the  employed  between  the  ages  of 19  and  65 
have participated in  further  training,  a total  of about  4 million  people.  In 1979,  by  compa-
rison,  10  percent  of the  employed,  or 3.2  million  people,  participated.  Skilled  and  highly 
qualified  groups  are  overrepresented  compared  to  unskilled  or  semi -skilled employees, 
women,  and  foreign  workers  (Vocational  Training  Report  1984,  99;  BMBW  1984).  The 103 
most  recent  surveys  for  1985  conclude  that  participation  in  further  training,  compared  to 
1979  and  1982,  saw  a  further  polarization:  "While  participation  of employees  without 
completed  occupational  training  fell  by  more  than  half between  1979  and  1985,  that  of 
employees  with  completed  vocational  training  or  vocational  college  degrees  remained 
essentially unchanged.  Among highly qualified employees,  i.e. those  with  Meister certicates 
or university degrees,  participation in  further training in  1985  was  significantly  higher than 
in  1979"  (lnfratest Sozialforschung 1985). 
The criteria in  these  studies  of what  is  meant  by  further  training  are  not  identical  with  the 
standards  of the  AFG  or BBiG.  Rather,  in  addition  to  further  training  courses  inside  and 
outside  of firms  as  well  as  in  schools,  the  category  includes  on -the-job  training  and 
retraining  at  the  workplace.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  proportion  of non -standardized 
on-the-job training and  retraining  activities  (which  in  the  discussions  of the  early  1970s 
were  generally not defined  as  further  training)  has  substantially  increased.  The  numbers  of 
participants  in  the  legally  regulated  areas  of further  training  for  career  advancement  and 
retraining,  on  the  other hand,  while  also  on  the  increase,  have  risen  at  significantly  lower 
rates.  Since  retraining  and  on -the -job training  are  not  very  time -consuming,  it  is  not 
surprising that  for  almost  half of all  participants  in  1982  further  training took  up  less  than 
one  month. 
1  The  subjects  of further  training  courses  funded  under  the  AFG  changed  as  well.  While  in 
1970  75  percent  of AFG-funded  participants  in  further  training  were  enrolled  in  career 
advancement  programs  (that  led  to  recognized  certificates),  in  1985  their  share  dropped  to 
i  26.3  percent.  AFG -funded programs  consisted  predominantly  of retraining  courses  which 
include  motivation  and  counselling  workshops  for  the  unemployed  as  well  as  short-term 
!  training programs in  firms  or in  training workshops. 
'  The  most  important  agencies  of further  training are firms.  In 1982  some  4  7 percent of all 
·  participants took  part in  internal  further  training programs.  Internal  further  training  largely 
consists  of retraining  and  on -the -job training.  Further  training  for  career  advancement 
(as  well  as  retraining  for  a  new  occupation)  plays  a  very  minor  role  in  further  training 
programs  provided  at  the  workplace  (lnfratest  Sozialforschung  1980)  unless  it  is  a project 
of the  Labor Administration offered through a firm  to external participants. 
In addition  to  firms,  there  is  a  whole  range  of agencies  offering  courses  and  workshops. 
The  most  important  of these  are:  occupational  and  other  associations  (11  percent  of all 
participants),  vocational  academies  and  scientific  institutions  (8  percent),  private  institutes 
and  general  or  occupational  schools  (7  percent)  as  well  as  the  Chambers.  The  remaining 
participants  took  courses  at  community  colleges,  churches,  workers  compensation  boards, 
universities,  or trade  union  institutes.  As  this  list  shows,  employers'  associations,  occupa-
tional  associations,  Chambers,  and  trade  unions  act  not  merely as  interest  representatives  in 
a  formalized  procedure as  is  the  case  in  initial  training.  Rather,  as  suppliers  of programs, 
i they are also competitors on  the  further training market.  Competition exists  in  a number of 
i respects:  for  participants  who,  on  their  own  or  their  employer's  initiative,  may  want  to 
1,  enrol  in  further training programs;  in  the  design  of subjects  and  length of programs to  the 
1  extent  that  these  are  not  federally  regulated  under  the  BBiG;  in  terms of quality  standards 104 
and adaptation of subjects to the changing demands of potential participants  and  firms;  and 
for  further  training  projects  funded  by  the  Labor  Administration  (Sauter  et  al.  1984).  In 
contrast  to  the  late  1960s,  the  state  is  in  favor  of competition  between  various  agencies 
pursuing  very  different  and  often  even  opposing  goals  in  their  further  training  programs. 
"Pluralism  and  diversity  of programs"  as  a  result  of competition  is  seen  to  insure  the 
flexibility  of further  training,  and  as  an  expression  of the  pluralistic  structure  of society 
(BMBW 1984). 
The Views of the Social Partners on Further Training 
Employers'  associations  and  trade  unions  in  a  number  of respects  occupy  opposing  posi-
tions  in  the  debate  on  further training.  Employers'  associations  and the  peak organizations 
of the Chambers basically favor further training that is closely related to the  needs of firms 
and  to  the  requirements  of specific  jobs.  They  wish  to  see  regulatory  intervention  of the 
state  limited  to  improving  individual  funding.  Trade  unions,  on  the  other  hand,  advocate 
the  institutionalization of further training,  the  regulation of subjects  and  certificates,  greater 
openness  and  transparency  as  well  as  improved  accessibility  (Gors  and  Schlaffke  1982). 
Particularly  controversial  is  the  extent  to  which  further  training  should  provide  qualifica-
tions  that go beyond the  needs  of the  individual  firm,  as  well  as  the  question  of how  the 
trade  unions'  demand  for  abandoning  the  separation  between  occupational,  general,  and 
political further training might be financed. 
Since  1969 the  peak  associations,  represented  by  the  Joint  Committee of German Business 
for  Vocational  Training  (KWB)  and  by  the  DGB,  together  with  representatives  of the 
DIHT, the  DHKT,  sectoral  associations,  and  the  DAG,  have  been  involved  in  the  newly 
created  institutions .of  the  BIBB  and  at the  Federal  Ministry  of Education  and  Science  in 
the  development  of further  training  regulations  according  to  the  legally  prescribed  proce-
dure.  Since  the  mid -1970s  a  number  of regulations  for  further  training  and  retraining 
have been passed.  However,  the  standardization of further  training is  still  in  a  preliminary 
state,  and the  further  training experts of the  BffiB  as  well  as  the  trade  unions  consider  it 
inadequate.  The  "Coordinating  Group  for  Further  Training"  established  in  1983  and 
consisting of employers'  organizations and trade unions,  was  formed  in  order to  settle the 
subjects of regulations prior to the  actual  legal  procedure.  To what extent the  work of this 
group will in  fact lead to intensified regulatory activities remains to be seen. 
In  the  area of further  training  policy,  trade  unions  continue  to  press  for  employer-paid 
educational  leave  for  all  employees  as  well  as  for  the  corresponding  legislation  at  federal 
and Land levels.  Employers' associations,  on the other hand,  contend that private firms are 
not responsible for general and political education and should therefore not have to fund  it. 
Controversies  on corresponding collective  agreements  continued  into  the  mid -1970s. The 
resulting agreements on  educational  leave differed strongly from sector to sector. 
At the collective bargaining level,  further training opportunities have  been incorporated into 
rationalization  protection  agreements,  which  have  gained  in  importance  since  the 
mid -1970s. An essential aim of the unions was to get some guarantees on job security for 105 
employees  affected  by  rationalization.  Further  training  or  retrruntng  may  be  one  way  of 
achieving  this.  Most  of the  rationalization  protection  agreements  concluded  since  1975 
contain a clause according to which employees are eligible for further training or retraining 
only  after  rationalization  measures  have  been  introduced.  As  a  result,  only  a  small  group 
!  of employees are eligible  for  such programs and  usually  there  are  limitations  on the dura-
tion  of  retraining.  Moreover,  the  employer  will  fund  such  measures  only  if  no  other 
(public) financial  assistance is available. 
Over the  years  a  division  of labor has  emerged between  internal  and  government-funded 
external further training (under the  AFG).  Firms in their further training efforts concentrate 
primarily on highly  qualified employees that  have  been  on  the  staff for  a  long time,  parti-
cularly mS!'agement and technical  personnel.  Unskilled  and  semi-skilled  employees  rarely 
participate  in  internal  further  training  programs.  AFG-funded  further  training,  on  the 
other  hand,  has  focused  on  reintegration  of  the  unemployed  and  those  threatened  by 
unemployment,  and  since  1969  has  largely  lost  its  preventive  character.  Government-
funded  further  training  is  mainly  controlled  by  the  Labor  Administration.  In  1985,  its 
projects, administered by further training agencies,  accounted for two-thirds of all  partici-
pants (Maier, F. 1986). 
In  1985  the  Federal  Labor  Administration  initiated  a  "qualification  offensive"  which 
entailed  the  relaxing  of restrictive  personal  criteria of eligibility  for  AFG-funded  further 
training in conjunction with appeals to firms to make themselves more available as  agencies 
of government-funded  further training.  The  reactions of employers' associations and trade 
unions to this initiative were rather interesting.  In  a joint statement by the  Federal Associa-
tion of Employers' Associations (BDA), the Federal Association of German Industy (BDA), 
the  DIHT,  and  the  Central  Association  of  German  Artisans  (ZDH),  firms  as  well  as 
external  training institutions  were called upon  to make  use  of additional  funding  for  work-
place -oriented further  training  and  retraining.  This  appeal  was  addressed  in  particular  to 
the  firms.  In  order  to  recruit  firms  as  agencies  for  qualification  programs,  which  allow 
them  to  try out and train employees  for  workplace-specific  tasks  without  having  to  enter 
into  an  employment  contract,  the  BDA  in  two  of its  brochures  pointed  out  that  such 
programs  would  not  create  any  costs  for  participating  firms.  "You  will  be  better  able  to 
influence the subjects of training programs if your own firm takes part in their implementa-
tion ... Of course there  is  no  obligation to provide  a  contract of employment. ..  Any  neces-
sary  personnel  and  material  expenses  will  be  paid  by  the  Labor  Administration"  (Esser 
1986; BDA 1986). 
With the  BOA's appeal  to  firms,  backed  up  by  a  corresponding  circular  sent  out  by  the 
Federal Labor Administration,  a new  phase was  launched in  the  use  of public funds  under 
the  AFG.  In the  past,  funds  for  internal  further  training  and  retraining  in  firms  were  not 
made available  since  qualifications  that only serve the  interest of individual  firms  were  not 
considered to be  in  line  with  labor market policy.  Now a  redistribution  of public  funds  in 
favor  of workplace  programs  is  sought  by  way  of giving  firms  the  status  of training 
agencies.  External  training  institutions  cooperating  closely  with  firms  (Chambers,  occupa-
tional  associations,  and  some  of the  private  further  training  institutes)  are  likely  to  profit 
from  this  reorientation  to  a  greater  extent  than,  for  example,  union-related  agencies  or 106 
community colleges.  The trade unions  DGB and DAG, in  a joint recommendation with the  , 
Federal  Labor Administration,  for  this  reason  have  emphasized the  importance of external 
agencies  and  particularly  of union -operated training  institutes.  "...  They  agree  that  the 
training  institutions  of  the  trade  unions  make  a  significant  contribution  to  providing 
employees with qualifications"  (Gemeinsame Empfehlung 1986). 
The  rekindled  interest  in  a  more  intensive  utilization  of state  funds  can  be  understood 
against the  background of the  financial  expenditures that are committed to further  training. 
While German industry, according to their own figures,  in  1985 spent about 10 billion DM 
on further training,  under the AFG some 5  billion DM were provided. Of these,  however, 
only 10 percent went towards subsidies for on-the -job training or towards defraying the  , 
costs  of firms  in  their  role  as  training  agencies.  The  new  policy  seems  to  be  aimed  at  ' 
compensating firms for their further training expenses out of Labor Administration funds. 
Summing up the developments  in  the area of further training since  its  "institutionalization" 
in 1969, the following phases may be distinguished: 
During a  first  phase  until  1975,  the  state  rapidly  expanded  its  legal,  institutional,  and 
financial  commitment to  further  training.  The rationale  for  further training  was preven-
tive.  It  was  aimed  at  modernizing  the  economy  and  avoiding  unemployment.  The 
financing  of further training was  largely assured under the  AFG with its  liberal criteria 
of eligibility. 
The second phase  was  characterized by  slower institutional  growth and a  concentration 
of financial  resources  on  more  "curative"  further  training  programs.  Reintegration  of 
the  unemployed  was  paramount.  Internal  further  training  by  and  large  no  longer 
received  public  funds.  Instead,  the  area  of further  training  institutions,  where  interest 
associations  are  also  active,  strongly  expanded.  Since  firms  were  no  longer  able  to 
externalize  the  costs  of further  training  to  the  same  extent  as  in  the  early  1970s,  the 
interest  of  firms  in  government-funded  further  training  declined  considerably  and 
shifted to promoting their own highly qualified employees. 
In the third phase, since about  1985/86, firms  as well as the  Labor Administration have 
shown a growing interest  in  linking  government-funded  further training once  again  to 
workplace training programs.  Firms and their associations are motivated by general cost 
considerations  as  well  as  by a  concern that  in  the  future  internal  training  facilities  and 
external  training  centers  may  become  underutilized as  a  result of declining  numbers  of 
apprentices.  The  further  training  market  that  has  developed  in  response  to  exclusive 
funding  of external  further  training  is  characterized  by  a  lack  of transparency  and  by 
substantial differences in the  quality of programs. This is in part due to the fact  that the 
area of further  training  is  largely  unregulated  and  controlled  by  an  agency  - namely, 
the Federal  Labor Administration  - that  is  not really  equipped and  competent  for  this 
task.  To  what  extent  there  will  actually  be  a  reorientation  in  the  public  funding  of 
further training is  at the present time not clear. 107 
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E.  Tables: Statistics on Vocational Training and Further Training 1963 
1965 
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1983 
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Table  I 
Total  Number  of Apprenticeships 
(Training Contracts) 
December  31,  1963  - 1984 
Training  Contracts 
Male  Female 
Total  % 
1,268,503  63.5  36.5 
1,331,948  63.6  36.4 
1,402,465  62.7  37.3 
1,281,762  63.4  36.6 
1,271,612  64.2  35.8 
1,331,239  64.7  35.3 
1,328,925  64.6  35.4 
1,397,354  63.5  36.5 
1,644,619  62.2  37.8 
1,676,877  61.4  38.6 
1,675,864  61.0  39.0 
1,722,416  60.7  39.3 
1,800,141  60.1  39.9 
Source:  BMBW,  Berufsbildungsbericht  1986. 1972 
1974 
1976 
1978 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
115 
Table II 
Number  of Training Contracts  and 
their Distribution by  Economic  Sectors, 
December  31,  1972  - 1984 
Share  of: 
Industry  I 
Training  and  Artisana11 
Contracts  Commerce  Trades  I  Others 
'000  % 
1,301.4  55.5  33.3  11.2 
1,330.0  50.0  36.5  13.5 
1,317.1  46.5  38.8  14.7 
1,517.4  45.6  40.5  13.9 
1,715.5  45.9  40.9  13.1 
1,676.9  46.0  40.2  13.8 
1,675.9  45.6  39.7  14.7 
1,721".6  46.0  39.2  14.8 
1,800.1  46.7  38.5  14.8 
Source:  BMBW,  Berufsbildungsbericht  1986;  own  calculations. 116 
Table III 
Supply of Young  People  with Training Posts,  1976  - 19851 ) 
New  Supply  of  Demand  for 
Training  Training  Training  Excess 
Contracts  Posts  Posts  Supply 
Number 
in  2  Per  Cent 
1976  495,800  513,900  523,500  -1.8 
1977  558,400  583,900  585,400  -0.3 
1978  601,700  624,000  625,500  -0.2 
1979  640,300  677,200  660,000  +2.6 
1980  650,000  694,600  667,300  +4.1 
1981  605,636  642,984  627,776  +2.4 
1982  631,366  651,361  665,546  -2.1 
1983  676,734  696,375  724,142  -3.8 
1984  705,652  726,786  764,072  -4.9 
1985  697,089  719,110  755,994  -4.9 
;~  September  30 
Supply  minus  demand,  in  per  cent  of  supply. 
Source:  BMBW,  Berufsbildungsbericht  1986. 117 
Table  IV 
Training Contracts: 
Structure of  Supply  and  Training Ratio, 
April  1985 
Apprentices 
Per  100 
Economic  Sector  Number  Employees 
Industry  371,800  5.4 
Employees: 
20- 49  42,200  6.6 
50-199  84,100  5.8 
200-499  70,800  5.8 
500-999  45,100  5.0 
1000  and  more  129,700  4.9 
Construction  92,400  8.2 
Employees: 
3- 49  52,600  9.0 
50-199  27,300  7.9 
200-499  8,200  6.6 
500  and  more  4,200  5.3 
Commerce  340,006  9.7 
Employees: 
3-5  63,900  8.8 
6-19  101,700  13.2 
20-49  64,300  15.3 
50  and  more  110,100  7.4 
Banking  and 
Insurance  65,500  8.5 
Artisanal  Trades  608,500  15.5 
Employees: 
3-4  100,500  15.4 
5-9  162,600  19.5 
10-19  157,400  21.3 
20  and  more  188,000  11.1 
Source:  BMBW,  Berufsbildungsbericht  1986. T
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Table  VI 
.. 
Number  of Apprentices  Participating  in  Final  Examinations 
and  Success  Rates,  by  Economic  Sectors 
and  Selected Occupations,  1985 
Participants  Passed 
Number  I  % 
Industry  and  Commerce  349,100  I  91.4 
Artisanal  Trades  221,800  . I  84.7 
Agriculture  23,300  I  93.1 
Civil  Service  23,000  I  95.0 
Free  Professions  53,900  I  90.2 
Domestic  Services  6,000  I  92.9 
Merchant  Marine  400  I  82.4 
I 
All  677,500  I  89.3 
I 
Banking  Assistant  20,300  I  95.3 
Mechanic  13,700  I  94.6 
Car  Mechanic  28,900  I  83.6 
I 
Source:  BMBW,  Berufsbildungsbericht  1986. I 
I 
I 
I 
,  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
120 
Table  VII 
Employment  Status of Apprentices  Six Months 
After  End of Apprenticeship 
Per  Cent 
Employment  Contract  in  Same  Occupation!  54.0 
I 
- indefinite  50.0 
- fixed-term  4.0 
Employment  Contract  in Different 
Occupation  15.0 
- indefinite  12.0 
- fixed-term  3.0 
Further  Training  13.0 
Military Service  9.0 
Unemployed  9.0 
Source:  BMBW,  Berufsbildungsbericht  1986. T
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Table  IX 
Further  Training  Examinations,  1981  - 1985 
1981  1982  1983  1984 
Industry  and  Commerce  21,398  50,753  50,139 
- Meister  7,217  8,360  8,117  7,761 
- Fachkaufleute  5,736  5,904  5,647  5,495 
- Fachwirte  5,063  5,068  5,298  5,512 
- Fremdsprachl.  Fachkrafte  3,119  4,683  5,227  5,984 
- Fachkrafte  Schreibtechnik  21,382  20,049  21,631 
- Sekretar/in  2,193  2,161  2,271 
Artisanal  Trades  (Meister)  37,372  39,434  38,857  38,773 
- Construction  5,430  5,614  5,626  5,449 
- Metal  21,890  23,075  22,328  21,4;30 
- Wood  1,637  2,012  2,120  2,361 
- Apparel  and  Textiles  859  863  990  974 
- Food  2,814  2,955  2,883  3,452 
Agriculture  3,704  4,180  4,241  4,540 
- Meister  3,531  4,063  4,113  4,478 
- Agrarfachwirte  173  117  128  62 
Civil  Service  1,529  2,593  1, 9101 
Free  Professions  160  229  268  421 
Domestic  Services  1,070  1,241  1,175  1,108 
Merchant  Marine  15  11  11  18 
Source:  BMBW,  Grund- und  Strukturdaten  1984/85. 123 
Table  X 
Public  Support  of Vocational  Training,  19851 ) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-I 
I 
Federal  Government 
Programs 
Subsistence 
Others 
Lander 
Programs 
Subsistence 
Federal  Employment  Office2 ) 
Vocational  Training  Assistance3 ) 
Subsistence 
Further Training  and  Retraining 
On  the  Job  Training  Assistance 
Expenditures 
Million  DM 
909.3 
720.5 
150.0 
38.8 
732.5 
652.5 
80.0 
4,008.1 
546.2 
1,850.1 
1,415.6 
30.7 
165.5 
l)  Excluding  regulations  under  industrial agreements  to re-
distribute part of  the  costs  of  training.  "Programs": 
expenditure  on  generation of  apprenticeships.  "Subsist-
ence":  payments  to participants in training. 
2 )  Excluding  rehabilitation programs  (1985:  DM  1,898 million). 
J)  Including  program expenditures. 
Source:  BMBW,  Berufsbildungsbericht  1986. 124 
Table  XI 
Expenditure of the Federal Ministry for  Education 
and Science  in Support of External Vocational 
Training Centers,  1974  - 1985 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
19841) 
1985 
Total 
l)  Budget  estimate 
Investment 
Current 
Expenditure 
Million  DM 
10.8 
25.7 
74.9 
96.0 
155.3 
196.1 
247.0 
181.6 
208.1 
183.4 
165.4 
185.0 
1729.2 
0.5 
1.8 
4.0 
2.9 
8.1 
6.9 
11.5 
9.5 
19.4 
16.1 
20.0 
100.7 
Source:  BMBW,  Berufsbildungsbericht  1986. 
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